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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a normative account of how we should conceive of reconciliation 
between Indigenous people(s), states qua states, and their non-Indigenous citizens. It mines 
pre-theoretic understandings of reconciliation to determine appropriate governing norms for 
reconciled relationships, the normative expectations that attend these, and what processes or 
initiatives might be necessary to achieve them. In liberal democratic settler states like 
Canada, Australia, the United States and New Zealand the desirability of reconciliation is 
acknowledged by all parties. However, considerable ambiguity surrounds the concept 
‘reconciliation.’ This is problematic because concepts influence social discourse, and the 
rhetoric of reconciliation not only guides public policy by prioritizing some goals over 
others, it also influences the process of building healthy relationships by demarcating the 
contours of this discourse. This makes the need for clarity with respect to the concept acute. 
Yet a priori judgements about the content of reconciliation are unwarranted in intercultural 
political contexts. Accordingly, this work takes as its first point of reference an intriguing 
instrument of reconciliation almost universally thought to be involved in the process: official 
apology for historical and enduring injustices perpetrated by settler states against Indigenous 
people(s). In the broadest terms, the project offers something akin to a transcendental 
argument: if apology of this kind is involved in reconciliatory projects, what does its use say 
about the process and aims of reconciliation? Chapter 1 explores how to make sense of 
official apology for historical and enduring injustice by grounding contemporary non-
Indigenous citizens’ reparative responsibilities in the context of reconciliation. Chapter 2 
delves into official apology, asking what it should look like, from whom it should come, and 
what it should aim to do. Chapter 3 sheds light on the process of reconciliation by examining 
the means by which the goals of apology can be promoted through substantive initiatives that 
simultaneously demonstrate apologetic sincerity. Finally, chapter 4 offers necessary 
conditions for reconciliation as an outcome. It argues that since apology seeks both to 
circumscribe the range of reasonable interpretation of history and to enact or engender 
reciprocal attitudes or respect and trust, so too should these elements feature in any 
defensible conception of reconciled relationships in the settler state context.     
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Summary for Lay Audience 
In countries like Canada, Australia, the United States and New Zealand the desirability of a 
reconciliation between Indigenous people(s) and their non-Indigenous citizens is 
acknowledged by all parties. However, considerable ambiguity surrounds the concept 
‘reconciliation.’ This is problematic. Concepts influence social discourse, and the rhetoric of 
reconciliation not only guides public policy by prioritizing some goals over others, it also 
influences the process of building healthy relationships by demarcating the contours of this 
discourse. This makes the need for clarity with respect to the concept acute. This dissertation 
explores how we should conceive of reconciliation in this context. It mines our 
understandings of reconciliation to determine what reconciled relationships might look like 
in practice, and how these relationships might be achieved. De-contextualized judgements 
about the content of reconciliation are unwarranted in intercultural political arenas. 
Accordingly, this work takes as its first point of reference an intriguing instrument of 
reconciliation almost universally thought to be involved in the process: official apology for 
historical and enduring injustices perpetrated by settler states against Indigenous people(s). If 
apology of this kind is involved in reconciliation, what does its use say about the process and 
aims of reconciliation? Chapter 1 explores how to make sense of official apology for 
historical and enduring injustice by exploring contemporary non-Indigenous citizens’ roles 
and responsibilities in the context of reconciliation. Chapter 2 delves into official apology, 
asking what it should look like, from whom it should come, and what it should aim to do. 
Chapter 3 sheds light on the process of reconciliation by examining the means by which the 
goals of apology can be promoted through substantive initiatives that simultaneously 
demonstrate apologetic sincerity. Finally, chapter 4 draws conclusions about what the 
preceding three have to say about reconciliation as an outcome. It argues that since apology 
seeks both to circumscribe the range of reasonable interpretation of history and to enact or 
engender reciprocal attitudes or respect and trust, so too should these elements feature in any 
defensible conception of reconciled relationships in the settler state context.     
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Preface 
While most often seen in discussions of post-conflict resolution and transitional justice, the 
term ‘reconciliation’ is equally deployed in the political contexts of liberal democratic settler-
colonial states characterized by historical and enduring injustice suffered by Indigenous 
people(s). My dissertation’s focus is on this latter context. Its guiding question is: what does 
(or should) reconciliation look like in settler states? Countries like Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States now ostensibly reject the logic of settler colonialism. Yet the 
legacies of colonialism remain – if indeed it can really be considered over. Nobody denies 
that the historical and enduring injustices perpetrated against Indigenous people(s) contribute 
to fraught relationships in contemporary times. Nearly everyone agrees that a reconciliation 
between Indigenous peoples(s), settler states and their non-Indigenous citizens is desirable. 
In each of these countries the rhetoric and methods of reconciliation are in use. Yet a key 
unresolved question hovers over reconciliation projects: what exactly is reconciliation in this 
context? Normatively, how should we conceptualize it?1 Answering this question is the goal 
of this dissertation. 
  A challenging obstacle to the study of reconciliation is that there is no consensus on 
the definition of the term. While scholars agree that its core meaning concerns the creation or 
restoration of ‘right’ relationships (Philpott 2012, 5), they cannot agree on what else is 
involved. As the primary source of the panoply of interpretations, scholars in the field of 
transitional justice have variously defined reconciliation as a process or an outcome (or both), 
as a top-down state-mediated initiative or a grassroots citizen-driven project (or both), as a 
political value, an ethic, a stand-in for social harmony, or a concept of justice unto itself. 
Different accounts prioritize socio-structural, relational or identity-related changes (Nadler 
2012, 4). Perspectives range from the religious, psychological and philosophical to the 
juridical, historical or political (Rettberg and Ugarizza 2016, 521). Sometimes reconciliation 
is thought to reduce to ‘simple coexistence’ between groups formerly at odds (Crocker 
2000); sometimes it is thought to entail affective change in individuals amounting to 
forgiveness (Tutu 1999). The questions around the concept, say Sarkin and Daly (2004), are 
 
1 Some scholars take issue with the prefix ‘re’ in this context, arguing that, to reconcile, parties to reconciliation 
must have once been in a harmonious relationship (e.g. Chrisjohn and Wasacase 2011, 199). In many settler 
states, they note, such a situation never obtained. The point is well taken, but for the purposes of this 
dissertation I will ignore the solecism.   
  2 
 
 
 
“dizzying” (671):  
  Is it national unity? Is it peace? Is it healing? Is it relationship building? Is it 
 stability? Is it harmony? Is it developing a democracy that ensures the fullest sense 
 of inclusivity and opportunity, as well as access to resources for those who reside  in 
 the country? Is it all of these? Or none? (665).     
Even with a definition in mind, many questions remain concerning, for instance, how to 
promote reconciliation, whether it is fundamentally illiberal, how it relates to justice, and 
whether it is even a desirable project. As Prager (2003) notes, “the problems involved in 
understanding the dilemmas of reconciliation are so daunting that anyone in search of rigour 
and clarity would probably head off in the opposite direction were it not for their enormous 
intrinsic importance” (10). 
  Thus, while the term ‘reconciliation’ is widely used, it is little understood (Dwyer 
2003, 92). Indeed, the concept of reconciliation in scholarly literature is surprisingly 
amorphous (see Radzik and Murphy 2019; Bhargava 2012; Meierhenrich 2008). There are at 
least three things that explain why there is no agreed understanding of reconciliation. The 
first confounding problem is that equivocation in the literature between reconciliation 
considered as a process and reconciliation considered as an outcome tends to obscure the 
parameters of the debate. Another reason the concept remains contested is that it is often 
understood as “reducible,” or a concept comprised of many others (DeGreiff 2008, 122; 
Schaap 2005, 11). As is evident from the literature, just which concepts comprise 
reconciliation is far from clear. Another barrier to understanding reconciliation is that its 
meaning may be sensitive to context. That is, circumstances may dictate what reconciliation 
involves, and hence what the term means in any given situation (C. Murphy 2010, 9). For 
these reasons, it is hard to neatly describe ‘reconciliation’ in a simple formula.  
  Without knowing precisely what reconciliation is, it is difficult to see how to promote 
it. The lack of conceptual rigor surrounding the concept is problematic given the prevalence 
of attempts to achieve reconciliation in settler states like Canada, where it is an urgent 
societal priority. The varied understandings of reconciliation employed in the scholarly 
literature on the topic make dialogue difficult, as authors often speak past one another. In this 
context, definitions matter: it is only with a clear understanding of reconciliation that we can 
hope to achieve it. While one might think we could look for guidance on the definition of 
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reconciliation from the various Truth and Reconciliation Commissions lately undertaken, 
such as those in Canada or South Africa, it turns out that TRCs do not always offer ready 
definitions, or indeed very useful ones. The Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015a) characterizes reconciliation as an “ongoing 
process of establishing and maintaining respectful relationships” (6). While it is surely not 
wrong to say that this is a part of reconciliation, a definition like this “yields little insight as 
to what exactly a reconciled relationship will look like, and how exactly Canadians can work 
to achieve it” (Shelley 2014, 15). True, the commission goes on to specify ways and means, 
as well as to list 94 Calls to Action that implicitly promote a vision of reconciliation (2015b). 
Yet the commission’s wide-ranging recommendations, comprehensive elaboration on the 
multivalent character of the process, and ambiguous definition of reconciliation combine to 
create the sense that reconciliation can mean pretty well whatever one wants it to. This 
definitional deficit (or surplus) was even more pronounced in the proceedings of South 
Africa’s truth commission. Hamber and van der Merwe (1998) identify five distinct notions 
of reconciliation employed by the commission, each espoused and promulgated throughout 
the proceedings and apparent, if only implicitly, in its report. The result, they argue, “is that 
very seldom is anyone in South Africa talking about the same thing when they refer to 
reconciliation” (561). 
     This ambiguity may be surprising, but it is understandable. For if the world is any 
guide, one thing is certain: there is no fixed meaning of ‘reconciliation.’ Any appropriate 
characterization is sensitive to context (Hayner 2011, 189). In every country where the 
rhetoric of reconciliation is employed, the word means something different (Sarkin and Daly 
2014, 666). This is an empirical fact we should embrace. While some scholars attempt to 
offer a definition that can cover wide variety of contexts, these definitions suffer from their 
generality (C. Murphy 2010, 15). Unitary understandings pay insufficient attention to societal 
particularities and offer little guidance on what sorts of attitudinal, interpersonal, institutional 
or political changes might be needed (24). Any adequate notion of reconciliation must be 
complex and context-specific (see Kofi Annan Foundation 2018, 6). Reconciliation is 
complex because, in addition to its core meaning, it can comprise a constellation of related 
concepts and ideas that address the layers of repair required (Meierhenrich 2008, 225). It is 
context-specific because these related concepts and ideas are suggested by the nature of the 
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harms that stand in the way of right relationships, the analysis of which can offer 
prescriptions for repair (C. Murphy 2010, 23-24). This is why “[r]econciliation is not an 
elusive concept, for it has a strong, constant core relating to the mending of relationships; but 
its shape, perimeters and nuances shift and adapt to the contour of socio-political 
relationships at any given time” (Kofi Annan Foundation 2018, 17). Seen this way, it is no 
wonder that there is no agreed definition of reconciliation, nor is this lack of agreement 
necessarily problematic. ‘Reconciliation’ in the political world is a sort of placeholder for 
varying ideas related to the creation or restoration of right relationships in each context 
(Quinn 2009, 182). If ‘reconciliation’ is a placeholder, just what it is holding a place for 
depends on context.  
  Considering that scholars cannot agree on what reconciliation is, it is surprising that 
many nonetheless agree on the fundamental role that apology for historical wrongs – not just 
their enduring effects – must play in any national reconciliation process in settler states.2 This 
seems odd, for if we do not know what reconciliation is, then it is not clear why scholars 
think apology promotes it. But it makes more sense when we consider that achieving 
reconciliation requires that we pay appropriate attention to the wrongs of the past (see Ivison 
2000; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2015a, 6). Acknowledgement of the wrongs 
committed by the state, its institutions and/or its members is widely considered a pre-
condition for reconciliation (e.g. Govier 2003; Waziyatwain 2011). Apology, requiring as it 
does an airing of the historical record, is one way to do this (see Tavuchis 1991, 98-117). 
Intuitively, apology and reconciliation are remarkably close cognates. While the latter could 
come without the former and vice versa, there are conceptual connections that are hard to 
ignore. Exploring these connections makes for a fruitful philosophical investigation into the 
nature of reconciliation. For this reason, the reader should take note that it is the operating 
intuition of this dissertation that official apology is a part of the process of reconciliation in 
settler states characterized by historical injustice. That is its fundamental premise.  
  Assuming the necessity of official apology for historical injustice is a methodological 
choice driven by the insight that the content of the concept of reconciliation cannot – or 
should not – be derived from a vacuum. Context matters. A common way of defining 
 
2 For example, see: Govier 2003; Minow 1998; Thompson 2009; Howard-Hassman and Gibney 2008; Gibbs 
2009. 
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reconciled political relationships is to begin by asking what healthy political relationships 
look like, then to elaborate on the norms which best govern them (Radzik and Murphy 2019, 
sec. 2). This approach follows the usual method of concept-formation, where scholars first 
determine a conceptual ideal, and then ‘operationalize’ it: “[t]he conceptual analysis of 
reconciliation must be prior to the strategic analysis of reconciliation,” says Meierhenrich 
(2008, 214). However, notwithstanding how perennial disagreements over the nature of 
reconciliation suggest it has not worked, this method of establishing a definition works to 
foreclose contextually determined understandings of the concept. This dissertation aims at an 
experimental inversion of the normal process of concept formation, an inversion which 
requires that the reader grant me the hypothesis in the following conditional for the sake of 
our study: if official apologies for historical and enduring injustice are a part of reconciliation 
in settler states, then whatever effective official apology requires, whatever its normative 
foundations presume, whatever it aims to achieve – all will shed light on the concept of 
reconciliation, considered both as a process and an outcome. The basic idea is that the very 
fact that official apologies are employed in this context means that apology has something to 
say about the process and aims of reconciliation in settler states.  
   While presupposing that apology is involved in reconciliation is a methodological 
choice, it nonetheless has considerations in its favor. Aside from the obvious fact that 
apology is generally thought to be involved in reconciliation – as evidenced by its 
widespread use in these contexts – there is a counterfactual argument that lends the idea 
support. Suppose settler states eliminated all the lingering effects of historical wrongs, and 
suppose compensation, reparation and restitution were made to victimized Indigenous 
people(s). Would we then say that the accounts had been settled? Surely not, for settler states 
would still not have cleared what Vernon (2003) calls the “respect account” (2003, 545; see 
also Gill 2000, 23; Flemming 2008). Beyond making good on losses suffered through 
wrongdoing there is an element of disrespect attendant on the perpetration of wrongdoing (J. 
Murphy1988, 25). Only apology can address this in an explicit way (Zutlevics 2002, 72). 
Perhaps this is why some consider apology to be an obligatory component of reparative 
projects of this kind (Thompson 2008, 34; Boxill 1972, 118). Another reason that apology 
seems appropriate for this context is that reconciliation in settler states – whatever it is – 
demands that we view history with a broad lens if we are to address the legacies of 
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colonialism (Spinner-Halev 2007). Apology is singularly suited for this purpose. By its very 
nature it straddles past, present and future; in paying attention to the past, it looks towards the 
future (Coicaud and Jonsson 2008, 77; Freeman 2008, 58; M. Murphy 2011, 54). These 
considerations suggest that the intuition that apology is involved in reconciliation is not 
misplaced. 
  Of course, building a dissertation on a conditional is a risky business. If apology is 
not a part of reconciliation, the entire edifice falls. But the conceptual obstacles to official 
apologies –  especially those for historical wrongs – have so much in common with those 
associated with the project of reconciliation that, even if the reader were unwilling to grant 
the conditional’s hypothesis, this dissertation’s conceptual analysis will nonetheless shed 
light on reconciliation more broadly. Apologies are used to address those harms that stand in 
the way of right relationships. In identifying those harms that should feature in apology, we 
can at least identify some of the barriers to reconciliation. Furthermore, a study of collective-
level apology can offer a clearer picture of individual culpability in the context of collective 
harms. This will help to delimit the reparative responsibilities of non-Indigenous people even 
if the reader is unwilling to grant me my hypothesis. These findings, then, will enable us to 
navigate some of the “dilemmas of reconciliation”3 that recur in the literature.  
 Official apologies of the kind I discuss in this dissertation are a species of ‘collective 
apology,’ or apologies delivered on behalf of a group as opposed to an individual. They are 
officially endorsed, publicly delivered apologies offered by a representative of a state (or one 
of its institutions) to groups, nations or collectives that were victims of state wrongdoing.4 
Official apologies to Indigenous peoples for historical injustice have been issued with 
increasing frequency in the past few decades. In 1993 the United States Congress apologized 
 
3 The title of the influential edited series by Prager and Govier 2003. 
 
4 Apologies of this kind are variously termed ‘official,’ ‘public,’ ‘historical’ or ‘political’ apologies. Some 
scholars make distinctions between these, which suggests we should be careful with our language (e.g. Hassman 
2012; Kampf 2013; Coombs 2013). For instance, a ‘public’ apology can come from a celebrity, a corporation or 
a government official. A ‘historical’ apology can come from a university, a professional sports team or a 
religious figure such as the Pope. A ‘political’ apology can come from a delinquent politician, a party, a 
government or a state. Many authors who explore the type of apology I discuss in this work term them 
‘political’ apologies because they arise in political contexts and generally have some political purposes. 
However, I choose to use the term ‘official apology’ for two reasons. First, it connotes that such apologies are 
somehow collective in nature and delivered in an official capacity by a representative of a state or an institution. 
Second, it does not foreclose the possibility that these apologies have aims and functions that go beyond the 
expressly political.  
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to Indigenous Hawaiians for depriving them of their right to self-determination a century 
earlier. In 1998 New Zealand apologized to the Ngāi Tahu for historical breaches of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. That same year, Canada’s minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development issued a statement of regret to Indigenous Canadians for the harms of the 
residential school system. In 2000, the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs apologized to 
Native Americans for their treatment at the hands of state institutions in the preceding 175 
years. 2005 saw the government of Newfoundland and Labrador apologize to the Inuit of the 
Nutak and Hebron communities forcibly relocated in the 1950s. In June of 2008, Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper apologized to First Nations, Inuit and Métis people(s) for the 
harms of Canada’s Indian Residential Schools system. A similar apology followed in 
February of that year, when Australian Prime Minster Kevin Rudd apologized to Aboriginal 
Australians and Torres Strait Islanders for Australia’s Stolen Generations. In 2010 the United 
States Congress offered a blanket apology to Native Americans for the many harms of 
colonialism. In 2014 the Governor of Colorado apologized to the Arapaho and Cheyenne 
tribes for the Sand Creek Massacre. More recently, after his election in 2015 Canadian Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau began a series of apologies to Indigenous people(s) in Canada for 
several historical wrongs. In 2017 Trudeau apologized to survivors of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador residential school system. In 2018 he apologized to the Tsilhqot’in nation for the 
murder of six community leaders in 1864. In March 2019 he issued an apology to the Inuit of 
northern Canada for Canada’s failure to attend to epidemics of tuberculosis in the mid-20th 
century. And in May of that year Trudeau apologized to the Cree nation for the false 
conviction of Chief Poundmaker 130 years before. Even more recently, in 2020 New Zealand 
signed an agreement with the Moriori of the Chatham Islands, which provides for a Crown 
apology for land theft and forced labor. The list goes on. We are, says Marrus (2007) “awash 
in apologies” (75). 
  What is going on here? By this I do not mean to ask why this intriguing instrument of 
reconciliation has gained in popularity.5 Rather, my interest is in the theoretical mechanics of 
this practice. On its face, the practice of apology for historical injustice appears to make little 
sense. In general, to meaningfully apologize one must have ‘standing;’ that is, one must be 
 
5 For some reflections on this question, see: Brooks 1999; Barkan and Karn 2006; Gibney and Howard-
Hassman 2008; Marrus 2007.  
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responsible, directly or indirectly, for the transgression that is the subject of the apology 
(Smith 2008, 208; Winter 2015). Yet here you have an official, speaking on behalf of both 
the state and contemporary settlers considered as a category, apologizing for injustices 
perpetrated by individuals who are (often) no longer living to sets of people that are (often) 
not direct or primary victims of these injustices. How does this make sense?  
  Answering this question is not just a speculative philosophical exercise, for its 
solution speaks to the justification for the project of reconciliation more broadly. Apology is 
just one part of a multi-pronged effort at reconciliation (Volkan 2006, 116). Beyond apology 
lie a host of other features common to reconciliation projects, such as reparations, restitution, 
reform, cultural revitalization and transformative movements towards Indigenous self-
determination. Achieving these forms of redress demands that contemporary non-Indigenous 
citizens accept reparative responsibilities non-contingently connected to wrongs in which 
they apparently did not and do not take part. Imposing associated burdens on contemporary 
non-Indigenous citizens requires justification. If we can make sense of how standing to 
apologize can transmit across generations, perhaps we can make sense of how 
contemporaries have moral obligations to redress the wrongs of the past. For if they can have 
standing to apologize, then surely it is worth exploring whether they are connected to 
historical wrongs in such a way that they are answerable for their repair.  
  The question of contemporaries’ reparative responsibilities is a recurring theme of 
this study, and it is why I direct this dissertation primarily towards settlers who harbor doubts 
about their moral obligations in the context of national reconciliation projects. Objections to 
contemporaries shouldering the burden of repair associated with reconciliation come in many 
forms, but most boil down to the refrain ‘it wasn’t me, so why am I responsible?’ As a 
settler, I have encountered variants of this refrain many times in daily life, as well as in 
scholarly literature and the media. It is a fair question, and one that deserves an answer – not 
least for the prospects of reconciliation. Given the political and demographic realities of 
liberal democratic settler states, national reconciliation projects in this context require broad-
based support from non-Indigenous citizens. If non-Indigenous citizens are not convinced of 
their reparative roles, the prospects for reconciliation – whatever it is – appear very dim. My 
intuition is that answering this question in a satisfactory way – a way that will stimulate 
support for reconciliation – requires addressing settlers on their own terms within familiar 
  9 
 
 
 
frameworks of liberal justice. Doing so may be the best way to reveal to them the moral 
significance of the historical and enduring injustices associated with settler colonialism and, 
consequently, their moral obligations in the context of reconciliation.  
  Before beginning our investigation, a preamble on some of its constraints and 
limitations is necessary. As a settler who has not suffered any of the injustices we will 
explore, I do not want the reader to have the impression that I think I have all the answers. 
Indeed, I have very few definitive answers, and those I offer will be contested by both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike. In the first place, then, the reader should keep in mind 
that the scope of this dissertation is narrow. I do not aim to offer sufficient conditions for 
reconciled relationships. I do not aim to describe political solutions for reconciliation. I do 
not aim to offer a framework suitable for addressing every wrong in need of righting. Instead, 
I seek only to explore what the use of official apology for historical injustice says about the 
governing norms of reconciled relationships in settler states. While the political realities of 
settler states mean that reconciliation has a distinctly political character, I will avoid offering 
a vision of political reconciliation so far as is possible. This is because it is simply not 
appropriate to determine the political outcomes of the process of reconciliation pre-
politically. Nor would it be appropriate for a settler to pontificate on these outcomes in 
isolation from broader political dialogue. So, while reconciliation is in part a political project, 
it is better to understand my dissertation as a study of the normative parameters of any 
political reconciliation that might attend these. I discuss the concept through the lens of 
ethics, not politics. As I argue, the use of apology suggests several necessary governing 
norms for reconciled relationships. But it says little more than that. How long will 
reconciliation take? What exactly will the political architecture of settler states look like in 
20, 50 or 100 years? What else is involved in reconciliation, both as a process and an 
outcome? How can Indigenous people(s) achieve full justice? This dissertation cannot 
answer these questions and does not attempt to. However, provided that we keep in mind that 
the conditions I offer are not sufficient, the conclusions offer a frame of reference that can 
help us (or, more likely, our descendants) identify when reconciliation has been achieved. 
  My study is further delimited by certain constraints for a defensible conception of 
reconciliation that emerge from scholarly literature on this topic. This time, however, the 
constraints are more welcome, for instead of acting as limitations they serve to frame the 
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outlines of a defensible definition. The field of transitional justice has made significant 
advances in our understanding of reconciliation, chiefly (but not only) by clarifying the 
dimensions of any useful or appropriate view. Theories of reconciliation from scholars 
working in this field differ widely. For example, May (2011) offers a very robust account 
involving, among other things, ‘civic friendship,’ solidarity and positive attitudes towards 
others. Verdeja (2012) considers reconciliation a condition of mutual respect among former 
enemies, requiring reciprocal recognition of moral worth and dignity. C. Murphy (2010) 
suggests that reconciliation requires the establishment of the rule of law, ‘political trust,’ and 
securing fundamentally important capabilities for individuals. Philpott (2012) argues for an 
‘ethic’ of reconciliation best understood as a concept of justice. Moellendorf (2007) 
considers reconciliation to be a political value based centrally on the idea of political equality 
among citizens. The list of compelling and valuable interpretations of reconciliation is long.   
  I mention the above views only in passing, not to presage an in-depth discussion of 
them, nor to criticize them – for they all have important things to say about reconciliation, 
some of which I discuss later. Rather, I mention them here to draw attention to a limitation of 
looking to the transitional justice literature for insights into reconciliation in settler states. For 
it might initially seem tempting to consider these and other views in some detail and, by a 
process of eliminative induction, decide which best applies to our context given its 
particularities. However, this would be a misguided strategy for the simple reason that all 
rely on an implicit assumption: namely, each is premised on the idea that the establishment of 
a cohesive society under the auspices of the state is a desirable – or necessary – outcome. 
  We can see the problem with this presupposition by reflecting on the criticisms of 
official apology – and the reconciliation agenda itself – that will be discussed in more detail 
in this dissertation (chap. 3 and 4). The fundamental problems with the way reconciliation 
projects have manifested in settler states are that they serve to reify state sovereignty, limit 
Indigenous aspirations to self-determination, invite Indigenous peoples to unwanted 
citizenship, and divert attention from the broader issues facing Indigenous people(s).6 Far 
from erasing colonial patterns of oppression and subordination, reconciliation promotes them 
 
6 I discuss these worries in detail later, but notable critics include Alfred 2011; Coulthard 2007; 2014; 
Corntassel and Holder 2008; Dominello 2017; Henderson and Wakeham 2009; Henderson Youngblood 2002; 
see Nobles 2014.   
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in disguised form (Jung 2018; Elgersma 2012). As we will see, support for these concerns 
comes from extant settler state apologies.7 From the perspective of those Indigenous peoples, 
groups or nations seeking autonomy, meaningful reform and redress, any account of 
reconciliation that promotes what some argue amounts to “democratic reciprocity” (Guttman 
and Thompson 2000), “liberal social solidarity” (see Crocker 2000) or “social cohesion” 
(Quinn 2009) will be more than suspect. It will be objectionable.  
  These concerns suggest the first requirement of a defensible conception of 
reconciliation appropriate to settler states: it cannot presuppose that the outcome of 
reconciliation consists in a unified national consciousness, political unity, undivided 
sovereignty, or the necessity of a political arrangement under the auspices of the settler state. 
Apologies will often fail to achieve their moral goals when they communicate a 
presupposition that the state is justified in exercising what it has long held to be its sovereign 
powers over Indigenous people(s) (see Muldoon and Schaap 2012). So too will reconciliation 
projects fail to be embraced by Indigenous people(s) should they begin with a conception that 
immediately and imperiously limits what can be achieved.   
  In this context, it is not appropriate to prescribe a political architecture for 
reconciliation in any detail pre-politically (Schaap 2005, 8-11). This is partly for the reason 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and partly because it would defeat the purpose of 
meaningful or potentially transformative political dialogue. The contours of any political 
resolution to the problems plaguing settler states should be subject to negotiation lest this 
resolution undermine the very intent of reconciliation. That is why this dissertation seeks to 
uncover only the governing norms that will foster and maintain these yet to be determined 
political relationships. This means that our conception of reconciliation must be flexible 
enough that it can apply to a variety of political outcomes. This will respect the requirement 
that our concept not license political question-begging, where the outcome is presupposed by 
the content of the concept. It will also allow for a flexibility that some argue is required for 
the process of reconciliation (e.g. Govier and Verwoerd 2002a, 186; Woolford 2004, 431).  
  That the political outcomes of the process of reconciliation are subject to negotiation 
between parties suggests a further requirement. As some have noted, analysis of extant 
 
7 For example, see: Dorell 2009; Funk-Unrau 2013; James 2008; Moran 1998; Reilly 2009a; 2009b. 
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definitions of reconciliation shows that it often manifests as “peculiarly Western” (Sampson 
2003, 181). “In fact,” notes Elgersma (2012), “at its core, reconciliation is a Western concept 
with religious connotations rather than an Indigenous concept” (92). In a context where 
assimilative practices have caused significant harm to Indigenous peoples, employing a 
hegemonic conception of reconciliation based wholly on Western thought would demonstrate 
disrespect and evidence a persisting colonial mindset. Notions of reconciliation, then, require 
intergroup dialogue and assessment against diverse cultural frameworks (Tsosie 2006, 207). 
This means that a defensible conception must be broadly acceptable from a variety of cultural 
perspectives and worldviews. As will be apparent, it should therefore offer thin, or minimal, 
conditions that describe cross-cultural values.       
  While this dissertation respects that the process of reconciliation may be at least as 
important as the outcome, it is nonetheless true that we need some guidance on where we are 
headed. That is, a useful conception must specify the type of improvement in relationships 
aimed for (C. Murphy 2010, 23-24). Transitional justice scholars agree that reconciliation is a 
‘spectrum’ or ‘scalar’ concept (Radzik and Murphy 2019, sec. 2; see Verdeja 2012). On one 
end of the spectrum are those conceptions considered ‘minimal,’ such as non-violent 
coexistence (e.g. see Bhargava 2012). On the other are those considered ‘maximal,’ such as 
forgiveness (Tutu 1999). These views are normatively ‘thin’ or ‘thick,’ respectively (Crocker 
2006, 64). To illustrate, thin views emphasize tolerance or institutional arrangements which 
prevent (further) violence, while thick views often comprise, among other things, affective 
dimensions such as warm feelings towards fellow citizens. We can thus frame this 
desideratum as a requirement for guidance as to where on the spectrum our conception of 
reconciliation as an outcome lands; or whether the sought-after improvements are 
institutional, attitudinal, political and so on. Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) refer helpfully to 
this question as an issue of “content” which “concerns the kind of reconciliation involved” 
(180, emphasis added).  
  We can flesh out further requirements for a defensible conception of reconciliation by 
building on those outlined above. First, since any view must stipulate what sorts of 
improvements in relationships are aimed for, and considering that different types of 
relationships are governed by different norms or expectations, it follows that our definition 
must specify which relationships need reconciling. For Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) this is 
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an issue of “quantity” concerning “the level at which reconciliation is sought” (180). To 
illustrate, whether reconciliation concerns relations between individuals, between groups, 
between groups and institutions, or between groups and the settler state considered in the 
abstract will have important ramifications for what is involved. Second, this latter 
desideratum suggests that a useful understanding of reconciliation will offer some guidance 
on how to achieve it, or that it must describe reconciliation as a process. This is where 
reconciliation as an idea moves from the abstract to the concrete, offering prescriptive or 
justificatory arguments relating to policy. Finally, since reconciliation has two faces – as both 
a process and a goal – a good account will explain both, and thus it must describe the 
contours of reconciliation as an outcome so as to allow us to identify when it has been 
achieved. 
  This dissertation has four chapters. Chapter 1 approaches the study of official apology 
sidelong, attempting before anything else to convince settlers of their reparative roles in 
reconciliation. If settlers do not accept reparative responsibility, they will surely object to 
official apology offered in their name. I approach this issue by asking why contemporaries 
might be responsible for the redress of historical wrongs in the first place. Of course, 
reconciliation is not only about redressing historical wrongs. But if we can show how settlers 
are responsible for their repair, we will be on the road to unraveling the content of non-
Indigenous citizen obligations in the context of the project. For our purposes, an important 
consequence of my answer to the question of how reparative responsibility can transmit 
across generations is that contemporary non-Indigenous citizens have standing to apologize 
for historical wrongs. Yet an equally important takeaway is that settlers – and not just states, 
governments and institutions – must bear the wider burdens of reconciliation if the project is 
ever to get off the ground. Chapter 2 puts the framework developed in chapter 1 to work, 
taking a closer look at the mechanics and aims of official apology, as well as the 
characterization of the apologizing agent(s). By seeing what apology should look like in this 
context, from whom it should come, and by identifying some aims that need emphasizing, 
the chapter offers a launch pad for the next. In chapter 3 I explore how states can promote the 
aims of apology through substantive reparative mechanisms in which non-Indigenous 
citizens should take part, and without which official apology would be empty rhetoric, 
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vacuous and insincere. Exploring these mechanisms allows us to glimpse necessary 
conditions for reconciliation conceived as a process.  
  Finally, chapter 4 explores the conclusions of the preceding chapters to offer a picture 
of the governing norms of reconciled relationships suggested by the use of apology. The 
findings of chapters 1 through 3 show that there is a moral substructure to apology and those 
mechanisms that promote its moral goals. Exploring these foundations allows us to approach 
the conceptualization of reconciliation by working backwards. The methodology of this final 
chapter is based on the idea that there are several things that need to be presupposed before 
engaging in apology would even make sense to the parties that offer and receive apologies in 
this context. That is, if the apologizers and recipients both understand the ritual of apology, 
and if both parties recognize what makes for a good or bad one, then they must share an 
understanding of its purposes. By engaging in the social practice of apology, then, parties 
tacitly acknowledge the value of its goals. Consequently, within apology lies the basis for a 
mutually agreeable vision of ‘right’ relationships, one which is cross-culturally acceptable 
and does not beg the question of what these relationships should look like. Apology, I will 
argue, seeks both to circumscribe the range of reasonable interpretations history, and to 
acknowledge (or engender) attitudes of reciprocal respect and trust. The use of official 
apology, then, suggests that the practical implications of these outcomes constitute mutually 
agreeable normative expectations for reconciled relationships. These, then, are necessary 
conditions for reconciliation as an outcome.     
  Before proceeding a final note on a baseline assumption I am making is in order. 
Given the diffuse adoption of reconciliation rhetoric in settler states, it is perhaps surprising 
that both the character and desirability of reconciliation is hotly debated. Even the legitimacy 
of the project is contested.8 Yet an important insight to keep in mind is that these criticisms 
depend on specific understandings of the term ‘reconciliation.’ One must have a concept in 
mind in order to criticize it, so here the importance of conceptual clarity becomes even more 
apparent. Regan (2010) notes that there are in fact two basic ways ‘reconciliation’ can be 
understood. The first is “to restore to friendship or harmony”; the second is “to cause to 
submit to or accept something unpleasant” (60). Many scholars, capitalizing on the 
 
8 Jung 2018 offers a useful taxonomy of objections. 
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homonymic word, identify state-engineered reconciliation projects as reflecting the latter 
definition as opposed to the former (e.g. Alfred 2011, 168; see Short 2005; Woolford 2004). 
Instead of the creation of ‘right’ relationships, some argue, reconciliation is about convincing 
Indigenous people(s) to resign themselves to ongoing internal colonialism. Thus, while in the 
transitional contexts of societies emerging from violent conflict the desirability of 
reconciliation is rarely questioned, this unanimity is not paralleled in settler states in the 
(ostensibly) postcolonial era. 
  This worry will receive some attention in chapters 3 and 4. However, although I do 
not mean to dismiss the significance of the reconciliation-as-resignation criticism, this 
dissertation will nonetheless proceed on the assumption that whatever reconciliation means 
will be closer to the first reading than the second. While the second reading’s upending of the 
term has rhetorical power – a means of hoisting the settler-state by its own petard of language 
– it will be more fruitful to try to understand reconciliation normatively in the way it is 
intended rather than the way cynics suggest it has actually manifested. That is, I am 
supposing that reconciliation, whatever it ends up meaning, is a desirable moral goal. In our 
context, the concept is meant to guide a moral and political project seeking the creation of 
right relationships between Indigenous people, groups, nations and settler states and their 
non-Indigenous citizens. That is the avowed intent of the process, no matter whether this 
process has been correctly executed thus far, and so that is how I will understand it at its 
most basic. 
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Chapter 1: Responsibility for Historical Wrongdoing and the 
Transmission Problem 
Introduction: the transmission problem 
Unredressed historical injustices are barriers to reconciliation between Indigenous people(s), 
settler states and their non-Indigenous citizens. They are barriers not just because Indigenous 
people(s) continue to suffer from the enduring effects of these injustices, but also because the 
fact that they remain unredressed is a stark reminder of the persisting colonial dynamics of 
modern settler states. Lack of redress demonstrates that the relationships between settler 
states and Indigenous people(s) are in many ways continuous with those of the past. 
‘Reconciliation,’ if it is to mean anything at all, demands a change in the modalities of these 
relationships. Redress for historical wrongdoing is thus a prerequisite for improved relations, 
for a lack of redress both epitomizes and perpetuates the status quo. And while reconciliation 
is neither coextensive with nor reducible to redress, it is clear from any cursory look at 
reconciliation projects that redress is one of their principal modes of realization.  
  If we grant that redress for historical injustice is necessary for reconciliation, there 
remains a glaring conceptual problem. The question of why contemporary non-Indigenous 
citizens of settler states should carry the burden of redress for injustices committed in the 
(often distant) past is a tricky philosophical obstacle. Intergenerational contexts confound the 
conceptual frameworks available in the traditional philosophical toolbox. The strength of the 
intuition that redress is owed does nothing to tell us from whom it should come and why. As 
a shorthand, we can term this obstacle the ‘transmission problem:’ if the perpetrators of 
historical injustices are no longer alive, then it is not obvious why contemporaries should be 
responsible for redress. As I argue in sec. 1.2, the settler state – a subsisting, organized 
collectivity with agency of its own – is liable for what it has done in the past. For this reason, 
the transmission problem as regards the state is arguably solved as a consequence of its 
ontology. But this view does not fill in why citizens bear the burden of the state’s obligations. 
Appealing to the analyticity of ‘citizen’ is one familiar strategy, but I share Kukathas’ (2003) 
intuition that one cannot – or at least should not – impose burdens on people just because 
they are a member of the convenient category ‘citizen’ (169). Any impositions require a 
deeper moral justification. For worries about a transfer of reparative duties across generations 
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arise with respect to the consequences of such a move: won’t impositions on non-Indigenous 
citizens be unfair, and effectively transgress individual autonomy (Thompson 1999, 496; 
2000a, 334)? Wouldn’t things like re-distributive reparations, justified by appeals to the past, 
impact the justness of distributions now (335 and 344)? Any solution to the transmission 
problem must answer these objections. 
  The difficulty here is one of connecting the past to the present in such a way that 
history speaks to the moral demands of today. As we will see in chapter 2, the conceptual 
difficulties associated with the transmission problem burst to the fore in the context of 
official apologies for historical injustice, where settler-states offer formal apologies to 
Indigenous people(s) victimized at its hands. As we saw in the preface, this practice appears 
to make little sense. Meaningful apologies for grave wrongs are generally thought to come 
only from those with ‘standing,’ or those responsible for the transgression at issue (Smith 
2008, 208). So how can contemporaries apologize for injustices in which they played no 
part? For this species of official apology to make sense, the transmission problem needs 
solving. Official apology is thus a sort of trial by fire for any solution. If an answer to the 
transmission problem entails that contemporaries have standing to apologize for historical 
wrongs, it follows that they may be answerable for their repair. Likewise, if apology is 
offered, then surely it is owed. That is, if we can make sense of official apology for historical 
injustice, this is evidence that our solution is adequate for justifying the project of redress and 
its attendant burdens on contemporaries. 
  The most common way to assign responsibility for wrongdoing is via the liability 
model (Young 2011, 95 and 97-99). The ‘fault principle’ inherent in the model holds that one 
should only be held responsible in a forward-looking9 way if one was (directly or indirectly) 
causally responsible in a backward-looking way (e.g. Butt 2007, 138; Feinberg 1970, 222). 
This perspective parallels understandings of apology. In general, to meaningfully apologize, 
one must be responsible. The transmission problem arises within the context of Western 
adherence to the liability model. John Howard, former prime minister of Australia, succinctly 
 
9 By ‘forward-looking’ responsibility I mean responsibility to repair harms, for example through reparations. 
Here reparations are a response to previous wrongdoing, yet these are intended to improve the conditions for 
parties materially affected by this wrongdoing. Despite the intuitions behind the liability model, there is no 
necessary connection between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. 
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articulated this perspective when explaining his resistance to government apology to 
Aboriginal Australians for historical wrongdoing: “I do not believe, as a matter of principle, 
that one generation can accept responsibility for the acts of an earlier generation” (Davies 
2008). The principle Howard is referring to can only be the fault principle: to be responsible, 
one must be culpable. Thus, if we cannot reasonably consider contemporaries responsible for 
historical wrongs, it might seem that nothing can be done without transgressing liberal 
societies’ received model of liability.  
  This suggests that we need to look beyond the bounds of liberal justice in seeking a 
solution to the transmission problem. This approach would have the advantage of heeding 
calls for settlers to extricate themselves from narrow channels of Eurocentric thinking, 
channels which have historically led to paternalistic and harmful colonial practices.10 Yet at 
the same time, for better or worse, a solution that ignores the liability model of the liberal 
contexts in which the transmission problem arises will fail to convince most settlers of their 
reparative responsibilities. To greater or lesser degrees, many non-Indigenous citizens of 
settler-states are wedded to this model. And if reconciliation is in large part about solving the 
“settler problem”11 by convincing non-Indigenous people to take part in reconciliation, 
settlers must first be convinced of their moral duty to participate. While the state could 
unilaterally impose reparative burdens on its citizens, it is desirable in any just state that the 
justification for these impositions be widely (if not universally) acceptable to them. A useful 
solution to the transmission problem will thus have to work within the confines of the 
liability model to convince the John Howards of the world that they should support apology 
and redress for historical wrongdoing, despite their apparent lack of culpability.  
  Various scholars have attempted different strategies for getting around the problem of 
how to address the concerns of descendants without offending received liberal principles 
regarding individual autonomy and fault.12 The idea of these strategies is to justify shifting 
 
10 See Regan 2010, who discusses this topic in detail. 
 
11 I believe this term originates with Epp 2003.   
 
12 These strategies come in several forms. It is impossible to canvass them all, but a few stand out. Benefits-
based arguments hold that contemporaries incur duties of repair (or disgorgement) because they have benefited 
from past injustice (e.g. Butt 2006; Goodin 2013; Goodin and Barry 2014; Kukathas 2003). Many benefits-
based views share characteristics with property-based arguments, which hold that rights to property – and hence 
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the burden of redress to contemporary people by showing how they are connected to past 
wrongs; the aim is to convince individuals to consider it incumbent on them to play their part 
in making amends for the past. This chapter carries on in this tradition, but it does so in a 
way that takes a wide view of historical injustice and its legacies. Instead of thinking of these 
injustices straightforwardly as discrete events of the distant past, I aim to broaden the 
temporal lens in such a way that we can better understand their scope and significance. By 
widening our view, we can see their origins and legacies. In so doing we will be able to 
approach redress in the responsive and holistic way demanded by reconciliation projects. It is 
only by clearly identifying the problems arising from historical wrongdoing that we can 
identify their solutions. Doing so requires that we look at the connections between the 
present and the past with a wide-angled lens.   
  My solution to the transmission problem is a species of ‘complicity’ view. I argue 
that contemporary non-Indigenous citizens of settler states are complicit in the perpetuation 
of: (1) non-contingent outgrowths of historical injustices; (2) ongoing injustices constituting 
the ‘automatic’ (or causal) effects of historical injustice;13 and (3) the maintenance of 
systemic colonial orientations that underpinned unjust policies of the past, orientations that 
made injustice possible in the first place. My view falls within the liability doctrine outlined 
above: citizens are responsible for participating in processes of redress because of things they 
are doing, have done, or failed to do. It is only through active participation in processes of 
 
restitution and sometimes reparation – are inheritable, and as such contemporaries should be required to 
participate in redress (e.g. Simmons 1995; Sher 2005; Thompson 2001). A few scholars argue that the dead 
have rights, and hence rights to reparation (symbolic or otherwise) do not evaporate upon the death of direct 
victims of historical wrongdoing (e.g. Meyer 2006). Citizenship-based strategies focus on the meaning and 
demands of citizenship, and conclude that some feature(s) of citizens qua citizen makes them liable for the 
redress of state-perpetrated injustice (e.g. Pasternak 2011b). Some of these citizenship-based views have a 
communitarian streak, and/or rely on accounts of associative or political obligations (e.g. Stilz 2011; Schaap 
2005; see Scheffler 2018). Other approaches draw attention to contemporaries’ temporal position in a 
transgenerational community, emphasizing how moral consistency demands we redress the wrongs of previous 
generations (e.g. Thompson 1999; 2000; and especially 2009b). For identity-based arguments, responding to 
past injustice is a way of demonstrating who ‘we’ as a society are, or would like to be (Ivison 2000; Sparrow 
2000). In a related vein, some suggest that, since collective memory and the interpretation of historical events 
affect contemporaries in material, psychological and dignity-impacting ways, steps should be taken to address 
those memories that are damaging to a cultural group’s well-being or identity (Hendrix 2002; Margalit 2002). 
Still others take as their starting point the persistence of enduring injustice, emphasizing the continuities 
between the past and present to show contemporaries’ connection to history (e.g. Lu 2011; Sparrow 2000; 
Spinner-Halev 2007). For reasons that will be clear later, this latter approach seems most promising. 
  
13 The term ‘automatic effect’ is from Sher 1981. 
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redress that citizens can avoid the moral risk of implication in wrongdoing, wrongdoing that 
cannot be understood without reference to the historical injustices that concern us here. The 
complicity approach comprises several necessary tenets I defend in turn below (sec. 1.2-1.4). 
In brief, by demonstrating the complicity of contemporary non-Indigenous people in the 
perpetuation of enduring injustice connected to or resulting from historical wrongs, as well as 
their implication in the maintenance of colonial outlooks that made these injustices possible, 
non-Indigenous citizens are liable for the redress of historical wrongs because they contribute 
to its causes, meaning and legacies. This engenders a moral responsibility to proactively 
address not just the effects of historical injustice, but historical injustice itself. Since citizens 
are causally responsible for the perpetuation of injustice, their liability entails reparative 
duties. These are inchoate duties, but they can be given shape by the state of which these 
citizens are a part. The duties boil down to individual participation in the reparative 
collective actions of the state. Such measures include – but are not limited to – things 
associated with national reconciliation processes in settler states: structural, institutional and 
political reforms; reparations and/or restitution; cultural revitalization; and – most notably for 
the purposes of this dissertation – endorsement of official apologies. Integral as they are to 
the functioning of the state, citizens bear responsibility for state omissions and actions 
despite not always sharing in the purposes of the state. While not always blameworthy, as co-
responsible agents non-Indigenous citizens have a moral obligation to participate in redress. 
As I argue in chapter 2, on this view, not only can official apology make sense, it becomes a 
moral imperative.   
1.1 Desiderata for a solution to the transmission problem 
When considering the transmission problem, a worry arises about the ability of familiar 
frameworks of liberal justice – concerned as they are with liability, individual inviolability, 
and distributions in contemporary contexts – to attend to history in a manner that meets the 
needs of Indigenous people(s) (Ivison 2000, 361; Thompson 2009b, 196-197; Spinner-Halev 
2007, 579). Traditional liberal justice forgets the importance of things like acknowledgement 
and apology (ibid.; see Marrus 2007, 83). But for justice to be served, history and its 
relevance to the identity and dignity of Indigenous peoples cannot be ignored (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 2015a, 7). That there is no straightforward answer to the 
transmission problem in the liberal paradigm is not a reason for denying the importance of 
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history in assessing the claims of Indigenous people(s). Treating calls for justice for 
Indigenous individuals, groups, peoples, or nations as a purely contemporary problem with 
distributions leaves much out of the picture. Many Indigenous individuals and groups 
continue to suffer from the material and dignity-affecting aspects of past injustice. Some may 
not, yet still seek acknowledgement in the form of apology for the wrongs perpetrated against 
their ancestors or communities. For these people collective memory matters, and their 
concerns deserve to be addressed in responsive way.     
  This in mind, it seems there are several normatively desirable components to a 
comprehensive answer to the transmission problem. Firstly, and most obviously (a), an 
answer to the transmission problem must particularize the duty of repair to one set of people 
and not another – a people connected in some appropriate way to the historical wrongs in 
question. In this context, this set will consist of non-Indigenous citizens of settler states. In 
meeting this condition, the solution must take the importance of history into consideration 
and should not be reducible to, say, the application of general principles of morality to a local 
setting14 or considerations of distributive justice alone.15 This is because of the importance 
attached to history that is a feature of many Indigenous calls for justice (Marrus 2007, 79). 
Since we are seeking justification for the imposition of burdens on contemporary non-
Indigenous citizens it must be demonstrated why it is they and not others who ought to 
shoulder them. Given that we are seeking a responsive solution to the transmission problem, 
history should feature prominently in this justification – especially since we will later be 
using official apology for historical injustice as our test case (chap. 2). Secondly (b), a 
solution must offer convincing normative reasons for individuals to play their part in redress, 
reasons that do not appeal to something like voluntary identification with the responsible 
state. Answers to the transmission problem that appeal to identity, citizenship or the value of 
community16 threaten to introduce a voluntarist aspect to the solution that risks leaving 
behind those most in need of convincing (Thompson 2012, 221). We need narrow, agent-
 
14Goodin’s 1988 “assigned responsibility model” would be one such approach (678). On this view, 
contemporaries would be responsible for redress because they are best placed to undertake it. However, that 
there are no special duties arising from citizens’ connection to historical injustice is a problem for this strategy. 
 
15 Brennan 2004 discusses the problems with this approach. A focus on distributive justice misses the forest for 
the trees by drawing attention away from the root causes of structural inequities. 
 
16 See footnote 12 for examples. 
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centred reasons for non-Indigenous citizen participation in national reconciliation processes. 
Thirdly (c), the approach must show why despite being personally innocent of any historical 
wrongdoing, contemporaries still have a moral duty to play their part in its redress. This, of 
course, is just another way of saying that it must answer the transmission problem 
simpliciter. I include it here to emphasize that the link between causal responsibility for 
historical injustices and responsibility for their righting must be severed in a manner 
justifiable to liberals concerned with infringements on autonomy or the impact of redress on 
the justness of distributions in contemporary contexts. Fourthly (d), since we aim to solve the 
transmission problem in the interest of reconciliation projects, any solution to the should 
derive (in part) from the recognition that the systemic colonial structures, attitudes, and 
prejudicial patterns of behaviour that legitimised and facilitated the subordination of 
Indigenous people in the past survive in recognizable form to the present day. Continuities 
between the past and present serve not only to link contemporaries to the past, but also to 
highlight how the perceived significance of historical injustice in the collective memory of 
victimized communities can be detrimental to their well-being. Meeting this desideratum will 
open the door to the sort of robust, transformative vision of reconciliation that many call 
for.17  
  If fulfilled, these desiderata suggest a solution to the transmission problem that may 
have positive real-world effects. But they are silent on why redress should be undertaken in 
the first place. This is an important question to consider. For imagine, as an example, that we 
justified redress solely on the grounds that historical injustice has corrupted contemporary 
distributions, leaving descendants of victims unfairly disadvantaged. Would such redress 
even be about historical injustice at all? If there were no material disadvantage resulting from 
a historical wrong, would redress even be considered? We all believe that wrongs deserve 
righting, and this stems from the moral intuition that wrongs are wrong and should be 
recognized as such. Redress justified on the above grounds lacks the normative value it 
would have were it motivated by the recognition that a wrong was done and that that wrong 
needs addressing. Importantly for the moral character of reconciliation, then, (e) any 
successful approach must locate a motivation for repair in the correct moral arena: the 
 
17 For example Alfred 1999; 2011; Coulthard 2007; Corntassel and Holder 2008; see Jung 2018. 
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wrongness of historical injustices. A solution grounded solely in other places runs the risk of 
suggesting a policy of redress that amounts to cynical political expediency. Redress, at least 
in the context of reconciliation projects, is supposed to be an attempt to make moral amends, 
and so the normative dimensions of its justification must have some priority. That is, things 
like reparations and apology should be undertaken for the right reasons if they are to satisfy 
those to whom they are given (Thompson 2012, 221). As I hope to show in this chapter, the 
meaning and significance of historical injustices from the perspective of victimized 
communities are key to identifying and justifying the remedies for them. These remedies 
require we undertake redress with the right intent. Since the meaning of historical injustice is 
significantly connected to the identity and dignity of Indigenous people(s), the motivating 
normative reasons that underlie the justification for redress will dictate the sorts of 
significance that it can have in the context of reconciliation.18 As I argue in chapter 3, while 
redress has forward-looking components insofar as it aims to confer a benefit on victimized 
parties, it is essentially backward-looking insofar as it depends for its justification on the 
events of the past (sec. 3.2). Thus, in justifying the burdens attendant on projects of redress 
we cannot appeal to contemporary paradigms of distributive justice alone. These frameworks 
are not appropriate because a consideration of the meaning and significance of the historical 
experience of Indigenous people need not feature in their justification. Recall that a concern 
raised at the outset is that liberal approaches to justice tend to leave history out of the picture. 
This is not a satisfying prospect for Indigenous peoples, groups or nations. A solution that 
ignores history is just what we are trying to avoid.   
1.2 The elements of the complicity approach: state as agent 
I now turn to the first of the elements of the complicity view, the state-as-agent thesis 
gestured towards in the introduction to this chapter. That certain types of organized 
collectives can constitute entities with an identity, agency and moral autonomy of their own 
is a view espoused by scholars interested in solving problems related to collective 
 
18 This is an area where other approaches have difficulty. For instance, from a meta-ethical perspective, 
grounding the duties of contemporary citizens in the theory of associative political obligations is misguided: 
instead of the motivation for citizen participation stemming from the wrongness of historical injustices, it will 
instead derive from the non-instrumental value of an appropriately meaningful political association. The 
benefits-received approach arguably fails in this context, too: instead of the motivation for redress lying in the 
heinous source of benefits, it comes instead from the wrongness of the ongoing failure to disgorge them, a 
related but ultimately distinct grounding. See footnote 12. 
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accountability for wrongdoing. These scholars have the right approach for both normatively 
and argumentatively compelling reasons.  
  Scholars who advocate for the view that certain types of collectives are distinct moral 
agents offer convincing arguments. To presume only individuals capable of moral agency is 
to assume an unwarranted “anthropocentric bias” (French 1979, 207). Because organized 
collectives can act and have intentions based on reasons, we should recognize them as 
morally autonomous agents (ibid). As moral agents, they are responsible for their intentional 
actions or omissions. Although specific arguments vary in focus, scholars who endorse this 
view generally agree that organized collectives such as states have intentionality distinct 
from the intentions of their members as a result of structures of decision-making and 
authority, avowed policies, procedures and stipulated roles (212; Kukathas 2003, 181; Pettit 
2007, 187; Isaacs 2011, 27). Because of these features, a collective can theoretically form an 
intention that none of its members share (Pettit 2007, 181). This is why “the more structure a 
collective has, the easier it is to dissociate its identity from any particular cohort of members” 
(Isaacs 2011, 24). Collective actions then flow from collective intentions. Like a collective 
intention, a collective action is distinct from the actions of any individual actions that 
contribute to it; a collective action, if you like, supervenes on individual actions (50). That 
collective action flows from collective intention warrants the description of this action as 
irreducibly collective: neither collective intentions nor collective actions are reducible to 
individual ones, and that is why they are described as ‘collective.’ Importantly for later, 
though, all scholars of this school agree that there is a dependence relation: collectives 
operate through the actions of their members.        
  There are also strong normative reasons for espousing the collectives-as-agents view. 
One advantage is that it enables us to locate responsibility at the collective level in such a 
way that it is not reducible to an aggregate of individuals’ responsibility. For our purposes, 
this aspect of the view is important for two reasons. First, in the context of settler states it is 
only by embracing a robust notion of collective agency that we can capture the true 
normative significance of both collective wrongs and the actions of individuals in the context 
of those wrongs. At the macro level, without a notion of collective agency there will be 
significant normative loss in the description of collective wrongdoing (Isaacs 2011, 179; see 
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Lawson 2013; Wringe 2016). At the micro level, the actions of individuals take on new 
significance when re-described as falling within the context of collective wrongdoing, 
because “individuals’ contributions to collective acts inherit relevant moral features from the 
collective action context in which they occur […]” (Isaacs 2011, 57). This serves to highlight 
the moral contours of individual acts in the context of collective ones. Second, viewing the 
state as an agent offers resources for solving problems related to (irreducibly collective) 
historical injustices specifically, and not just their enduring effects. It allows us to identify an 
agent causally and morally responsible for injustices which would otherwise appear to be 
unintended phenomena arising from the parallel actions of a seemingly amorphous collection 
of individuals (43-48). Importantly, then, collective responsibility of the sort I advocate 
represents a domain of responsibility that transcends any amalgam of the culpabilities of 
individual participants and which attaches to a collectivity that can withstand replacement of 
its members. Therefore, since there is a strong distinction between a collective and its 
constituents, moral responsibility for wrongdoing can transcend generations so long as the 
collective subsists. This is why the transmission problem isn’t such a problem as regards 
subsisting collectivities like states. 
  Admittedly, for the purposes of this chapter the above is necessarily somewhat 
stipulative. But notwithstanding the metaphysical concerns of some skeptics19 the virtues of 
this framework are enough to make an exploration of its resources valuable from a 
philosophical perspective. Those who deny the enduring identity and agency of organized 
collectives on metaphysical grounds will not be convinced by the arguments below. But the 
thesis has important advantages, not least of which is the recognition that, from this vantage, 
collective backward-looking responsibility (or moral guilt) need not translate into individual 
responsibility of the same genus. This observation may alleviate some of the concerns of 
liberals concerned with transgressions of individual autonomy (Isaacs 2014, 43). Given their 
culpability, collective agents are responsible for the forward-looking redress of historical 
wrongs. Given that the agent persists over time, so too do its moral obligations. The state is 
an entity that persists through time as an identifiable agent and is thus an obvious candidate 
 
19 See for example: Narveson 2002; Van den Beld 2002; Zoller 2014. Methodological individualists generally 
argue that there is no need to posit collective actions or intentions as such, for these are reducible to individual 
actions and intentions.  
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for ascriptions of collective agency (48; see also Stilz 2011). By ascribing agency to the state, 
philosophers can work within the liability model even in the context of intergenerational 
societies (see Butt 2006). Even though members of a state are replaced over time, the state 
endures. Since historical injustices in state contexts were collective acts perpetrated by the 
state, the state – as distinct from its members – is responsible for them. 
  One corollary of the thesis just elaborated is that if reparative responsibilities can 
persist over generations, rights to redress must somehow persist in tandem. Since in settler 
states both the state and victimized Indigenous groups endure over generations, a theoretical 
framework that respects a collective level of analysis is well suited to our context. For 
distinguishing between a collective and its members has advantages when seeking solutions 
to another problem related to historical injustice worth touching upon briefly. Sometimes 
called the ‘exclusion principle’ (Thompson 2001, 116), the objection here is that, since 
descendants of (direct) victims of historical injustice did not themselves suffer that injustice, 
they cannot demand redress. Only direct victims can claim rights to redress, is the thought, 
for such claims do not transcend individual lives and thus obviously cannot translate across 
generations. Yet if enduring collectives (or communities) – as distinct from their members – 
can be harmed, they can likewise lay claim to redress (see Hill 2002). As the historical record 
shows, collectives qua collectives can indeed be harmed (see e.g. Holder 2014; Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 2015a, 1). The historical activities of the settler state merit (at 
least) the term ‘cultural genocide,’ which encompasses “the destruction of those structures 
and practices that allow the group to continue as a group” (ibid., emphasis added; see 
MacDonald and Hudson 2012). Cultural genocide is a harm to a group qua group, even if its 
effects manifest at individual levels too. Since a moral debt is owed to a group, the moral 
ledger books will not balance themselves with a replacement of its members or the mere 
passage of time.20 Importantly, group agency is not necessary to this side of the equation: if 
an identifiable, subsisting group suffered from an intentionally perpetrated historical 
 
20 Cf. Waldron 1992 and Lyons 1977. See footnote 25. 
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injustice, this is enough to justify finding a way to right the wrongs of the past in a way 
responsive to its current needs.21    
  Granting the state-as-agent thesis means that we can start looking at the transmission 
problem in earnest. While responsibility can attach to the state, why the state might be 
justified in distributing burdens to its individual members remains unclear. That is, the view 
does not automatically answer the transmission problem. Since the state and its constituent 
members are conceptually distinct, the reasons the state must pursue redress will be different 
from those of its non-Indigenous citizens; after all, these citizens are not culpable for 
historical wrongs.  
  As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the fault principle inherent in the 
liability model entails that one cannot be culpable for what one has not done. Thus, it seems 
the idea that contemporary individuals should be held responsible for a historical injustice is 
highly suspect. However, this interpretation forgets one of the advantages of the 
collective/constituents distinction outlined above. The claim is not that individuals are 
causally responsible in a backward-looking way for a historical wrong, but only that they 
may be responsible in a forward-looking way for its righting. In other words, there is a 
distinction between the condemnation of a state for a historical wrong and the liability of its 
citizens for its righting (Pasternak 2011, 212). This allows normative considerations other 
than a strictly interpreted fault principle to enter the equation when considering responsibility 
for the redress of historical injustice (Smiley 2014, 6; Isaacs 2014, 44). Working within the 
liability model, we can say that the state is responsible for redressing historical injustice 
because of what it did in the past. Its citizens are responsible for some other reason.  
1.2.1 The elements of the complicity approach: enduring injustice 
I now turn to another of the components of the complicity approach, one which is seemingly 
quite obvious but needs some explication. Namely, the idea is that a historical injustice is not 
historical ‘full-stop.’ Indeed, the very fact that apologies are offered for historical injustices 
 
21 Of course, what makes a collective ‘identifiable’ or ‘subsisting’ is a thorny issue (Marrus 2007, 93; see 
Waldron 1992). What is required to make a group the self-same thing over time? Is modern-day Germany the 
same entity as the Third Reich? In our context, however, such concerns do not apply, because the focus is on 
self-avowedly subsisting settler states and the equally enduring Indigenous peoples, groups and nations that 
were (and often continue to be) the victims of oppression at its hands. 
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suggests that they have enduring legacies that need attention. To really get a grip on the 
dimensions of these legacies, we will need to understand them with reference to the 
circumstances of their genesis. Namely, settler colonialism. Examining historical injustices 
with the historical context in mind draws our attention to the background which informs the 
significance, impact and meaning of its legacies.  
  As Margaret Moore (2019) argues, there is no single thing that is wrong with settler-
colonialism.22 Various aspects of colonialism need to be understood before we can begin to 
see how to address its legacies (Alfred 1999, 70; see Wolfe 2006). To illustrate, it is not only 
the relationship of domination that makes it wrong, nor just its assimilative aspects, nor even 
the discrete historical wrongs which often attended it. Trying to distil ‘the’ injustice of 
settler-colonialism down to a simple formula is misguided, for “it makes it seem that we 
ought to be searching for a single feature that accounts for its wrongfulness, and that any 
additional wrongs that might have been associated with it were just incidental to the practice” 
(Moore 2019, 89). By focusing on only one feature of settler colonialism we fail to get a 
sense of the many harms associated with it. Heeding Moore’s warning, in what follows I 
elaborate on some of the other injustices of settler colonialism, focusing for obvious reasons 
on those related to the types of discrete historical injustices that are the subjects of official 
apologies (see Preface). I argue that there are further, distinct injustices resulting from, or 
non-contingently related to, the discrete wrongs of the past, injustices which endure in the 
present and whose content we cannot capture through description of historical wrongs. But 
nor is their content captured by a description of them in isolation from the historical injustice 
which engendered them. In the context of settler colonialism, the effects of a historical 
injustice linger, and we cannot understand these effects without understanding their genesis.  
  There are three types of injustice that I will refer to as ‘enduring’ injustice, all of 
which are ultimately results of the intentional acts or omissions of the state.23 The first 
concerns wrongs which, though not direct causal effects of historical injustices, are 
nonetheless non-contingently related to them. The best example of this type of enduring 
injustice, as some scholars have noted, comes from the idea that the failure to rectify a 
 
22 Cf. Ypi 2013. 
 
23 The term ‘enduring injustice’ is from Spinner-Halev 2007, but I understand it a bit differently.  
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historical injustice constitutes a distinct wrong. This is a wrong that, though not a direct 
result of a historical wrong, is nonetheless an outgrowth of it (see Butt 2013; Sher 2005; 
Pettigrove 2003). Though distinct, it compounds and worsens the original wrong (Butt 2013, 
18). The second type of enduring injustice I consider concerns those injustices which are 
direct (or causal) results of a discrete, historical injustice. The term ‘automatic effect’ is 
therefore apposite (Sher 1981). Following Thompson (2001), I understand automatic 
injustices as those which cannot be attributed to any other cause than a historical wrong 
(118). An analogy from tort law is ‘cause-in-fact causation,’ a demonstration of liability 
through the meeting of a ‘but-for’ condition: but for an agent’s perpetration of X, event or 
circumstance Y would not have obtained in its wake (Kadish 1985, 357-360). For both of the 
above types of injustice – call them ‘secondary’ enduring injustices – there is a non-
contingent connection to a chronologically prior ‘primary’ injustice; the historical wrong is 
the sine qua non of their reality. History is thus indispensable for understanding these 
enduring injustices, for there is both a historical and a contemporary component to them 
(Spinner Halev 2007, 578). The third type of enduring injustice I will discuss requires that 
we expand our temporal lens yet further to encompass the cultural context of the time 
preceding historical injustice to examine systemic attitudes, cultural orientations and patterns 
of oppression to see how our contemporary context is continuous with that of the past. 
Though not caused by historical injustices, this injustice24 is intimately related to them 
insofar as it enabled, legitimated and contributed to their perpetration or perpetuation (M. 
Murphy 2011, 51). The subsistence of this form of injustice is partly sustained by the 
expressive message of disregard sent by the historical injustice which it played a role in 
engendering (on which more in 1.2.4).  
  At the base of all the above-named injustices lies a failure of the state to take 
historical injustice seriously. It is a failure in the administration of justice that demonstrates a 
lack of respect for Indigenous people(s). It is important to my argument that state omissions – 
the failure to undertake redress – are characterized as intentional. Scholars emphasize the 
“ongoing agency” of a wrongdoer in refusing redress (Butt 2006, 359). Ongoing agency is 
 
24 I refer to this as an ‘injustice’ as a shorthand. More properly, it is a mindset that disposes the state and its non-
Indigenous citizens to commit or perpetuate injustice. It is a necessary condition for many of the injustices this 
dissertation explores.   
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exhibited in our context by the intentional omissions of the state. They are intentional 
because it is not the case that the denial of redress has taken place in the context of 
ignorance: Indigenous calls for justice have been consistent and ongoing for generations (see 
e.g. Newton 1999, 261; Vrdoljak 2008, 198; Morse 2008, 227). Nor is it the case that the 
state was unaware of the harms for which it is responsible (see e.g. Holder 2017, sec. 3, para. 
4). The duty-engendering fiduciary relationships established between governments and 
Indigenous peoples via treaty-making in some states has similarly been flouted (Royal 
Commission 1996a, 6). Therefore, the refusal to address historical and enduring injustices 
should be understood as intentional exercises of the agency of the state. The active erasure of 
history and denial of justice is intentional. As the current constituents of an identifiable 
community, descendants of victims are wronged by the state’s ongoing failure to address the 
damage done.  
  Given that my argument rests in part on the plausibility of the notion of enduring 
injustice, further elaboration of some examples is in order. To prefigure what follows, when 
an organized collective commits a (1) discrete, historical injustice, this can echo down the 
generations in the form of: 
2 The injustice of the ongoing failure to make redress of some kind to victims, their 
descendants and/or their cultural groups, which negatively impacts individuals’ life 
prospects and causes cultural harm to communities;  
3 The structural injustices that stem directly from (1) and which likewise negatively 
impact descendants’ life prospects and the cultural survival of their communities;  
4 The injustice of the negative and disrespectful expressive message sent by the refusal 
to address injustices (1), (2) and (3) and the attendant impact on descendants. This 
form of injustice is manifest most clearly in the contemporary dignitary harms 
associated with the expressive meaning of a historical injustice to a victimized 
community;  
5 Paying attention to the disrespectful expressive message sent by the erasure of history 
and the denial of justice thus draws our attention to the subsistence of systemic 
colonial patterns of oppression that are continuous with policies of the past, and 
which reflect an essentially colonial mindset.    
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1.2.2 The failure to tender reparations and provide redress 
Given our framework as described above (1.1), if redress for (1) a discrete historical injustice 
has never been provided, it is still owed. As I noted a moment ago, in addition to suffering at 
the hands of a morally responsible state, individual victims and cultural groups qua groups 
suffer a further injustice when the state fails to fulfill its moral duty to provide restitution, 
reparations or other forms of redress. This injustice is thus non-contingently related to a 
historical wrong even if the latter is not its direct cause. When not provided with material 
restitution and reparations, the interests of victimized parties are affected. This failure 
negatively impacts the descendants of original victims in material ways (Cohen 2009, 84; 
Sher 2005, 191; Butt 2006, 359). The lack of control over resources unjustly acquired, for 
example, undermines the prospects for both descendants and the cultural survival of groups 
(Pascoe and Richmond 2009). Since a failure of moral accounting is the cause of the harms 
to descendants, and since the state is responsible for this failure, descendants, either 
individuals or groups, can justifiably demand redress. That counterfactuals can cloud the 
picture25 is beside the point: if the interests of one generation are affected, then so 
presumably will be those of the next.26 For this reason, just as the repercussions of 
wrongdoing carry over generations, so too do (at least moral) rights to redress.  
1.2.3 Structural injustice 
Historical injustices have led to structural injustice in settler societies (Reading 2015; Royal 
Commission 1996, 15). As a direct causal consequence, structural injustice should thus be 
considered as among the automatic effects of historical injustice. Structural injustices stem 
from widely held beliefs and attitudes in a society, embodied in institutions, and which 
manifest           
 when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of 
 
25 Waldron 1992 discusses the question of counterfactuals in some detail. Thompson 2000a notes that while 
considerations like these may carry some weight, they are at best reasons for negotiating the terms of redress 
rather than abandoning redress altogether (343). 
 
26 The fact that the reparations awarded to a parent may have dissipated before the conception of a child does 
not negate the fact that the reparations were never offered. The non-identity problem can be overcome in this 
context if we allow that the child who otherwise would not have existed were it not for the wrong is still entitled 
to reparations if they were never offered to a parent, provided we stipulate that some of those resources would 
have been used to improve the lot of the child (Cohen 2009, 82).  
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 domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the 
 same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of 
 opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities. (Young 2006, 114). 
Structural determinants emerging from historical wrongdoing affect the well-being of people 
and communities (Reading 2015). The dispossession of a collective, for example, can lead to 
enduring, unjust institutional structures and prejudicial patterns of behaviour that unfairly 
disadvantage groups, individual victims and, subsequently, their descendants (e.g. see Pascoe 
and Richman 2009). These structural determinants include the inaccessibility of services and 
opportunities, and a widespread discounting of the interests of the community. According to 
Morse (2008), “dispossession through colonization has had the most dramatic effect upon the 
physical, cultural, economic and spiritual health of Aboriginal peoples and their 
communities” (286). The expressive message of disregard intrinsic to the act of dispossession 
is reproduced over generations and validated both by the initial transgression of that 
collective’s rights, and the denial of those things necessary to its integrity, such as sacred 
lands (Vrdoljak 2008, 203 and 219). The message is that these people count for less, and this 
is embodied in institutional structures and oppressive patterns of behaviour which negatively 
impact the prospects for descendants and the cultural survival of their groups. The system of 
residential schools in Canada, or the Stolen Generations of Australia, are another example of 
wrongs which have contributed significantly to structural inequalities (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 2015b; 2015c). Evidence for structural injustice stemming from 
residential school systems is not hard to find. Indigenous people(s) in Canada, for instance, 
experience higher incarceration rates (Brzozowski, Butts and Johnson 2006; Statistics 
Canada 2019), more unemployment and poverty (Best Resource Centre 2011), poorer health 
and housing (Pascoe and Richman 2009; Sawchuck 2015), higher rates of youth suicide 
(Indigenous Services Canada 2020), higher representation in the child welfare system 
(Greenwood and De Leeuw 2006) and greater violence when compared to the non-
Indigenous population (Department of Justice 2015; RCMP 2014). Acknowledging structural 
injustices draws attention to the broader continuities of the ongoing colonial project of 
subordination that are of central concern of Indigenous people(s) (Sparrow 2000: 351-353). 
1.2.4 Expressive messaging and dignitary harms 
There is a further automatic effect of historical injustice that merits special attention, one 
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exacerbated by, but distinct from, the persistence of structural injustices. This injustice is best 
understood as a dignity-affecting consequence of historical injustice experienced by 
contemporary descendants of direct victims. As many scholars have noted in the context of 
Indigenous calls for redress, collective memory matters to victimized communities.27 Janna 
Thompson (2001a) points out that “what happened in the past […] makes a difference to the 
well-being of people of the present” (134). Thompson has in mind the impact of the socially 
constructed meanings of a historical injustice. The need to respond to the harms associated 
with such meanings is the reason why a worthwhile solution to the transmission problem 
must respond to history and its significance. The dignitary harms to contemporary members 
of a victimized collective, or indeed to a collective itself, are automatic effects of historical 
injustice, regardless of intervening years or generations, “[f]or it is the meaning of the 
injustice to descendants, not the immediacy of the causal relationship, which is crucial” 
(ibid). As Philpott (2012) argues, “[m]emories are not just brute facts; they involve meaning 
and interpretation” (42). The de facto expressive message of disregard intrinsic to 
dehumanizing historical injustice stands as an affront to the dignity of a contemporary 
community and its members. Long denied acknowledgement, group members may justifiably 
feel angry, insulted, or that that they are not considered full members of the moral 
community. The “standing victory” of unredressed injustice is a barrier to any reconciliation 
(38), for the meaning of this injustice derives in part from what the failure to redress it says 
about the relationship between Indigenous people(s) and settler states. 
  Here we should go a bit further and try to understand how historical injustice may 
come to represent much that is wrong with the state’s treatment of Indigenous people(s). 
Doing so requires that we take a panoramic view of the effects of injustice by considering 
how the secondary effects of historical wrongs described above serve to compound and 
worsen the symbolic meaning of the original wrong, and thereby the dignitary harms to 
descendants. As we have seen, both the failure to offer redress and the persistence of 
structural injustices are enduring injustices non-contingently related to, or resulting from, 
historical injustice. These secondary injustices are distinct from the original wrong, but they 
cannot be understood without reference to it. They represent new sites of direct moral 
 
27 For example, see: Fleischner 1999, 333; Ivison 2000, 362; M. Murphy 2011, 63; Philpott 2012, 42-43; 
Spinner-Halev 2007, 576. 
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responsibility for the state. Importantly, they too have automatic effects representing distinct 
injustices in need of correction, and the transitive relation between a historical injustice and 
the effects of its effects means that the state is also responsible for these. While a historical 
injustice is one step removed from these effects – call them ‘tertiary’ effects – it is either 
their proximate cause or bears a non-contingent relationship to them. No intervening agent is 
responsible for these tertiary effects, and nor are the effects so remote as to be unrelated to 
the initial transgression. This means that while the tertiary effects of a historical injustice 
may not be the original intention of the state, since the state is responsible for the foreseeable 
effects of its injustices it should nonetheless be responsible for their rectification. While these 
tertiary effects may not have been intended, the willful failure to do anything about them is a 
result of the intentional structure of the collective at fault.28  
  Here at this tertiary level we can begin to grasp why a historical injustice can 
sometimes loom so large in the collective psyche. The de facto expressive message of 
disrespect intrinsic to the undertaking of a historical injustice is reinforced, reproduced and 
perpetuated by the secondary enduring injustices which follow. This is because the mere fact 
of the denial of reparations represents the state’s view that the victimized community counts 
for less. The mere fact of the existence of structural injustice represents a failure of the state 
to take seriously the concerns of the oppressed. In short, these injustices are understood 
within the context of the modalities of settler-colonialism, a context in which memories of 
historical injustice stand as representative symbols of an ongoing relationship of 
subordination. These expressive messages will receive more attention in the next chapter 
(2.3.1), but the takeaway here is that historical injustices are but one part of an enduring 
pattern of disregard for Indigenous peoples. These injustices are “beginnings and emblems of 
a continuing process” (Vernon 2012, 113). Here I mean to emphasise not the material impact 
of secondary injustices, but rather what the fact of their reality expresses to victimized 
communities. If there was ever any doubt that the modalities of settler colonialism persist, the 
persistence of secondary injustices dispels it. The state’s ongoing refusal to rectify these 
 
28 How far this chain of liability should extend is, for the purposes of this chapter, moot, for the argument 
requires only that we accept the transitive relation of responsibility for injustices so far as is described. 
Injustices at the tertiary level meet the ‘but-for’ condition described above (1.2), and hence are by definition 
automatic effects.   
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reinforces the meaning of a historical injustice to a victimized community and contributes 
significantly to (4) the injustice of dignitary harms to descendants. 
1.2.5 Colonial mindset  
Consideration of the disrespectful expressive message sent through the failure to take history 
seriously by addressing historical injustice and its enduring effects draws our attention to 
another enduring injustice that requires attention if we are to offer a responsive solution to 
the transmission problem. While contemporaries are quick to distance themselves from 
colonial attitudes towards assimilation, dispossession and annihilation which provided the 
social context for historical injustice in a way that encouraged and legitimated them, the 
attitudes that inspired these injustices survive in the present. 
  Perhaps part of the reason that the dignitary impact of historical injustice can loom so 
large in the minds of descendants has to do with how contemporary attitudes towards 
historical injustice are essentially continuous with the colonial project of subordination in 
which it took place. As many authors have pointed out, all injustice takes place in a broader 
system of social meanings, cultural orientations and attitudes (Celermejer 2013, 47). The 
images and stories of Indigenous peoples that shape public consciousness have profound 
effects on the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of settlers, and hence the lived experiences of 
Indigenous people (Furniss 1999, 111). While contemporaries may deny that these systemic 
outlooks persist, the colonial project that sought to assimilate, annihilate, or deny identity to 
Indigenous peoples survives in altered but recognizable form in the present (see e.g. Wolfe 
2006; Woolford 2004).29 Indeed, one need only consider what lack of clean drinking water or 
access to adequate health care says about settler society’s perspective on Indigenous peoples’ 
membership as full and equal members of the moral community to see how these cultural 
perspectives are far from erased (Sparrow 2000: 351).30 The “macro-level” systemic 
injustices which made possible the “micro-level” discrete injustices of the past persist (M. 
Murphy 2011, 55). The underlying attitudes of colonialism – racism, cultural chauvinism, 
paternalism, disregard for the autonomy and rights of Indigenous peoples – survive in altered 
 
29 See also: Short 2003;2005; Moran 1998; Regan 2010. 
 
30 For statistics on boil-water advisories see Health Canada 2016. For health disparities and their relation to 
colonialism see Allan and Smylie 2015 and Frolich, Ross and Richmond 2006.  
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but recognizable form today; the colonial project of dispossession and disempowerment 
continues (see Dorrell 2009; Coulthard 2007; Short 2003). That the enduring injustices 
described above remain unredressed in the face of continuous demands for justice is evidence 
that there is much truth to this idea.    
1.2.6 The elements of the complicity approach: state functioning, civic 
complicity, and wrongful social practice 
The injustices described above are a result of the intentional acts or omissions of the state. 
Given the strong distinction between the state and its citizens espoused in this chapter, it 
might appear that citizens cannot bear responsibility for them. However, this ignores the 
mechanics of state activity, glossing over the interconnection of state acts or omissions and 
the activities of its citizens. That these injustices are the product of collective action or 
inaction does not absolve individuals of responsibility for them, for there is a dependence 
relationship between the acts, omissions and intentions of the state and the acts, omissions 
and intentions of its constituents. Indeed, since the state derives its very legitimacy from the 
(often passive) endorsement of its members (Vernon 2016, 46), individual actors are essential 
for what Lu (2011) calls the “operationalization” of collective injustice (271).   
  Before discussing how individuals can be blameworthy for their contributions to 
emergent injustices like those described above, the first step is to show how they can be 
implicated in them. How the acts and intentions of a state arise is no mystery. While the 
framework I espouse respects a two-level conceptual distinction between the state and its 
citizens, this does not mean that the agency of the state is not exercised through its citizens. 
Indeed, logically it must be. A collective such as a state has a “profound ontological 
dependence on its individual members” (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b, 192). If there were no 
people, there would be no state. This dependence relation bears on the ability of the state to 
exercise its agency. We have already seen how distinctive collective intentions arise from the 
decision-making structures, rules, hierarchies of authority and policies of a state (1.2). The 
intentions of the state, which lead to its actions, likewise derive from the diverse actions and 
intentions of its citizens acting in their assigned roles. While the state has moral autonomy, 
this autonomy is a function of the activities of citizens. So, while the collective acts, 
intentions, and omissions of the state are not reducible to those of its citizens, this does not 
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mean that citizens do not play a part in producing them. We should not forget that the 
everyday activities of citizenship – paying taxes, abiding by the law, participating in the 
economy, voting – support the state in all its functions. The activities of citizens, pursued for 
diverse reasons, result in wrongful collective acts and omissions as I have described them. 
These ordinary activities of citizens amount to what Vernon (2016) calls ‘civic complicity’ 
(37). Since citizens may pursue their activities without sharing or even knowing the 
intentions of the state, if follows that implication in emergent wrongs does not always entail 
blameworthiness. But civic complicity can “transform minute quanta of power into the 
capacity for great violence” (54). Without these, the ordinary activities of citizens, the state 
would not be possible. Nor would its actions or intentions supervene on those of its citizens. 
Importantly, nor would all the injustices for which the state is ultimately responsible persist 
in the world. Thus, the ordinary activities of citizens make a difference to the world. If the 
state is failing those it wrongs, then so by implication are its citizens.31  
  This sketch of civic complicity, concerning as it does the everyday activities of the 
citizen qua citizen, does not tell the whole story. There is another component to the picture of 
citizen implication in wrongdoing that I am painting. While emergent injustices stem from 
citizen activity, these activities occur in the context of a system of meanings, of cultural 
orientations, beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. Just as many citizen activities have little to do 
with citizenship per se, so too are many of these latter features only contingent aspects of 
citizen mindsets. A bare-bones view of civic complicity does not emphasize the essential 
point that any activity is dependent on a complex cultural, social and moral background 
which frames, suggests and encourages individuals’ decisions. If everyday decisions of 
citizens are informed by this background, and if these everyday decisions result in actions or 
omissions that collectively contribute to the injustices for which the state is ultimately 
 
31 Note that the above account of civic complicity (and, later, that of the individual responsibility which flows 
from it) is compatible with both ‘citizen-inclusive’ and ‘citizen-exclusive’ accounts of the state. Citizen-
inclusive models understand the state as consisting of the government, state institutions and citizens (Lawford-
Smith 2019, 16-19). Citizen-exclusive models understand the state as consisting of some amalgam of its 
institutions, its government, and sometimes its civil servants, but exclude its citizens from the formula (69-70). 
For the purposes of the above argument, the characterization of the state does not matter. What matters is that 
the agency of the state, however it manifests, is dependent on the action or inaction of the citizens who thereby 
support it in their everyday activities. This is not to say that degrees of responsibility are indifferentiable. But 
the account of ‘civic complicity’ sketched above does not require that citizens share in the purposes of the state, 
nor even that they have much control over the actions or inaction of the state.    
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responsible, we need to pay some attention to this background. For it is apparent that there is 
something terribly wrong with it.  
  In contributing to the production of injustice – knowingly or not – non-Indigenous 
citizens are engaging in wrongful social practices. Often such practices are seemingly benign 
activities which, cumulatively, produce emergent injustice. For example, Calhoun (1989), 
from whom we will hear more below, notes that “without the ordinary man’s participation in 
routine social practices – in marriage, in the workplace, in daily conversation – oppression 
[of women] would not take the universal form it does” (390). Drawing on Calhoun’s 
discussion, Isaacs (2011) explains that when individuals participate in wrongful social 
practice, they contribute to larger patterns of oppression that affect distinguishable segments 
of society (157). These individuals may not even be aware that they are doing so, for “[w]hen 
ways of life are uncritically accepted as legitimate, individuals routinely participate in 
practices of whose wrongness they are ignorant” (157). In our case, such wrongful social 
practices stem from an ingrained disregard for Indigenous people(s) and their well-being, a 
disregard flowing from the colonial mindset described a moment ago (1.2.5). Such disregard 
results in activities which cumulatively support the state’s injustices. Isaacs notes that, when 
considering wrongful social practice, we are often talking about aspects of societal cultures: a 
blindness to injustice, an ignorance of the impact of seemingly harmless comments, actions 
or activities. For this reason, Isaacs points out that collective wrongdoing of this kind is 
difficult to come to grips with, because “cultures do not, strictly speaking, act, so there is no 
wrongful collective action to isolate” (ibid.).  
  Isaacs (2011) is right to draw attention to this difficulty. However, our context has 
salient characteristics that allow us to bypass it. In this case we can identify an agent – the 
state – that is responsible for the emergent injustices at issue. What’s more, the state bears 
significant responsibility for the main driver of non-Indigenous citizens’ participation in 
wrongful social practice, a driver that is a key feature of the complicity framework I am 
developing. By engaging in the enterprise of settler colonialism, by systematically seeking to 
eradicate Indigenous peoples, by endorsing and instilling a culture of racism, paternalism and 
chauvinism, by labeling Indigenous people as inferior for centuries, by disregarding their 
claims for justice, by abducting their children and banning Indigenous cultural practices and 
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languages, settler states like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States bear a 
heavy burden for promoting, engendering and maintaining the colonial mindset in non-
Indigenous citizens. It is this mindset that forms the salient background of beliefs, attitudes, 
practices and cultural orientations I am drawing attention to here. If this mindset facilitated 
historical injustice and the perpetuation of its legacies, then it seems reasonable to hold the 
state accountable for its remedy. Non-Indigenous citizens carry out their everyday activities, 
and make their seemingly inconsequential decisions, in the context of this background. 
Cumulatively, the results are profoundly harmful. 
  That it is the ordinary activities of citizens that make possible ongoing injustices 
resulting from historical wrongs is significant. It means that almost no non-Indigenous 
citizen is exempt from the moral risk of implication in the perpetration or perpetuation of 
emergent injustice. This consequence is useful in the context of national reconciliation 
projects, for these require broad-based support from citizens (Moellendorf 2007, 215). If only 
collective action on a mass scale can remedy the injustices at issue, casting the net wide is 
important. However, my argument has a paradoxical corollary. For the picture painted above 
ignores how Indigenous people who live in the geographical confines of settler states 
participate in many or all of the same activities as non-Indigenous citizens. It follows from 
my account of civic complicity that these individuals are ‘complicit’ in their own oppression. 
For as participants in the economy, voters and taxpayers they support the state in all its 
functions. Such a conclusion is not only faintly absurd, it is also unseemly.  
  Note that I have thus far said nothing about blameworthiness. How civic complicity 
can transmute into morally blameworthy behavior is discussed in the next section. However, 
to keep the stakes high, let’s allow for now that if complicity of this kind justifies blame, then 
Indigenous people may be as blameworthy for their civic complicity as non-Indigenous 
people. To blame Indigenous peoples for the injustices which impact them is an attitude that 
rightly belongs in the dustbin of history (Tsosie 2006, 193). An initial response to the 
complicity view’s troubling corollary might be to note that it does not obtain in all settler 
states, where many Indigenous peoples, groups or nations are legally at arm’s length from the 
state. However, a response that comes closer to defeating rather than constraining the scope 
of the objection requires that we take note of something I have thus far not emphasized. 
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Within any organized collective there are degrees of connection to emergent collective 
actions and intentions that have bearing on the degree of individual responsibility attributable 
to those constituting the collective. While the collective is ontologically dependent on the 
actions and intentions of its members, some of these members have more influence on the 
direction the collective takes. Degrees of responsibility are similarly differentiable (see 
Lawson 2013). Here we might imagine a spectrum of responsibility, where the degree of 
reparative responsibility falling on an individual is commensurate with their responsibility 
for the perpetration or perpetuation of injustice. On one end might fall those who have a great 
degree of control over the direction of the state, such as a high-ranking politician. Towards 
the other end of the spectrum might fall those who are very recent immigrants. In the former 
case, the reparative responsibility attending individual failure to direct policy towards the 
elimination of injustice may be significant. In the latter, reparative responsibility may entail 
only such things as the endorsement of policies of redistributive taxation. At the very far end 
of this spectrum of liability – perhaps so far as to be outside of it – we might imagine another 
sort of individual. Namely, those who are actively taking steps to promote redress, or those 
who consciously try to avoid engaging in wrongful social practice. The very fact that many 
Indigenous groups, people or nations are seeking redress signals that they are taking forward 
steps that others are not. Since actively trying to eliminate injustice is what ultimately does 
away with it, we can make the case that these parties are not complicit in the emergent 
injustices of the state in any meaningful sense, and certainly not in a blameworthy way. 
While a strict reading of the complicity view holds that even those who agitate for redress 
and who oppose the moral failings of government are implicated to some degree through 
civic complicity, there is a certain point at which adhering to this model might lapse into 
absurdity. 
  However, abjuring the unseemly corollary of the complicity view in this way is 
something of an artificial response. For, by the logic of the approach I am defending, even if 
an individual does not support the state’s reluctance to address injustice, and even if she 
actively promotes the elimination of injustice, she still supports the state through her 
everyday activities. That is, she is still implicated even if she disavows what amounts to the 
collective intention of the state. Escaping the net of civic complicity is difficult if not 
impossible. Indeed, it is so difficult that it suggests we consider another response to the 
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above objection concerning Indigenous peoples’ apparent complicity in their own 
oppression.  
  Here it is important to recall that the model of complicity I am developing consists of 
two distinct but related features. First is civic complicity simplicter, or the idea that everyday 
citizen activities support the emergent collective actions of the state. Second is the 
background system of meanings, orientations and attitudes which suggest or encourage 
citizens to act in certain ways within a state. The latter element informs the nature of the 
activities and decisions in the context of the former, and hence indirectly contributes to the 
injustices under review. Appealing to Calhoun’s (1989) discussion of ignorance and reproach 
in the context of wrongful social practice is helpful for elucidating the significance of a moral 
context permeated by a colonial mindset. Calhoun makes a useful distinction between 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ moral contexts. Normal moral contexts are ones in which society at 
large shares in the moral knowledge needed to guide right action. “In normal moral contexts, 
the rightness or wrongness of different courses of action is ‘transparent’ to individuals” 
(394). By ‘transparent’ Calhoun means something like ‘obvious’ – it is obvious to people 
what the moral rules are, which normative expectations apply to particular circumstances, 
and so on. That is, a normal moral context is one in which reasonably reflective individuals 
can apply moral knowledge to guide right action in particular contexts, where they know 
what is right and wrong, and know which behaviours are acceptable and which are not (395).  
 In contrast to a normal moral context, an abnormal moral context is one in which 
moral knowledge has advanced, but only a subset of the population is aware of it. “As a 
result, the rightness or wrongness of some courses of action … are, for a time, transparent 
only to the knowledge-acquiring subgroup but ‘opaque’ to outsiders” (Calhoun 1989, 396). 
In an abnormal moral context ignorance of the advances in moral knowledge can sometimes 
excuse individuals’ participation in wrongful social practice (though Calhoun argues they are 
still subject to reproach). While Calhoun’s discussion concerns moral progress among expert 
subgroups such as feminists or bioethicists, Isaacs (2011) makes the point that one needn’t be 
an expert in any formal sense to be at the forefront of moral knowledge. She points out that 
those who are members of disadvantaged or oppressed groups surely have insight into the 
patterns of social practice that contribute to their marginalization. These people, argues 
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Isaacs, “do not need moral experts to understand that there is something troubling and unjust 
about their situation” (170). In our context, it makes sense to say that Indigenous people have 
expert knowledge of the abnormal moral context that encourages their oppression at the 
hands of settlers and the settler state. If this is so, what follows is the thoroughly unsurprising 
conclusion that what I have termed the ‘colonial mindset’ exhibited by settlers is not shared 
by Indigenous people.  
  This suggests that Indigenous people, who through their lived experience arrive at the 
forefront of moral knowledge in this domain, are not contributing to the maintenance of an 
abnormal moral context in which the colonial mindset is still widely thought acceptable. 
Along this dimension of civic complicity, then, they cannot be reproached for maintaining a 
mindset that indirectly perpetuates the enduring injustices which impact them. While the 
above sketch of civic complicity suggests that there are some injustices which an individual 
cannot help but contribute to through supporting the economy, voting, paying taxes and the 
like, so far as is possible moral experts are unlikely to participate in the wrongful social 
practices that contribute to the emergent harms stemming from seemingly benign citizen 
activities. Given the choice, Indigenous people would undoubtedly not seek to enable their 
own oppression. And even if Indigenous individuals are implicated along the first (civic) 
dimension of complicity, this is not enough to demonstrate blameworthiness. To place moral 
blame entailing liability on someone for actions that do damage to their own person – actions 
that they have no option but to undertake – would be strange if not objectionable. Thus, a 
reasonable response to the above objection is that Indigenous peoples cannot incur reparative 
responsibility (towards themselves, consider) on the grounds that not only is it absurd to 
suggest they do, but also on the grounds that, whatever the extent of their participation in 
state activity, that they are not a legitimating source of colonial attitudes which indirectly 
support injustice – that they know what is wrong and would do otherwise if they could – 
absolves them of any moral responsibility for the repair of the injustices the state is 
perpetrating. While non-Indigenous citizens who espouse a latent colonial mindset may incur 
reparative responsibilities through civic complicity, Indigenous victims of state-perpetrated 
injustice will not.  
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1.3 The complicity approach 
What sort of moral responsibility stems from the injustices described in 1.2, and on whom or 
what does it land? That there is injustice suggests that someone or something is responsible 
(Young 2011, 95). The framework espoused in this paper identifies a responsible agent: the 
state. But how are we to understand what sort of responsibility flows to the other type of 
agent that is of interest here – the non-Indigenous citizen – in virtue of her implication in 
wrongdoing? This is what Lawson (2013) refers to as the “problem of collective wrongs”: 
how do we assign blame or remedial responsibility to individuals for collective wrongs when 
none of them appear to be responsible for those wrongs (228)? In what follows I take a 
dialectic approach to the complicity view to uncover how the state and its contemporary 
constituents are morally responsible for the injustices described in 1.2, but in different ways. 
Specifically, the state is the agent with ultimate responsibility for these injustices: it is 
factually ‘guilty,’ even if it cannot know it (Isaacs 2011, 71-72). The state, if you like, is the 
‘principal’ in these wrongs. However, non-Indigenous citizens of the state are responsible 
too. They are responsible for forward-looking redress because, if they do not promote or 
participate in state redress for these injustices, they become complicit in their perpetuation in 
a blameworthy way. Consequently, attending this duty of participation is an obligation to 
help move us from an abnormal to a normal social context.  
  To presage the forthcoming argument, consider the example of those structural 
injustices that are automatic effects of a historical wrong. Contemporary individuals who 
retain a colonial mindset perpetuate structural injustices largely unknowingly, yet they are 
parties to the unjust deprivation of descendants of victims of historical injustice (Lyons 1977, 
268). They participate in wrongful social practice. Given their ignorance of the impact of 
their behaviour, they are initially not morally blameworthy. However, once an individual is 
made aware of structural injustices resulting from a past wrong, and once that individual 
recognizes that only collective action can remedy them, that individual has a moral 
responsibility to both take part in the state’s redress and encourage others to do so as well. If 
they do not, they become blameworthy in virtue of knowing causal complicity. The 
avoidance of morally blameworthy complicity thereby offers agent-centred reasons for 
individuals to participate in collective redress, reasons which respect the liberal liability 
model these individuals espouse. The idea is that non-Indigenous citizens cannot condemn 
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structural injustice while simultaneously doing nothing about it. This sort of inconsistency is 
morally blameworthy. It is therefore the recognition of injustice and its root causes that 
engenders a moral duty to do something about it.32  
  If we grant that distinct injustices in need of rectification result from historical 
injustice, it may still be protested that ‘complicity’ in these injustices is an unfair charge to 
level against contemporary non-Indigenous citizens of a state. After all, these injustices are 
ultimately the responsibility of the state, and often unknowingly perpetuated by the citizens. 
Within the confines of the liability model, one might argue that citizens should not be 
responsible for their rectification. The core of this challenge speaks to the core of the 
transmission problem: no fault, no duty. Answering it will take us further down the road to an 
understanding of how to combat it, or how to begin to solve the ‘settler problem’ by 
convincing settlers of their reparative duties.  
  To be complicit in a morally blameworthy way for a wrong one must knowingly make 
a causal contribution to that wrong when they have a choice to do otherwise; so-called 
“participatory intent”33 – that is, sharing in the purposes or intentions of the principal – is not 
required for the type of complicity that concerns us here. Standard discussions in criminal 
and tort law hold that participatory intent and causal contribution are necessary for 
ascriptions of paradigmatic complicity (Feinberg 1970, 222). Accomplice liability derives 
from a secondary party’s knowing causal contribution to the wrongful actions of a principal 
when both parties share the same goal (Kadish 1985, 337-338). Not all scholars agree. 
Indeed, some suggest that only participatory intent, and not even a minimum of causal 
contribution, is enough to make one complicit in a wrong (Kutz 2007; 2011; Lawson 2013, 
234). However, both understandings of complicity derive from legal analysis. Our context is 
a moral one. Whatever its merits in other domains, the requirement of participatory intent is 
not appropriately applied to individuals in our context because of the nature of the individual 
wrongs in question: unsought perpetuation of unjust collective acts or omissions. Instead, my 
 
32 The notion that inconsistency between moral judgements and subsequent inaction is blameworthy is 
borrowed from Daniel Butt (2007), who argues that “[we] make a conceptual error if we condemn a given 
action as unjust, but are not willing to reverse or mitigate its effects on the grounds that it has benefited us. The 
refusal undermines the condemnation” (143).  
 
33 The term is from Kutz 2011, 148. 
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approach requires that to be ‘complicit’ in a blameworthy way one, quite simply, knowingly 
contribute to a wrong. That is, this view of ‘causal complicity’ holds that one’s actions, made 
in conditions of knowledge, must make a difference to the world (Gardner 2007, 137 and 
140; see Anwander 2005). This sort of complicity is, of course, “all the more blameworthy” 
if the participant shares in the purposes of the principal, but “one can contribute causally and 
knowingly and hence be complicit with [the principal’s] wrongdoing without sharing the 
wrongdoer’s purposes at all” (Goodin and Lepora 2017, 269). Blameworthiness hinges on the 
requirement of knowledge, not intent. 
  This view of complicity suggests that, once made aware of the effects of their actions 
in the perpetuation of injustice, failure to participate in redress transmutes into a sort of 
complicity that is morally blameworthy (see Nussbaum 2006, 21). If we are living in an 
abnormal moral context, then a failure to take heed of the insights of moral experts at the 
forefront of moral knowledge represents a moral failure. To avoid morally compromising 
complicity, an agent should at the very least cease to play their part in the perpetuation of 
injustices arising through civic complicity. Yet, as I’ll show presently, the view of state 
functioning described above (1.2.6) has the consequence that doing so will require active 
participation in, or support for, redress. Thus, the objection – that since it is the state that is 
responsible for the injustice the citizenry should not be held responsible – just does not hold 
up: since non-Indigenous citizens can knowingly make a causal difference to the world in the 
form of acting as accomplices to the injustices of the state, they are responsible for those 
injustices, albeit to a much lesser degree.   
1.3.1 Objection: active vs. passive contributions to injustice and redress  
Here an objection might be raised. Since we are working within the liability framework it 
makes sense that I aim to assign blame to citizens for what they have done or what they are 
still doing. We seek to assign forward-looking reparative responsibility because of (causal) 
outcome responsibility for wrongful behaviours in the context of collective action. The type 
of complicity that I have just described has a requirement of knowledge. For this reason, it 
surely makes sense to call a citizen complicit in a blameworthy way when she knows what 
she is doing has harmful effects and yet continues to do it when she could do otherwise. But 
one could argue that a citizen who immediately withdraws enabling support upon being 
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apprised of the consequences of her actions cannot reasonably be reproached for complicity 
in the wrongdoing of the state; she was, instead, simply an inattentive actor. So how can we 
assign reparative responsibility to her because of knowing causal complicity? I have already 
noted that recognizing the wrongness of an injustice and doing nothing positive to fix it can 
be a source of moral blameworthiness insofar as it represents moral inconsistency. However, 
the objection bypasses this observation by pointing to the vexing distinction between doing 
and allowing, acting and omitting. The objection holds that, because of the distinction 
between doing and allowing, by ceasing to actively perpetuate injustice the citizen who 
withdraws enabling support is thereby absolved of moral responsibility because she no longer 
contributes to the action of the principal. This is because she is only allowing injustice to 
continue by doing nothing about it. That is, she is not complicit. Under my framework it 
appears that it is only by complicity that one can be liable for repair. Therefore, the 
normative motivation to participate in redress – if there is any – cannot stem from within 
liability doctrine.  
  Recall that omissions as I have described them are a result of ongoing agency. They 
are the result of choices made under conditions of knowledge. In this collective context the 
omissions of the state are intentional, for recall that it is simply not the case that these 
injustices are taking place in a context of ignorance. The state would find it very hard indeed 
to prove that it knows nothing of the injustices for which it is responsible. Now remember 
that the state’s intentional acts and omissions are dependent on – though not reducible to – 
the acts and omissions of its citizens. And finally, consider that redress is a project that 
requires action; the injustices at issue are not going to disappear all on their own. Redress is 
not a passive activity, and thus state redress requires the participation of citizens. This means 
that any omissions on the part of citizens in this domain will make a difference to the world: 
they will perpetuate injustice. When these omissions are willful – i.e. made in conditions of 
knowledge – citizens support the ongoing injustices of the state in a blameworthy way. Thus, 
though not acts per se, citizens’ omissions meet the definition of knowing causal complicity 
outlined above. Since lack of rectification on the part of the state effects the perpetuation of 
injustice, so too does an individual’s lack of participation in state redress effect this 
perpetuation. Active participation is required to avoid blameworthy complicity.  
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  Indeed, it is difficult to see how an individual could ever withdraw enabling support 
for enduring injustices when she lives in a state that limits her ability to do so, or which is 
unwilling to undertake redress. That is, it is difficult to see how an individual can avoid civic 
complicity entirely. Withdrawing from economic activity, for example, is not something 
most people are able to do. Recall that the activities of citizens are pursued in the context of a 
system of meanings, cultural orientations and attitudes, and remember that the activities of 
the state are dependent on those of its citizens. If a failure to address enduring injustice stems 
from the cumulative indifference of non-Indigenous citizens, it seems reasonable to hold that 
those who are aware of the harmfulness of the colonial mindset have a duty to apprise others 
– who are not aware – of their inattentiveness. Calhoun (1989) argues that to excuse people 
for their actions on the grounds that they know no better has the effect of sanctioning these 
actions (400-403). “In abnormal contexts, where wrong actions are socially accepted, not 
pointing out wrongdoing is not even ambiguous. It will automatically be interpreted as 
sanctioning” (401). This is because inattentive actors may wrongly think themselves to be in 
a normal moral context, and thus letting things slide is no different than endorsing the status 
quo. Since not reproaching others for their moral ignorance has a sanctioning effect, it 
indirectly contributes to the maintenance of those cultural orientations that ultimately 
perpetuate enduring injustice. So, while withdrawing enabling support for the state may not 
be possible in many areas, still non-Indigenous citizens must seek to redress injustice by 
convincing others of the need for it. Non-Indigenous citizens’ rejection of the colonial 
mindset will have the effect of redirecting the priorities of the state. If a critical mass of non-
Indigenous citizens is convinced, we will no longer be in an abnormal moral context, but a 
normal one, where society at large has absorbed newly discovered moral knowledge. In a 
normal moral context, moral rules and normative expectations are widely shared, and the 
state – ontologically dependent on its citizens and at least theoretically beholden to its 
members – will be better able to redress injustice through citizen participation in 
reconciliatory measures.  
  The upshot is that since it is only active change that can extirpate enduring injustices, 
not acting is sufficient to perpetuate them. Recalling again our desiderata (1.1), we can now 
see why contemporary non-Indigenous citizens of the settler state are (a) those who should 
undertake repair; why they have (b) normative reasons to participate in redress; why (c) 
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contemporaries, while innocent of historical wrongdoing, nonetheless have some liability for 
its righting.    
1.3.2 Objection: how useful is this framework?  
Perhaps the reader might still think it a bit harsh to tar non-Indigenous citizens with the brush 
of complicity. The motivation to use the language of blame comes from the need to draw 
attention to the wrongness of the injustices under consideration, as well as to serve as a sort 
of corrective to the fiction of settler benevolence that permeates the mythology of settler 
states.34 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that feelings of guilt motivate non-
Indigenous participation in redress for historical wrongs (Allpress, Barlow and Brown 2010). 
However, one might take issue with the use of juridical language, especially since our 
context is a moral one. Iris Young (2011), for instance, contends that assigning liability and 
blame to individuals for wrongdoing in the context of layered social processes and complex 
institutional structures is not productive (116). According to Young, “the liability model of 
responsibility… is inappropriate for assigning responsibility in relation to structural 
injustice” (99). In part, this is because “the specific actions of each [contributor] cannot be 
causally disentangled from structural processes to trace a specific aspect of the outcome” 
(100). As seen above, many of the enduring injustices discussed are fruitfully conceived as 
structural injustices of the type Young has in mind. For Young, that individuals deserve no 
blame for their participation in wrongful social practice does not entail that they are not 
responsible for its righting, but it does suggest that this understanding of responsibility 
should be essentially forward-looking (108). Since backward-looking blame is not useful in 
this context, “[w]hat we should seek is not a variation on a weaker form of liability, but 
rather a different conception of responsibility altogether” (104). Part of the reason for this 
approach stems from Young’s insight that failing to intend an outcome surely mitigates 
moral responsibility (103). Furthermore, “[a] public discourse of blame […] oversimplifies, 
failing to develop a public understanding of the actions and practices whose consequences 
produce injustice” (117).  
  I sympathize with Young’s view, and I do not intend to rule it out as an approach to 
resolving enduring injustices. However, notwithstanding Young’s argument, I think that in 
 
34 See for example: Regan 2010, Dorrell 2009, Dominello 2017. 
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this context the language of complicity and blame is appropriate. While Young may be right 
to suggest that it is intuitively implausible to associate blame with citizens for their everyday 
activities, her model is not geared towards our context: a context which views these 
individual actions as falling within the background of intentional collective action. The 
actions of individuals operating in the context of collective action inherit some of the moral 
characteristics of that collective action (Isaacs 2011, 11 and 57). Seen this way, the activities 
of citizens take on a new normative significance, for their action-descriptions must refer to 
the place of those actions in collective wrongs to fully convey their moral contours (100-102 
and 127). The moral significance of some actions changes when we realize that we find 
ourselves in an abnormal moral context and that we should not consider these actions morally 
appropriate. If non-Indigenous citizens’ actions and omissions contribute to the perpetuation 
of injustice, everyday activities are no longer so harmless. Drawing attention to this 
highlights the urgency of the moral situation. For this reason, the language of blame is 
appropriate and highlights how citizens should conceive of their agency and its impact as 
opposed to how they do conceive of this agency. 
Young thinks that, because individual contributions to injustice cannot be causally 
untangled to match cause with effect, the language of blame is inappropriate (100). Extent of 
causal contribution is indeed a live issue in the context of criminal complicity (Feinberg 
1970, 246). However, in our context, I do not see what follows from the indeterminacy of 
contributory effects. After all, we are not seeking to assign full blame for collective 
wrongdoing to any individual. By definition, that is impossible. Instead, we seek to show that 
the minute contributions of each individual amount to intentional collective action or 
omission. Individual responsibility – both backward and forward-looking – is consequently 
small for ordinary citizens. Simply knowing that one does contribute, by act or omission, and 
no matter the indeterminate consequences, is enough to show why one should support or 
participate in redress (see Kelly 2011, 196). Young’s conviction that causal disentanglement 
is impossible motivates her to suggest that we should seek a new account of responsibility. 
But this is not necessary. While, again, I would not want to rule out this approach, conceiving 
of individual responsibility for collective injustice as falling within the liability framework is 
fruitful insofar as it avoids moral revisionism. It offers a familiar way of assigning 
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responsibility for injustice, one that differs only in degree and not in kind, and which will 
help to solve the ‘settler problem’ by speaking to settlers on their own philosophical terms.   
Recall that we are seeking a solution to the transmission problem that pays 
appropriate attention to history: we seek a responsive solution. Identifying a principal agent 
as the bearer of full responsibility for historical injustices allows us to construe the acts and 
omissions of the state as intentional. Were the actions of citizens considered outside of this 
framework the injustices that arise in the wake of historical injustice would have to be 
thought of as almost inexplicable phenomena arising from the parallel actions of individuals. 
These parallel actions would therefore not inherit the normative features of what we should 
understand as intentional collective wrongdoing. Young’s construal is more fitted to 
something like climate change – a phenomenon arising from the largely unorganized 
activities of the denizens of the world – than injustices in an organized, enduring state (see 
Nussbaum 2006). Ignoring the intentional structure of the state and the consequent 
characterization of wrongdoing as intentional would leave a huge normative gap between a 
description of the ordinary activities of citizens and their impact on Indigenous people(s). 
Instead, the complicity view offers a way to assign both forward- and backward-looking 
responsibility to both the state and its citizens in a way that pays attention to the origins of 
enduring injustices while assigning ultimate responsibility to an agent capable of 
coordinating remedial collective action – the state. Since the need to attend to history is a 
feature of many Indigenous calls for justice, it is fruitful to seek a solution that lends itself to 
this.      
1.4 Answering to the desiderata 
Locating a wrong in non-Indigenous citizen complicity in the perpetuation of enduring 
injustice allows us to answer to many of the desiderata for a successful answer to the 
transmission problem outlined above (1.1). The complicity framework does not require 
voluntary identification with the state, nor any special understanding of the meaning of 
citizenship, nor contentious understandings of the value of community, nor even that we 
untangle individual impact on collective wrongs. Because the injustices in question are non-
contingently related to historical injustice perpetrated by a state it (a) particularizes the duties 
of moral repair to the state and consequently to the citizens of this collective; it (b) offers 
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convincing normative reasons for citizens to play their part in redress, for no morally 
conscious agent should be complicit in ongoing wrongdoing; (c) it shows that, contrary to the 
cynic’s argument, citizens are not always innocent of wrongdoing non-contingently related to 
a historical injustice, at least once they recognize that their actions or omissions support the 
ongoing injustices of the state; and (d) it demonstrates how contemporary non-Indigenous 
citizens are party to the reproduction of systemic colonial attitudes and outlooks that are 
continuous with those of the past. However, the reader will rightly point out that the 
framework so outlined does not adequately explain how (e) a normative motivation for 
redress lies in a recognition of the immorality of historical injustice itself. The focus has been 
on dealing with injustices of the present, not the past, and isn’t that missing the whole point? 
Since we want redress to respond to historical injustice per se, and not just its effects, the 
complicity approach arguably falls short. Fulfilling this desideratum thus requires further 
discussion. 
1.4.1 Locating a normative motivation for redress in history 
The motivation for a state to redress a historical injustice lies in its causal responsibility for 
that wrong and its ensuing effects. The framework outlined above suggests that citizens’ 
motivations to participate in the process of redress consist in how they can be complicit in a 
blameworthy way in the perpetuation of those effects, as well as in the maintenance of the 
legitimating systemic attitudes that led to historical wrongdoing. Citizens should therefore 
prevent their perpetuation and, since wrongs deserve righting, help atone for them. While the 
fundamental moral presuppositions for both state and citizen are that knowingly causing an 
avoidable harm entails a duty of rectification, and of course that we should avoid the 
perpetuation of injustice, the state and citizens are clearly operating by two distinct 
motivations. Importantly for the detractor, the motivation of the citizen does not seem to 
come from the right moral place.  
  As noted in 1.1, motivations matter for the project of reconciliation because the 
meaning and perceived significance of historical injustices from the perspective of offended 
parties are key to identifying and justifying the sorts of remedies that will respond to the 
harms at issue. These remedies require that we undertake redress with the right intent, for 
responding to historical injustice purely in the interest of political expediency will miss the 
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forest for the trees. Since the meanings of historical injustices are connected to the identity 
and dignity of Indigenous peoples, the normative motivations that underlie the justification 
for redress will dictate the sorts of significance it can have in the context of reconciliation. 
While the distinct motivations of the state and citizens coincide at a place where the 
independent reasons for redress, in practice, result in each type of agent addressing ongoing 
injustice, that non-Indigenous citizens aim to redress only effects of historical injustice, and 
continuities in systemic outlooks, is problematic. Often, calls for redress on the part of 
subsisting victimized communities specifically cite historical injustices – and not only their 
effects – for which no currently living people are causally responsible (Marrus 2007, 79). If 
we are to meaningfully address the grievances of offended parties, we must find a way to 
connect citizens to historical injustice in a normatively appropriate way.  
  As discussed in 1.2.4, there is an intangible, tertiary enduring injustice resulting from 
historical wrongs: the dignitary harms to descendants and their communities. The meaning of 
a historical injustice can have profound effects on a victimized cultural group or community 
(Thompson 2001, 134). Historical injustices dehumanized victims, and this is part of what 
made them wrong. Without repudiating the disrespectful message implicit in this 
dehumanization, it continues to be sent to descendants. This is part of the reason the memory 
of a historical injustice can impact members and communal memory in dignity-affecting 
ways: “[t]hose whose family lines were in the past attacked, exploited, suppressed, or 
denigrated are likely to suffer from feelings of anger, regret, sadness or insecurity […]” 
(ibid). To quote Philpott (2012) again, “memories are not just brute facts” (42); they are 
imbued with meaning and significance. For this reason, the harmful impact and 
interpretations of memories should be considered as among the effects of a historical 
injustice, for there is no other cause to which they can be attributed. The subsistence of 
secondary enduring injustices and the failure to offer redress reinforces, informs and 
perpetuates this damaging social meaning, and consequently its dignitary impact. 
  Part of the legacy of a historical injustice is that persecuted groups – long denied 
reparations, apology or acknowledgment – feel that they are unjustly ignored. Disregard for 
their claims reinforces mistrust and a sense that their community is not afforded the respect it 
deserves. The historical injustice thus stands as a representative emblem of a continuing 
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process (Vernon 2012, 113). As an emblem, historical injustice may come to represent the 
indignities and injustices attendant on settler-colonialism; it is an insulting and dehumanizing 
emblem, a sort of placeholder for much that is wrong with the treatment of Indigenous 
people(s), past and present. As Marrus (2007) argues, those who seek apology for historical 
injustice stress the importance of acknowledging “their understanding of the nature of the 
wrong committed, and its destructive effects, both originally and subsequently” (79). The 
“nature of the wrong” is part of the meaning of a historical injustice, or what it symbolizes. 
Marrus continues, 
  Violations of human rights, though long past, still ravage the identities of victimized 
 groups and individuals because human rights are so fundamental to the human 
  condition; trauma, shame, self-denigration, and then consciousness building around 
 the cause of rectification not only continue to shape the lives of victims, their effects 
 [also] persist in succeeding generations. (83). 
The meaning of an injustice thus becomes intertwined with identity, and this is why “[i]t is 
the remembering which is important for many people; and it is the forgetting which is most 
offensive” (Kukathas 2003, 173). Neglecting the historical record is damaging to a 
victimized community’s identity (Waldron 1992, 6). If the offended community cares about 
its history, so too should the inheritors of the polity that so impacted it.  
  Here we must recognize that the significance of a historical injustice and its 
consequent dignitary harms do not arise out of a vacuum. The ongoing failure to address this 
meaning on the part of a responsible collective can reinforce an offended community’s sense 
that non-Indigenous people do not consider them moral equals or worthy of attention. This 
attitude is in keeping with the colonial past. Persecuted Indigenous individuals, peoples, 
groups and nations see that the colonial mindset of the past persists in the present, even if 
many contemporary non-Indigenous citizens do not. The significance of the injustice as a 
symbol of colonialism arises from long-established patterns of oppression which involve 
non-Indigenous individuals’ attitudes, the political traditions of the state, the unjust structure 
of its social institutions, and the cultural ambivalence of its non-Indigenous citizens living 
their everyday lives in ways continuous with those of the past. Together, these reproduce the 
disrespectful expressive messaging of historical injustice. An ingrained disregard for the 
claims of a victimized community’s calls for justice reinforces these messages, for it 
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exemplifies the continually reproduced modalities of colonialism (see Sparrow 2000 and 
Spinner-Halev 2007). Citizens of a culpable state are thus complicit in the maintenance and 
reproduction of the damaging social meaning of a historical injustice, for they perpetuate the 
dignity-affecting disregard for calls for redress and fail to acknowledge the wrongfulness of 
historical mistreatment. The meaning of a historical injustice for a victimized community 
matters; ignoring this is unjust and disrespectful. Addressing the meaning of an injustice 
requires altering its significance to Indigenous peoples. Once we recognize that the 
maintenance of attitudes, prejudicial patterns of behaviour and political traditions in turn 
maintain the dignity-affecting meaning of a historical injustice for offended parties, citizens 
have a reason for participating in the state’s redress for it – and for participating in 
reconciliation more broadly. If they do not, they are blameworthy. 
  The reader may object that the motivation just described fails to fulfill desideratum 
(e), that the motivation to redress historical injustice stem partly from the recognition of its 
wrongfulness. She might argue that instead of the motivation for participation being about a 
historical injustice, it is actually about the avoidance of complicity in the perpetuation of its 
damaging symbolism, and thus the normative motivation is still misplaced. But this misses 
the nuance of my position. While it is true that citizens are not at fault for historical injustice 
per se, and that the fault principle thus does not apply with respect to this wrong, there are 
other normative considerations that come into play here. These bear on individuals’ liability 
for the dignitary harms inextricably connected to historical injustice.  
  The dehumanizing message of historical injustice is part of what made it wrong. 
Since dehumanization was an inextricable feature of historical injustices, failing to redress 
them means that their dehumanizing message stands. To the extent that such injustices 
remain undressed, the message of Indigenous inferiority is maintained. Yet one who focuses 
only on the present would not be getting the point. It is not just about the effects of historical 
wrongdoing and the recognition that they are unjust, but about what the perpetration of 
historical injustice says about settler societies’ perspective of Indigenous people(s). This 
expands our understanding of historical injustice from a narrow consideration of a discrete 
episode in history to the erroneous normative presuppositions of colonialism itself. Such an 
expanded understanding requires that non-Indigenous citizens recognize that the denial of 
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justice in effect denies the moral equality of Indigenous people in a way that is in keeping not 
only with colonial ideology, but also with the moral architecture of the historical injustices at 
issue. What matters is not sympathy with suffering, but acknowledgment that historical 
injustice was wrong (Marrus 2007, 79). This means that contemporaries must first understand 
history, its significance, and its bearing on – and relation to – the present. A commitment to 
redress historical injustice cannot really come with the desire to avoid complicity alone but 
must begin with a recognition that a historical injustice was wrong, that the cultural outlooks 
that made historical injustices possible persist, that offended parties are moral equals 
deserving of respect, and that the perspectives of offended communities with respect to the 
injustice are worth considering. Given the passage of time, how else are we to address a 
historical injustice directly but through its meaning?  
1.5 Conclusion 
The challenge this paper aimed to meet came from cynics who deny that contemporaries can 
be held responsible in a forward-looking way for historical injustices perpetrated by the state. 
By embracing a two-level distinction between the state and its citizens, and by drawing 
attention to how there are distinct, enduring injustices that resulted from or enabled historical 
injustice, I have offered a solution to the transmission problem that will help to solve the 
settler problem. By speaking from within the liability framework in a way that respects 
Eurocentric worldviews, this chapter sought to convince settlers not only that they are 
morally responsible for the redress of historical wrongs, but also that the larger project of 
reconciliation is worthwhile in the first place. Paying attention to enduring injustices helps 
lay the groundwork for a holistic approach to reconciliation: it is not just about 
acknowledging that what was done was wrong, but also about answering to the needs of the 
descendants of victims, victims who deserve redress for the wrongs they and their 
communities have suffered and continue to suffer.  
  What does all of this have to say about reconciliation in settler states, the ultimate 
focus of this dissertation? Answering this question would be getting ahead of ourselves. I 
said at the outset that official apology for historical injustice would be our test case for the 
transmission of responsibility across generations. Now that we have a conceptual armoury 
with which to approach official apology, it is time to turn to the issue of how we can make 
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sense of this intriguing instrument of reconciliation. That is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: The Moral Goals of Official Apology in Settler States 
Introduction: conceptual problems with historical apologies 
The most frequently voiced criticism of official apology for historical injustice is one that is 
familiar in form to the problem addressed in the last chapter. Namely, people alive today did 
not commit the acts that are the subject of apology (Wyeneth 2001, 25; see Thompson 2012; 
Govier and Vewoerd 2002d). Chapter 1’s solution to the transmission problem, or the issue 
of whether reparative responsibility for injustice can transmit across generations, was not 
undertaken solely to convince settlers of their moral responsibility to participate in the 
substantive processes associated with reconciliation. It was also in large part an effort to 
come to grips with whether contemporaries can apologize for something they did not do. The 
thought was that if reparative responsibility can transmit across generations, then so perhaps 
can standing to apologize. But this apparent corollary of my solution to the transmission 
problem is not readily deduced from the findings of chapter 1. In fact, one could argue that 
the conditional might be better understood as running the other way: if contemporaries can 
meaningfully apologize for historical injustice, then their reparative responsibilities must be 
clear. This is why I said that official apology would be our ‘test case,’ a sort of trial by fire 
for my solution to the transmission problem. By solving the hardest case of a kind, we have 
evidence that other cases of that kind are likewise solvable. Official apology is our test case 
because while the transfer of reparative responsibility across generations can be justified on a 
number of grounds, standing to apologize cannot be. This is because of a peculiar feature of 
apology: to meaningfully apologize for something, one must have been responsible for that 
something. I cannot apologize to you in any meaningful sense for the destruction of your car 
when it was your neighbor who borrowed the car, drove recklessly, and crashed it. But 
perhaps I incur some sort of reparative responsibility if I had previously told you that your 
neighbor was a trustworthy fellow and good driver. That is, it is harder to justify a transfer of 
standing than it is to justify a transfer of reparative responsibility. 
  One of the goals of this chapter will be to argue that the complicity approach can 
demonstrate how contemporaries have standing to offer a morally significant apology for 
historical (and enduring) injustice. In this aspect, the chapter will respond to the criticism that 
official apologies for historical injustice simply do not make sense because contemporaries 
are not responsible for the acts that are their subject. But if I were to stop there, we would be 
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no closer to understanding the meaning of ‘reconciliation,’ the ultimate aim of this 
dissertation. This chapter therefore calls for a more ambitious agenda. If we grant that official 
apology is a part of reconciliation, a wider exploration of official apology may be able to 
shed some light on necessary conditions for reconciliation considered as an outcome. That is, 
if we can understand how official apology for historical injustice might make sense, we may 
be able to uncover some of the underlying assumptions about the aims of reconciliation. 
Addressing the issue of standing will help in this conceptual excavation by putting the 
complicity approach to work, showing why contemporaries are key players in the project of 
reconciliation. But it will not be enough for a broader understanding of reconciliation. To 
better understand reconciliation, we need to explore what official apology is trying to do in 
this context.   
  Official apology, as a relatively new and emerging political practice, is haunted by a 
number of conceptual issues. My aim in this chapter is to address three of the most salient for 
the purposes of this dissertation. Because we need first to know what we are talking about 
before we can explore apology’s moral functions, sec. 2.1 will determine the essential 
components of an official apology. For empirical reasons, I will argue that these components 
should be nearly identical to those of interpersonal apology. To respond to the objection that 
a state cannot logically meet these component requirements, I will argue that we can rescue 
official apology from conceptual peril by understanding it from a functionalist perspective. 
Sec. 2 is where I will address the issue of standing, but I do this indirectly through an 
examination of how we should characterize the ‘apologizer’ in official apology. The reason 
for this indirect route is related to the observation that what an apology can do depends in 
large part on what its deliverer can do. To illustrate, my apology for the neighbor’s totaling 
of your car will likely not do much for you; it will probably not satisfy you. You want the 
apology to come from him, not me. An apology of the kind that concerns this dissertation is 
not an expression of sympathy, but instead involves an admission of responsibility. So, what 
the deliverer of an apology can do depends on what sort of standing they have. This is why it 
is important to land on an account of how we should conceive of the apologizer here. Is it the 
state, its citizens, or some amalgam of both? The answer to this question has implications for 
the meaning and significance an official apology can have. By drawing on the consequences 
of the complicity approach I will conclude that the apologizer should comprise two types of 
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agent: the state (understood as the sum of the institutions of government and inclusive of 
public servants) and its individual non-Indigenous citizens. Finally, section three will build 
on the findings of both this and the last chapter to determine what some of the most 
important moral functions of official apology to Indigenous people(s) in settler states should 
be. Answering this question will require an analysis of the wrongs these apologies aim to 
address. This will uncover the de facto messages expressed by historical and enduring 
injustices and conclude that the moral functions to be emphasized in official apologies should 
be designed as corrective antidotes to them. 
  Since this dissertation aims to better understand reconciliation, the overarching 
purpose of this chapter is to identify some of the critical moral functions of official apology 
in this context. These moral functions speak to the moral goals of reconciliation. But I hope 
the above made clear that the moral functions of apology cannot be discerned without asking 
other questions, such as what apology is, who it is coming from, and how it is justified. The 
methodology of this chapter reflects the insight that what official apology should seek to do 
must be context-sensitive, differentiating it from other treatments of official apology. These 
other treatments first define official apology as a speech act (Winter 2015, 263). They then 
put forth a list of requirements to make an apology meaningful. Finally, they apply this 
template to a given context (Cels 2015, 354). This chapter seeks to add a normative 
component to the study of apology, upending the familiar trend in at least one respect: by 
examining the context-specific problems – the historical and enduring injustices which 
official apology aims to address – the chapter will offer a viable picture of the moral goals 
that should be sought as partial remedy for them. 
 
2.1 What should official apology look like?  
The kind of apologies that I discuss in this chapter are a species of ‘collective apology,’ or 
apologies delivered on behalf of a group as opposed to an individual. They are officially 
endorsed public apologies offered by a representative of a state (or one of its institutions) to 
victims of state wrongdoing.35 Official apologies of this kind are thought to be expressive, 
 
35 For alternative but largely similar definitions see e.g.: Howard-Hassman 2012, 32; M. Murphy 2011, 49; Cels 
2015, 351; Funk-Unrau 2014, 138; Thompson 2008, 31. 
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transactional acts of moral repair, or acts aimed at restoring or engendering desirable 
relations between conflicting parties in the wake of wrongdoing (Cohen 2016, 359; Govier 
and Vewoerd 2002d, 140). My focus will be on ‘historical’ official apologies offered to 
Indigenous peoples who have suffered historically from the actions of the settler state. 
Official apologies – both the historical and contemporary varieties – are widely thought to 
help promote reconciliation.36 
  If we are to talk about official apology in any depth it is important that we get a grip 
on what it minimally involves.37 Numerous authors approach the study of official apology by 
first listing which elements together constitute an interpersonal apology, or what the ‘entry 
norms’ (MacLachlan 2014) or ‘existence conditions’ are (Winter 2015). That is, they explore 
what makes a locution an apology and not something else. They then ask how these elements 
can be transposed to the political arena (MacLachlan 2018, 383; see e.g. Gill 2000; Tsosie 
2006). Despite criticism on several fronts,38 I argue that this is the correct approach to take. 
This section will offer a template for the minimal requirements of official apology. Then, in 
light of certain metaphysical difficulties, it will go on to endorse a functionalist account of 
official apology. On this account, each of the identified requirements of the apology is 
understood to have a purpose – each aims to have an effect. If we emphasize the effects of 
apology in our analysis, we can then determine how the state can promote these effects in 
ways that serve as analogues of the components of interpersonal apology (on which much 
more in the next chapter). In this way, official apology can proceed on a conceptually sound 
basis.   
2.1.1 Requirements: official apology and its interpersonal counterpart 
Before getting to the minimal requirements of official apology, a bit of a preamble is in 
order. For it might well be asked: if official apology is political – a category of rhetorical 
 
36 See for example: Barkan and Karn 2006; Gibbs 2009; Govier and Verwoerd 2002b; 2002d; Walker 2013; 
Weyeneth 2001; Nobles 2008. 
 
37 It goes without saying that I am talking about apologies for grave wrongs. Official apologies only arise in the 
case of serious wrongdoing and consequently are more comprehensive than many interpersonal apologies 
(Howard-Hassman 2012, 38). The more serious an offense, the more that is required for its repair (Gill 2000, 
12).  
 
38 See for example MacLachlan 2014 and Thompson 2012 for a canvass of criticisms. I address some of these 
below. 
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device unto itself – then what is the value of starting with a foray into the mechanics of 
interpersonal apology? The answer is that probing interpersonal apology for insights into 
official apology is a valuable exercise for a very humdrum reason. Namely, empirical 
evidence suggests that the public views and judges official apologies in much the same way 
it does interpersonal ones (Kampf 2013, 153 and 158; Wenzel et al. 2017; 2018; Blatz, 
Schumann and Ross 2009). In determining the minimal requirements of official apology, it is 
therefore advisable to pay close attention to what an interpersonal one demands. Official 
apology is an existing practice that is meant to have positive impacts. If official apologies are 
to have any power or meaning – if they are to be effective as measures aimed at 
reconciliation – they should therefore be responsive in some measure to the attitudes of those 
who receive or witness them. In this instance, moral theory should respond to the facts of 
human psychology (Dwyer 2003, 97). This crucial point means that official apology should 
adhere to the requirements of its interpersonal cousin as closely as possible if it is to 
approximate rhetorical power of interpersonal apology. The core components of 
interpersonal apology must be mirrored in political analogues if we really aim to talk about 
official apology as being ‘apology’ at all – at least as the term is generally understood. 
Straying too far from the norms of interpersonal apology will mean we are no longer talking 
about ‘apology’ in anything but a suspiciously attenuated sense of the word.  
  This approach respects the realities of political practice. In their fundamentals, extant 
official apologies mirror those of interpersonal apologies. An examination of official 
apologies offered by representatives of culpable institutions or states supports the idea that 
these apologies are meant to mimic their interpersonal counterparts; most, if not all, make 
some effort to fulfil the prerequisites of interpersonal apology (Blatz, Schumann and Ross 
2009). Even the appearance of sincerity – a key measure of the seriousness of an 
interpersonal apology – is striven for (Vernon 2012, 82; see Kampf 2013, 152-158). This is 
not surprising, for perceived sincerity plays a key role in the effectiveness of collective level 
apology (Wenzel et al. 2017, 758; see sec. 2.2). Thus, since the public conceives official 
apology pre-analytically as an instance of apology as it is generally understood, and since 
mandated deliverers treat them as such anyway, it will not be fruitful to develop a model of 
official apology that pays little if any attention to its interpersonal progenitor. A 
reconceptualization of apology that bears little relation to its interpersonal counterpart will 
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offer an analysis of a convention that not only does not exist, but also one that is unlikely to 
be effective in political contexts.  
  If this argument is right, then a study of the ‘existence conditions’ of interpersonal 
apology will furnish those of official apology. Many scholars offer what is variously termed 
a ‘checklist’ or ‘regulative’ model of official apology (Cels 2015, 354). These accounts 
consist of a set of criteria that describe normative requirements for official apology, often 
derived from an analysis of what are thought to be putatively meaningful interpersonal 
apologies (Howard-Hassman 2012, 37). For the empirical reasons just described, this is the 
approach I take. Checklist models of apology are templates applicable to a variety of social 
contexts where apology is thought to be appropriate. The elements of some of the more 
elaborate checklists describe not just what makes for a real apology, or what qualifies as an 
apology, but also what makes for a good one. Nick Smith (2008), for instance, advocates for 
a ‘categorical’ apology – a form of apology that touches on all of the many meanings and 
functions of apology, and which demands everything from proper displays of emotion to 
appropriate mental states in the deliverer. While an apology that fails to live up to these 
demands can still qualify as an apology, the model is meant as an ideal to which apologizers 
can aspire (Smith 2013, 32). Other criteria suggested for checklist apologies include promises 
of reparation and an outline of benchmarks for retrospective assessments of sincerity (ibid).  
  Regulative ideals for apology are valuable for several reasons (James 2008, 139). 
First, the criteria provide yardsticks by which an apology can be evaluated for its robustness. 
Next, they allow for comparative assessments of qualitatively different apologies. Finally, 
they provide a reference point for assessing the moral consistency of various apologies 
offered by the same actor (ibid.). Note, though, is that these checklists should not be 
considered limiting. Some apologies may require more to be effective, and the context of a 
given apology will play a role in determining its additional qualitative content. The 
requirements for a good apology must respond to the needs of the person(s) to whom an 
apology is offered. Consider what sort of apology you would want from your reckless 
neighbor, and then ask yourself if anything less would satisfy you. As M. Murphy (2011) 
aptly notes about historical apologies, “[n]ot all cases of historical injustice are identical; 
therefore, not every apology for historical injustice should be expected to meet the same 
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criteria to be considered authentic” (49). Additional criteria can be added in light of 
contextual particularities. 
  As we will see below, my checklist for apology does not go so far as Nick Smith’s 
(2008; 2014) categorical apology, yet it is somewhat more exhaustive than those of scholars 
who prefer ultra-minimalist accounts.39 Minimalist accounts are thought to be useful insofar 
as they allow us to identify what does and does not qualify as an apology while 
simultaneously offering great latitude in its crafting (MachLachlan 2018, 361). This is 
admittedly a virtue of minimalist models, for their antipodes – ‘maximalist’ accounts such as 
Smith’s – run the risk of overburdening apologizers and discounting genuine apologies 
(MacLachlan 2014, 18-19). Yet despite these advantages, minimalist accounts tend to be so 
spare that they offer little guidance on what counts as a good apology. A useful model would 
offer some instruction in this domain. On minimalist accounts, many things which are 
eminently not apologies would qualify as apologies, and this is problematic. For instance, 
Weyeneth (2001) argues that memorials, plaques and renaming parks are forms of apology 
(15). Certainly, such initiatives are not to be dismissed. But are they apologies? It would 
seem not if we agree with Tavuchis (1991) that “… apology has two fundamental 
requirements: the offender has to be sorry and has to say so” (36). 
  Acknowledged responsibility and remorse are central to genuine interpersonal 
apology for grave intentional wrongdoing. Consider that apologies must be distinguished 
from other responses to wrongdoing such as excuses, justifications, and accounts (Govier and 
Verwoerd 2002c, 67; Tavuchis 1991, 17). Each of these can involve regretful sentiments – 
being sorry – on the part of the apologizer, but the apologizer need admit neither their 
remorse nor their responsibility. The minimal requirements of apology must serve to 
distinguish apology from these and other forms of equivocation employed by “verbal 
acrobats” seeking to minimize wrongdoing (Kampf 2013, 150). An internal mental state of 
remorse is not enough to make these distinctions. Excuses may acknowledge harms but deny 
responsibility. Justifications ask the listener to understand the reasons behind an action but 
need not acknowledge the wrongness of this action. Accounts tell a story, but often do not 
condemn a wrong. In contrast, I agree with Tavuchis that a felicitous interpersonal apology 
 
39 For examples, see De Greiff 2008; Weyeneth 2001; Winter 2015. 
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demands that the deliverer “stand naked”: no excuses, no justifications, no attempts to 
mitigate responsibility (18; see also Minow 1998, 115; Coombs 2013, 231). There is 
remarkable agreement among scholars on this core feature of apology (Marrus 2007, 79). For 
the above reasons, then, it is fruitful to model official apologies on a modest as opposed to a 
maximal or ultra-minimal set of conditions. 
  All this by way of preamble may seem excessive. Yet the literature on apology can be 
so discordant, the accounts of apology so variable, that some justification must be given for 
any proffered checklist if it is not to seem arbitrary. I contend that good interpersonal 
apologies for grave wrongs require the following elements in order to be felicitous: (a) 
remorse, sorrow, contrition or some other negative affect – the offender must be sorry 
(Tavuchis 1991, 36);40 (b) the clear identification of the wrong at issue; (c) the full, 
unmitigated acceptance of responsibility for this wrong; (d) an acknowledgement of the 
impact on the victim(s) and that the wrongdoing was in fact wrong; (e) a disavowal of the 
wrongdoing and the justifications that underwrote it; (f) a promise of forbearance; and 
finally, since the acceptance of responsibility is required, it follows that (g) the apology must 
come from a party who has appropriate standing to apologize.41 The effectiveness of an 
apology depends in large part on how successful the apologizer is in convincing the recipient 
that she is sincere in her fulfillment of these conditions (MacLachlan 2015, 444). 
  Since these are the core components of interpersonal apology, and since the public 
views and judges official apologies in much the same way that it does interpersonal ones, so 
then should they be the minimal requirements for an official apology. They must be the same 
 
40 Cf. MacLachlan 2018, 362. MacLachlan notes that there are many instances in which remorse does not seem 
central to interpersonal apology. However, the above discussion concerns apologies for intentionally perpetrated 
grave wrongs. Remorse (or a close cognate) seems an intuitive requirement for a genuinely repentant individual 
seeking to deliver a sincere apology.  
 
41 Many scholars of apology, if not most, proffer something which approximates this checklist, though some 
fold various elements I have chosen to demarcate into more comprehensive desiderata. Others choose to frame 
the desiderata in the form of questions apologizers should consider before crafting an apology. Examples can be 
found in, e.g., Gill 2000; James 2008; Lazare 2004; MacLachlan 2015; 2018; Marrus 2007; Smith 2014; 
Tavuchis 1991; Thompson 2008. The existence conditions I offer for apology are largely intuitive, and the aim 
is to strike a balance between maximal and minimal accounts. These conditions are not limiting; more can be 
added based on contextual particularities. As Winter (2015) argues, “[t]he best account of the apology’s 
necessary conditions will be sufficiently broad in conception, and flexible in application, to permit actual 
practice to specify most qualitative content” (263). However, without the above core elements an apology for 
grave wrongs will not be felicitous. Recall that we are interested in good and effective apology. If someone had 
gravely wronged you, would you be satisfied with an apology that left out any of the elements listed above?  
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if official apology is to respond to the facts of human psychology. Yet despite the need to 
define official apology in relation to interpersonal apology, it is important to note that the 
requirements of official apology need not be realized in the same way as in interpersonal 
contexts. Interpersonal apologies often succeed with just words, sometimes accompanied by 
displays of emotion. Official apologies may require much more than words to convince 
recipients of the sincerity of the apologetic message. As we will see in the next chapter, they 
may even need to be conceived as more than a speech act – they may in fact be better 
conceived as a process that lends the speech component meaning (Thompson 2012, 220; 
Govier and Vewoerd 2002d, 143). Given the wide gulf between the contexts of interpersonal 
and official apologies, we should allow that the way the requirements are fulfilled will be 
different.  
 
2.1.2 A functionalist account 
To say that the essential components of interpersonal apologies are the same as those of 
official apologies, then, does not commit us to believing that these forms of apology for 
grave wrongdoing are coextensive in all particulars. For instance, official apologies are 
publicly delivered with some pomp and circumstance, they are the outcome of a process of 
negotiation, and they are committed to written records. And not only do official apologies 
present unique metaphysical questions concerning the ontology of the deliverer (see sec. 2.2), 
but they also have expressly political functions that are absent in interpersonal contexts 
(MachLachlan 2014, 13). In addition, the essential presence of third-party witnesses – that is, 
the public and media – alters the dynamic of apology (ibid.; see Kampf 2013). Finally, 
moving from interpersonal to collective levels of analysis presents a tricky problem: namely, 
it is not immediately obvious that it makes any sense to demand that the requirements be the 
same. 
  The obvious objection to the idea that the minimal requirements of the two forms of 
apology are the same is that collectivities such as states just cannot fulfill what is arguably 
the most important of them. Being without a mind, a collectivity such as a state cannot fulfil 
(a) the requirement that the apologizer feel sorrow or remorse, or indeed display any negative 
affect. As we will see later (sec. 2), this objection begs the question of who or what is 
supposed to be the ‘apologizer’ in official apology. However, for reasons that will be clear by 
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the end of sec. 2.2, let us grant for now that the apologizing agent is the state considered in its 
own right as opposed to, say, some amalgam of its citizens. For the purposes of this 
discussion, then, I will understand the state as the sum of its institutions of government. 
  In interpersonal contexts, a demonstration of remorse serves a purpose, and that 
purpose is to give evidence of both the sincerity of the apology and the seriousness of the 
intention to forbear or make good. As MacLachlan (2013) argues, “[f]eelings and attitudes 
only appear as the vehicles for these primary functions” (376).42 Perhaps you would not 
believe in the sincerity of your neighbor’s apology if he had a smirk on his face while 
delivering it. Perhaps you would not even call his words an ‘apology’ in anything but a pro 
forma sense. A political leader, acting as a stand-in for a culpable state, can of course feel 
genuine remorse over a collective injustice. But this does not mean that the state feels 
remorse. This would appear to present an insurmountable obstacle to the very idea of a 
genuine official apology if we hold, as Tavuchis (1991) does, that remorse is essential to 
interpersonal apology, our guiding model. Some commentators therefore suggest doing away 
with the remorse criterion altogether.43 An apology, they argue, can still be an apology if it 
lacks remorse. 
  Yet given the empirical findings discussed above, I do not believe we can so easily 
cast the requirement of remorse aside. In order avoid being dismissed as a politics of 
distraction (Corntassel and Holder 2008), as “crocodile tears” (MacLachlan 2018, 359), as 
modes of artificial redress that do nothing but perpetuate or reify the existing colonial 
dynamic of settler states (Short 2003; Dorrell 2009), official apologies cannot be instruments 
of cynical political expediency. Being perceived as such will not only demonstrate disrespect, 
it will also mean that they will not be effective (M. Murphy 2011, 51; Wenzel et al. 2018). 
Perceived insincerity runs the risk of further damaging already fraught relationships (Nadler 
and Livatan 2006). This means that official apologies need to be sincere. Sincerity, as I 
understand it, requires, at minimum, that (a) the apology demonstrate a genuine desire to 
 
42 Similar arguments can be found in Lazare 2004, 116-117; Tavuchis 1991, 23-32; Vernon 2012, 81. 
 
43 For example Tavuchis (1991), who emphasizes that what matters in collective-level apology is not remorse, 
but the production of a written record (102-108). See also Govier and Vewoerd 2002c and 2002d; Vernon 2012, 
82-83; Winter 2015, 276. 
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develop new relationships by making amends for past wrongs that stand in the way of them; 
and it also requires that (b) the apology represent a serious commitment to forbear from 
further transgressions. 44 The importance of sincerity harkens to an argument made in the last 
chapter, and which I build on in the next: in the context of reconciliation projects motivations 
matter. An apology without remorse seems insincere and thus cannot do its work. The 
problem with the remorse requirement at the collective level of analysis, then, is that remorse 
cannot be a viable indicator of sincerity because collectives cannot feel remorse.  
  The way around this problem is to take a functionalist approach to official apology. A 
functionalist approach judges official apologies “not so much by what they are made of but 
by what they do” (Cohen 2017, 361, emphasis added). Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that 
interpreting the components of apology from a functionalist perspective is the implicit 
methodology of almost all those who write on apology. Some scholars do so by espousing 
Austin’s (1962) speech act theory, others by emphasizing in their analysis the intended 
effects of each of the components of apology. For instance, Lazare (2004) asks “…what 
psychological needs do successful apologies satisfy?” (44). Similarly, Smith (2014) begins 
his analysis by asking what a victims wants from an apology: “…she wants to know what 
happened, she wants someone to admit wrongdoing, she doesn’t want to stand by while 
someone ‘gets away with’ violating a moral principle she cares about, she wants to be 
respected…” (32). Gill’s (2000) analysis likewise seeks to “further enrich our understanding 
of apologies by identifying several functions that are pertinent to morality” (15). Tsosie 
(2006) explicitly judges the success of an apology by its ability to fulfil key functions. The 
basic question to ask in a functionalist approach, then, is what do the components of 
apologies do? What are they for? While the core requirements of an apology must of course 
be formally met in speech, whether or not we can say that they have truly been met – whether 
or not apology is serving its intended purpose – depends on whether the functions of these 
requirements have been effectively promoted.    
  If in interpersonal apology remorse serves the purpose of demonstrating sincerity, 
then a collectivity can fulfil the same function, just in other ways. Therefore, a slight 
amendment to our checklist is required: instead of requiring remorse, an effective official 
 
44 Dussault 2011 operationalizes ‘sincerity’ for this context in a similar way (31). 
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apology requires sincerity – the functional equivalent of remorse in official apology. The 
next chapter will explore at length how the state can demonstrate sincerity, as defined above, 
by undertaking reparative action. For the rest of this chapter I will bracket the question of 
state sincerity to consider how citizens, as distinct from the state, can help to demonstrate an 
official apology’s sincerity. As I will explain below (sec. 2.2.3), apologetic sincerity can be 
conveyed through citizen endorsement of the apologetic message, and not only through 
reparative initiatives undertaken by the state. Together, the participation of both state and 
citizen will demonstrate the seriousness of the commitments the apology expresses. 
  Political analogues of the other components of interpersonal apology can similarly be 
determined through careful dissection of the purpose of each. While a detailed analysis must 
await chapter 3, a preliminary functional interpretation would understand them thus: (a) 
remorse demonstrates the sincerity of the apology; (b) the clear identification of the wrong at 
issue provides victims with acknowledgement, the detailed truth they may desire and 
correctives to false historical narratives; (c) the full, unmitigated acceptance of responsibility 
for the wrong transfers the burden of the wrong and responsibility for its repair to the 
wrongdoer; (d) an acknowledgement of the impact on the victim(s) and that the wrongdoing 
was in fact wrong convinces victims of shared moral norms, restores dignity through 
rehumanization, and further acknowledges the impact of the harm they have suffered; (e) the 
disavowal of the wrongdoing and the justifications that underwrote it provide victims with 
evidence that the offender has undergone a process of reflection and emerged changed and 
contrite; (f) a promise of forbearance gives victims the hope that further transgressions will 
not occur, effectively inspiring trust.45  
  As I will argue in the next chapter, each of these functions can be promoted through 
concrete reparative initiatives that collectively serve to promote the moral functions of the 
apology and lend it credibility. I should be clear, though, that undertaking these initiatives 
without an explicit official apology accompanying them will not be an apology. A 
functionalist approach does not suggest that the speech act is to be done away with, the 
apology dissolving into a disparate set of reparative measures. While some see reparative 
measures as a form of de facto apology in themselves (e.g. Weyeneth 2001, 15; Pettigrove 
 
45 For similar treatments, see Blatz, Schumann and Ross 2009 and Cohen 2017. 
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2003, 324), I think we should resist this tendency. Without explicit apology, reparative 
measures might indeed represent a form of acknowledgement and communicate important 
messages. But since they do not fulfil the requirements of apology understood as a distinct 
and coherent whole, calling them such stretches the concept too far. Reparation, for instance, 
cannot perform all the moral functions of apology (Gill 2000, 23; Tavuchis 1991, 23). 
Instead, we should understand official apology as a speech act that draws much of its 
substance and meaning from the political analogues of the components of interpersonal 
apology.  
  There is a further component of official apology that I have left for last, one that 
presents problems for my analysis. Since admitting responsibility is required for official 
apology, it follows that (g) the apology must come from a deliverer who has some 
appropriate standing to apologize. Yet, as I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the 
preeminent philosophical objection to official apologies for historical injustice is that they 
simply do not make sense, for contemporaries are not culpable for their constative elements 
and thus do not have standing to apologize. The intergenerational nature of many of the 
injustices that stand in the way of reconciliation in settler states – as well as the murky 
ontological status of the apology’s deliverer – present obstacles that I now turn to. 
2.2 From whom – or what – is official apology coming? 
A meaningful apology for a wrong must come from a party with appropriate standing to 
apologize. In this context, ‘standing’ connects with moral responsibility: a party can only 
apologize directly for a wrong if it bears responsibility for it (Smith 2008, 52).46 This view of 
standing for apology parallels the liability doctrine discussed in the last chapter. To be held 
responsible, one must be to blame. To meaningfully apologize for a wrong, one must be 
responsible. So-called ‘vicarious’ apologies are rightly thought to lack the desired meanings 
of apology insofar as they communicate different messages to receivers than would an 
apology from a (directly) responsible party. A parent apologizing for a misbehaving child, 
for example, is conveying their regret at an apparent failure to properly instruct or control the 
child. They have standing to apologize for those failures, but not for the actions of the child 
per se. Again, think of what little value you might derive from my apology for your 
 
46 Cf. Cohen 2017.  
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neighbor’s joyride in your car. Instead of acknowledging direct responsibility and conveying 
remorse, a vicarious apology can do no more than such things as affirm norms or vindicate 
victims’ account of wrongdoing (Smith 2008, 52-53). Without appropriate standing, such 
‘apologies’ are not properly understood as apologies for the wrong they are ostensibly about. 
Of course, they may use the language of apology, but their meaning is not consonant with the 
spirit of a sincere apology as suggested by the normative requirements discussed above.  
  This point about standing is related to another insight alluded to in the introduction to 
this chapter. Namely, the character or constitution of the party delivering an official apology 
will have implications for the sorts of meanings that it can convey to receivers. It is not only 
the apologizer’s location in the architecture of responsibility that matters. How we conceive 
of ‘the apologizer’ will bear on the power of the apology. This is a bit of an obscure idea, but 
to illustrate: if it is the state that is apologizing, as opposed to some amalgam of its members, 
there is no conceptual barrier to its apologizing for historical injustices, for as a subsisting 
entity it is directly responsible for these. But if it is the constituents of the state that are 
apologizing, then it is less easy to see how they have appropriate standing for such an 
apology. In this latter case, the power of the apology might be undermined, because such a 
conception will not support the apologetic meanings associated with a genuine apology for 
historical injustice from a culpable party. Before we can land on any apologetic meanings to 
emphasize in the context of official apologies in settler states (sec. 2.3), we must decide on 
how to characterize the apologizer. 
2.2.1 A trilemma 
In his discussion of official apologies Winter (2015) notes that there are three competing 
models in the literature of whom (or what) these apologies are supposed to be coming from: 
the individualist, the collectivist, and the institutionalist accounts (261). The individualist 
account focuses on individual wrongdoing and conceives of official apologies as endorsed by 
culpable individuals and delivered by a representative that speaks on their behalf (265-266). 
The collectivist model understands wrongdoing as irreducibly collective and emanating from 
the ‘nation’ understood as a loose entity consisting of overlapping individual membership in 
a political community; the representative deliverer is its mouthpiece (269). The 
institutionalist model sees culpable political institutions as the apologizing agent, the 
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wrongdoing as an act of the state, and the deliverer as speaking on behalf of the responsible 
state and/or its institution(s) (273-275).  
  Winter’s discussion is useful because it outlines a trilemma that can help us navigate 
the tricky question of how we should characterize the apologizer in light of the complicity 
approach developed in chapter 1. As chapter 1 made clear, both individuals and the state bear 
responsibility for the intentional injustices at issue. While collective injustices are best 
construed as acts of state, these injustices are dependent on action (or inaction) on the part of 
individuals. Importantly, I argued, this does not mean that the collective nature of the 
injustices at issue requires a collapse into an individualist account of large-scale wrongdoing. 
Nor, I now argue, should it mean we need to turn to a wholly individualist account of official 
apology. Without the organizing influence of the state, the actions of individuals would have 
a vastly different normative significance. We cannot understand the moral contours of 
individual action without understanding the collective context in which it occurs (Isaacs 
2011, 57). These considerations suggest that neither the individualist, nor the collectivist, nor 
even the institutionalist model will work in this context. The individualist model by itself 
cannot account for the agency of the state. Likewise, despite being Winter’s favoured 
solution, the institutionalist model cannot account for the role and agency of individuals. 
Finally, the collectivist model cannot account for agency at all. 
  At first glance, the collectivist approach seems most promising. Since the injustices 
described in the last chapter are collective in nature, a ‘collectivist’ solution seems warranted. 
But the word ‘collectivist’ is fool’s gold here, and Winter (2015) is correct in his rejection of 
this approach. The sort of collective Winter has in mind is not of the type discussed in the 
last chapter: it is not organized. Winter’s discussion focuses on collectivities defined by 
membership in a ‘nation.’ Even if we accept his characterization of the nation as shared 
membership in a political community, the fact remains that collectivities defined only by 
shared national identity are usually not agents. Without organizing institutions, a collectivity 
of this kind is not an entity with any agency of its own (270). Indeed, without organizing 
institutions, there is no sense in which a nation can be anything more than a loose political 
community. At most, a nation without governing institutions is an aggregate of individuals 
bound together by shared (often contested) ideas. The problem for this model, then, is that a 
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meaningful apology for grave wrongs requires standing. Standing demands backward-
looking responsibility. Something without agency cannot bear responsibility in the way a 
meaningful apology requires. If this is correct, we can safely leave this option aside.      
  We can get closer to a solution to the remaining dilemma between the institutionalist 
and individualist accounts by examining Winter’s (2015) rejection of the individualist 
approach. According to Winter, the individualist account sees official apology as coming 
from an aggregate of (individually) culpable individuals through a representative (261 and 
265). This account thus requires individual wrongdoing on the part of the constituents of the 
aggregate. So far, so good for the complicity approach developed in chapter 1. Yet Winter 
uses the example of Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology to victims of Canada’s residential 
schools to illustrate the problem with this view: “[w]hen Prime Minister Harper says ‘We are 
sorry’, the individual approach would understand him as representing the sorrow that 
particular Canadians feel regarding relevant injuries” (265). For Winter, this is a problem. In 
the first place, the “relevant injuries” include forcible removal, abuse and assimilation. Yet 
(most) Canadians are not individually responsible for these wrongs, and none are responsible 
for them in their entirety (267). This means they do not have appropriate standing to 
apologize for these relevant injuries. In the second, the residential school system was 
primarily a consequence of the state acting through its institutions, not the consequence of a 
mere aggregate of individuals. As we have seen, the injustices described in the last chapter 
are properly understood as intentional exercises of the agency of the state. “By collapsing the 
political into the personal, the individual account leaves no space for independent 
institutional action” (ibid.).  
  Winter’s last point is precisely the reason that the last chapter endorsed the idea that 
both individual and collective levels of analysis are indispensable for assessing the moral 
contours of large-scale injustices (Isaacs 2011, 11). Winter (2015) is right that the “individual 
account is a theory of a non-existent practice” (267). Apologies for injustices such as the 
residential school system cannot be based on the individualist model alone because most 
contemporary Canadians are not directly responsible for these. Nor, of course, is any one 
Canadian singly responsible for residential schools. The injustices described in chapter 1 
transcend the actions of the individuals that help to perpetrate, perpetuate and/or legitimize 
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them: these injustices are irreducibly collective. An individualist model cannot account for 
the discrepancy between the content of the apology and the individual responsibility of the 
people whose remorse it is (partly) meant to reflect. In the case of the 2008 apology for the 
residential school system, the apology is indeed better understood as emanating from the 
state that produced it. 
  The institutionalist account understands official apology as emanating from the state 
(exclusive of citizens) through its institutions of government. In its favor is the empirical fact 
that state institutions orchestrate and execute policies, actions or projects that are frequently 
undertaken without the express consent or encouragement of the public. If citizens are not the 
authors of these actions, the argument goes, then only the state has standing to apologize for 
the constative elements of an apology like Harper’s. As an act of state, an institutional 
apology is undertaken on behalf of that (or those) institution(s) which deliberately committed 
an injustice, and also perhaps on behalf of those public sector workers who constitute the 
apologizing institution(s) (see Holder 2017). If citizens are not the authors of these actions or 
policies, then there may be no sense in which Harper was apologizing on behalf of non-
Indigenous Canadian citizens (ibid.).   
  Yet this argument does not mean that we need to take refuge, as Winter (2015) does, 
in the institutionalist account. Winter is right that “[t]here is a large gap between the [Harper] 
example’s apologetic content and what the individual account supports” (267). Yet the key 
question here does not concern what that apology was about, but rather what it should have 
been about. Here is where the normative component of this chapter begins to come into play. 
While the individualist model is “a theory of a non-existent practice,” this does not mean that 
theories of official apology cannot suggest new forms of practice, or for that matter more 
explanatorily powerful readings of existing practice. Indeed, the failure of most official 
apologies suggests that a new take on the practice is required.47 Such an approach may be 
better able to capture the normative stakes of collective wrongdoing. There is no reason why 
there cannot be another, hybridized model describing from whom official apology is 
supposed to be coming. The choice between the individualist and institutionalist accounts is a 
 
47 This is not to say that all political apologies come to nothing. Some have been well-received, even if they 
failed to meet the criteria for full apology (Moses 2011; James 2008).  
  74 
 
 
 
false dilemma. Perhaps, as Barkan and Karn (2006) suggest, a good apology “navigates 
between the extremes of orthodox individualism and romantic collectivism” (26). 
2.2.2 A hybrid solution   
The 2008 Harper apology was for the residential school system. “[T]he constative content of 
the Canadian apology focuses upon forcible removal, abuse, and assimilation” (Winter 2015, 
267). Winter emphasizes this point to show that the individualist account cannot explain the 
apology because most Canadians were not responsible for these injustices – most did not 
remove, abuse, or attempt assimilation. Most did not work in the public sector, nor design the 
requisite policies. What Winter fails to pursue is the idea that instead of condemning the 
individualist account outright, his point actually illustrates why the apology was an 
inadequate response to Indigenous calls for apology. While it addressed the harms of the 
residential school system, it mostly ignored the broader context in which the system arose 
and thrived. As I will argue in the next sub-section, a good apology for injustices like the 
residential school system would not address these wrongs in isolation, but would instead 
encompass their harmful causes, meanings and legacies. The Harper apology was a narrow 
apology for a discrete injustice. It boxed the injustice into the overused metaphor of a 
“chapter” in Canadian history (Wakeham 2012, 222-223). This is a failure of the apology, 
and not the individualist understandings of collective apology per se. And nor does this 
failure of the apology mean that we need now to turn to the institutionalist account as the 
only remaining solution to our problem.  
  Given the framework espoused in the last chapter, it is straightforward to argue that 
something approximating an apology as conceived in 2.1 can come from the state. States can 
act, make commitments, accept obligations (Thompson 2008, 38). Apologies, as described, 
are acts; they are expressions of agency. The state, as we saw in the last chapter, is an agent 
because of its organization and structured decision-making pathways (1.2). Thus, provided it 
demonstrates sincerity through reparative undertakings, the state can meaningfully apologize 
in a way that respects the institutionalist framework (see Chap. 3). But this is not a wholly 
satisfactory solution given the two-level analysis of large-scale injustice espoused in the last 
chapter. That analysis holds that both individuals and the states that depend on them are co-
responsible for large-scale injustices. As Thomson (2012) reminds us,    
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 The worst wrongs, and thus the ones for which apology is most needed, are not 
 merely the result of unjust government policies or the immoral behaviour of officials. 
 They are embedded in social relations and manifested in the everyday actions and 
 attitudes of citizens. (219). 
If both individual and collective levels of analysis are necessary for assessing the moral 
contours of large-scale injustices, it stands to reason that both individual and collective 
agents will have a role to play in an apology for them. Only a hybridized view of the 
apology’s deliverer can succeed in legitimizing the apologetic meanings that an official 
apology for large-scale injustice should convey. The ‘apologizer’ with appropriate standing 
must therefore in this instance comprise two kinds of agents.  
  This formulation may sound a bit peculiar, suggesting as it does an admixture of 
agents in a unitary actor. But, to employ a metaphor often used by scholars with a penchant 
for collectivism, it is little different than acknowledging that the soccer team Manchester 
United, as a collective agent, can ‘win’ a match only with the support of its individual 
players. That is, the apologizer in this context cannot succeed in delivering an effective 
apology without two types of agent playing the game. If there are different types of wrong at 
issue, and different types of agents responsible for these – and if these wrongs are narratively 
and causally interlaced such that one cannot be understood without reference to the others – 
then an adequate apology for these interlaced wrongs requires all parties with standing to 
participate.48 As I argued in the last chapter, while the state bears ultimate responsibility for 
the injustices described, non-Indigenous citizens are complicit in the perpetuation of their 
meanings and legacies. Both the state and its citizens are morally responsible, albeit for 
different things – the state for the injustice, the citizens for their contributions to its enduring 
harms. Without acknowledging both sides of this equation an apology will fail to meet the 
requirement that it acknowledge the injustices at issue. If historical injustice cannot be 
understood or acknowledged without confronting its causes and enduring legacies, then the 
deliverer of a meaningful apology in this context should be conceived of as the state (here 
 
48 Interestingly, this hybrid view respects existing practice. Consider again Harper’s 2008 apology: “…on behalf 
of the Government of Canada and all Canadians, I stand before you, in this Chamber so central to our life as a 
country, to apologize to Aboriginal peoples for Canada's role in the Indian Residential Schools system” (Harper 
2008, my emphasis). While by itself this says little about whether such practice is defensible, it at least suggests 
we explore whether this can make sense. 
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understood as the sum of its institutions of government) and its non-Indigenous citizens.49 As 
I demonstrate below (2.2.3), since the apology is delivered by a public official speaking on 
behalf of both the state and its non-Indigenous citizens, we can cash this out by saying that 
the apology should be understood as an act of state endorsed by individuals who are co-
responsible for injustice. If the apology emanates from both the state and its responsible 
citizens, a marriage of the institutionalist and individualist accounts is required. 
    This is easier said than done. Two main obstacles arise. In the first place, while it is 
reasonable to suggest that the state, because of its enduring, organized identity can be 
responsible for a historical injustice and thus apologise for it, it cannot be argued, as Winter 
(2015) rightly notes, that contemporary individuals are similarly culpable. If this is so, how 
can the specific admission of responsibility for historical wrongs emanate from both the state 
and contemporary citizens? Here again we encounter our perennial objection to the 
transmission of responsibility across generations. Secondly – and this point also bears on the 
last – it is not clear how an apology for large-scale injustices, historical or contemporary, can 
emerge from an aggregate of citizens who are not individually responsible for them, but only 
for their small-scale role in them. This is one of Winter’s main concerns. If the citizens are 
sorry for their role in injustice, then in what sense can a meaningful apology for large-scale, 
collective and emergent injustices – Winter’s “relevant injuries” (265) – be said to come 
from them at all? 
2.2.3 Objection 1 – individual roles and emergent injustice 
I will address the second obstacle first. One response to the objection that the content of 
official apology cannot reflect individuals’ sorrow over large-scale ‘relevant injuries’ relies 
on our observation that individual actions (or inaction) in the context of collective wrongs 
inherit the normative features of the large-scale wrongs to which they contribute. This 
suggests that an apology endorsed by an individual need not concern their seemingly 
inconsequential action or inaction alone. Instead, the apology’s constative elements and 
admissions of responsibility can concern the effects to which their action or inaction 
contributed. As I have stressed, to really get a grip on the moral contours of individuals’ 
 
49 Those who prefer citizen-inclusive views of states could understand this as an apology from ‘the state’ 
provided we allow that a state is composed of distinct kinds of agents. My account is meant to remain neutral on 
the characterization of states.   
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actions, the action-descriptions must refer to the collective injustice in which it took place 
(Isaacs 2011, 57). This gives us an opening through which we can import collective content. 
As I argued in chapter 1 (1.3.2), while individual impacts on collective injustices usually 
cannot be causally traced, nor their gravity assessed, it is enough to know that individual 
action does contribute to large-scale wrongs to engender reparative responsibility. This is all 
to say that an individualist understanding of apology can concern large-scale injustice even 
when we grant that individuals are not singly responsible for it. The apology need not imply 
a myriad of separate expressions of, for example, “I am sorry that I stood aside”; instead, the 
apology can say “We are sorry that we contributed to injustice X.” This means that those 
elements of the apology referring to collective wrongdoing can still concern large-scale 
injustices even when conceived as emanating in part from individuals.  
  But this solution is not enough, for it tends to elide individual and collective wrongs 
in a way that does not pay enough attention to the intentionality of the state that gave shape 
to injustice. At the very least, this argument requires supplementation. A comprehensive 
solution to our problem requires an additional feature: individual endorsement of the state’s 
apologetic message. This allows the state to accept ultimate responsibility while 
simultaneously involving individual citizens in apology. Non-Indigenous citizens, 
recognizing the normative features of their seemingly inconsequential actions in the context 
of collective wrongdoing, can lend their support to apology just as they lent their support to 
injustice. Recall again that, while not reducible to individual action, collective action 
nonetheless relies on individuals. While the state intentionally perpetrates injustice, this 
exercise in agency is reliant upon the actions of individuals. Individuals play a role in the 
perpetration of injustice. The last chapter argued at length that, once made aware of their role 
in collective injustice, individuals have normative reasons for playing their part in its 
rectification. One way to do this is to endorse collective-level apology. Endorsement of the 
message would imply that the apology is coming not only from the state, but also from those 
co-responsible citizens who affirm its message. In this way, settlers can “breathe life” into 
the state’s apology (Regan 2010, 18).  
  Endorsement from responsible citizens is a very demanding requirement for an 
official apology. Perhaps partly for this reason, some commentators prefer to understand 
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official apologies as coming from the state or state institutions (considered as exclusive of 
citizens) alone (e.g. Winter 2015). Endorsement, it is thought, is neither here nor there – what 
matters is that the state, however conceived, accept responsibility and apologize. But when 
thinking about what apology is trying to do, as my functionalist approach demands, it is 
important not to ignore the potential role of individuals. That citizens bear responsibility for 
injustices non-contingently related to historical wrongs is a normative reason for them to 
contribute to the efficacy of apology through endorsement. While official apology is trying to 
enact or restore desirable relationships between groups, it should not be forgotten that these 
groups are ontologically dependent on the people that compose them (Govier and Verwoerd 
2002b, 192). Groups are composed of people, and for a collective to be apologetic, it is at 
least reasonable to hold that its constituents must likewise be apologetic.  
  But it is not only for normative reasons that citizens should endorse apology. As 
argued above (2.1.2), to perform its moral functions an apology must be perceived as sincere 
(see Wenzel et al. 2017, 759; 2018). Here again it is crucial to pay attention to the facts of 
human psychology. Recipients reflexively understand official apology as emanating from a 
citizen-inclusive state, and are encouraged to do so by the language of mandated speakers. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the perceived sincerity of collective apology is (in part) a 
function of the perceived representativeness of the views of the individuals composing the 
apologizing group (ibid. 759-761). That is, perceptions of sincerity are informed by the 
proportion of individual members of a collectivity that are thought to endorse the message of 
the apology. A study by Philpot et al. (2008) suggests that this is because, while collective 
apologies are recognized as emanating from collective bodies, recipients nonetheless 
recognize that these bodies are composed of autonomous agents capable of acting in a variety 
of ways (485). If an official such as Stephen Harper lacks a clear mandate from these 
autonomous agents, an apology will not succeed in convincing recipients of sincerity as 
defined above (2.1.2) (486). Wenzel et al. (2017) concur, adding that members of offended 
groups are canny observers, and as such they pay attention to preliminary intragroup 
processes in subsequently apologetic collectives when judging the sincerity of apology (758). 
Another factor influencing this phenomenon may be the use of emotive language in 
collective apology: when mandated speakers use such language, individual recipients may 
tend to look for corresponding sentiments in those agents that can manifest them (Kampf 
  79 
 
 
 
2013, 152). Namely, individuals. In the real world, to meet (a) – the requirement of remorse, 
sorrow or regret – official apology must demonstrate its functional equivalent: sincerity. To 
demonstrate sincerity, it must be endorsed by co-responsible citizens. If it is not endorsed by 
co-responsible citizens, it will not be sincere and therefore should not be given in the first 
place lest it further damage fraught relationships.50 While endorsement may seem a tall order, 
empirical evidence shows it is required. 
  If endorsement matters for sincerity, one challenge is determining what level of 
endorsement is required to lend an apology credence. This is an empirical question that 
cannot be determined a priori. The best we can say given current evidence is the tautological 
conclusion that whatever level of endorsement is necessary is the level of endorsement that is 
necessary to convince recipients of the sincerity of non-Indigenous citizens. While it would 
seem overly demanding to require total unanimity in an offender group, especially in liberal 
democratic states like Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the United States, it would equally 
seem wrong to say that endorsement from a minority would suffice (Gill 2000, 19; 
Thompson 2012, 217; Nobles 2008, 70). The reality is probably that the necessary level of 
endorsement is somewhere between a bare and overwhelming majority. But it is certainly 
true to say, as Tavuchis (1991) does, that apology “. . . lacking the moral imprimatur of the 
group, amounts to no apology at all. It means nothing because it represents the unaccredited 
One [the speaker] and not the mandate of the Many” (101).51  
  If endorsement is required, how can it be measured? Measurement will be necessary 
if the offended group is to be able to gauge the representativeness, and hence sincerity, of the 
apology’s message. The best way to determine the level of endorsement of an apologetic 
message would be to have the apology emerge from the pathways of democratic decision-
making (Thompson 2012, 217; Wenzel et al. 2017, 760). As the result of dialogue, debate 
and ultimately voting, an apology could be understood as sincere insofar as it would be 
representative of the views of a majority of co-responsible citizens. In virtue of structured 
pathways of decision making, it would also be an act of the state as described in the last 
 
50 Admittedly, citizen endorsement will not address the state’s responsibility to demonstrate sincerity – that 
requires something else (see chap. 3). 
 
51 See Fette 2006 for an apology that was undercut for this reason (270-272).  
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chapter. Admittedly, this solution may be too demanding, requiring as it might costly 
referenda or that the apology mandate become a critical election issue. It may be that gauging 
citizen endorsement will have to rely on less formal procedures, such as public opinion polls. 
In either case, an indeterminate yet critical mass of responsible citizens must endorse the 
apologetic message if it is to be understood as sincere and thus have the potential of being 
effective.    
  The agency of the state, in this context, depends on its citizens accepting 
responsibility for injustice and its remediation (Thompson 2008, 37). Otherwise the apology 
will not be coming from an apologizer with enough standing to convey appropriate 
apologetic meaning: the state and its non-Indigenous citizens. At most, an apology without 
endorsement would represent an act of the institutions of government as conceived in citizen-
exclusive models of the state.52 Such an act would be incapable of addressing the several 
components of official apology because, as I detail in a moment, these should concern not 
just the historical wrongs perpetrated by the state, but also the actions and attitudes of 
citizens who contribute to their enduring legacies. This hybrid understanding of the party that 
delivers the apology respects what Smith (2013) calls a “binocular view” of responsibility, a 
scope of assessment which is necessary for a full accounting of collective injustice: “[a] 
binocular view that simultaneously appreciates how individual blame and structural causation 
combine to result in harm provides the best vantage for understanding what happened, who 
deserves blame, and how best to fix the problem” (36). If a state wants to commit an 
injustice, it requires action or inaction on the part of citizens. Similarly, if a state wants to 
rectify an injustice, this too requires action on the part of citizens. Since the state is 
apologizing for injustices in which its citizens are complicit, a meaningful apology requires 
that both parties acknowledge their responsibility (Thompson 2012, 219-220).  
2.2.4 Objection 2 – contemporaries apologizing for historical wrongs? 
I turn now to the second obstacle to a hybrid solution mentioned above, the preeminent 
objection to official apology for historical injustice noted in the introduction: namely, how 
can non-Indigenous citizens apologize for historical wrongs when they themselves were not 
responsible for them? At the risk of disappointing the reader, the short answer is that, strictly 
 
52 See Lawford-Smith 2019 (69-70). 
  81 
 
 
 
speaking, they cannot. Only the state has standing to apologize directly and without 
qualification for discrete historical injustices, for only the state is causally responsible for 
these. However, this conclusion need not foil our investigation, for it is based on a very 
restrictive view of the kind of official apologies we are considering. Very few, if any, 
historical apologies are so narrow as to focus solely on a discrete injustice in total isolation. 
For instance, despite its many shortcomings, Harper’s 2008 apology acknowledged the 
rationale behind the residential school system was “based on the assumption that Indigenous 
cultures and spiritual beliefs were inferior and unequal,” that the system “had a lasting and 
damaging impact on Aboriginal culture, heritage and language,” and that the harms of the 
system “contributed to social problems that continue to exist in many communities today” 
(Harper 2008). That is, even historical apologies which fall short pay attention to the origins 
and legacies of wrongdoing. A better apology would pay far more attention to these. This is a 
crucial point, for it allows us to see that while contemporary non-Indigenous citizens cannot 
assume direct responsibility for those elements of apology that refer to a historical 
wrongdoing, they can at least accept responsibility for its sustaining its legitimating causes 
and enduring effects. And if we conceive of these as inextricable aspects of what makes 
historical injustices so significant to descendants, then non-Indigenous citizens have a sort of 
standing that allows an apology for historical injustice to have more meaning than would first 
appear possible. 
  Fleshing out this idea requires that we step back for a moment. Consider that if 
official apologies aim promote reconciliation, we must first investigate what these apologies 
are trying to address to determine how they might do so. Reconciliation is a project 
conceived to deal with the legacies of colonialism. In the last chapter I noted that it is a 
mistake to try to identify ‘the’ thing that is wrong with colonialism (see Moore 2019). To 
offer a blanket apology for ‘colonialism,’ for instance, would gloss over its many associated 
harms. Partly to get a broader picture of these harms, I explored several injustices that have 
contributed to strained relationships between victimized Indigenous people(s), settler states, 
and their non-Indigenous citizens. These injustices are of both the historical and enduring 
varieties. To reiterate my argument, none of these injustices can be understood without 
reference to the others. The significance and meaning of each is affected by its layered 
relations to the others, for together they comprise a coherent picture of the modalities of 
  82 
 
 
 
settler colonial practice. This means that any meaningful official apology to Indigenous 
peoples in settler states must address related injustices in parallel to affect the damaging 
expressive messages each continues to convey. It is states’ attempts to isolate these injustices 
from each other, without addressing the larger picture, that has been the reason for the failure 
of most official apologies in settler states such as Canada.53 A particular injustice only gets 
its meaning in the eyes of living descendants from the broader context in which it arose 
(Vernon 2012, 115). A specific, discrete historical injustice is just one prong in the project of 
colonialism (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2015a, 133). To return to our operative 
example, residentials schools in Canada were but one “destructive node within a broader 
genocidal network” (Woolford 2013, 65). Without discussing the broader context of 
injustice, then, we cannot tell the full story. Without telling the full story, the apology will 
fail to meet the requirement (b) that it clearly identify the wrongs at issue.  
  Allowing that a meaningful apology for historical injustice must tell a broader story 
about colonial injustice, we can see the beginnings of a new form of apologetic practice. For 
ease of reference, I will call this form of apology a ‘comprehensive’ official apology. 
Comprehensive official apologies should address not just historical injustices, but also their 
enduring effects and the broader social contexts and cultural orientations that made them 
possible. They should address not just “micro” level injustices – discrete events, policies or 
effects – but also “macro” level injustice – the systemic colonial outlooks which enabled and 
legitimized them (Murphy 2011, 51). A comprehensive official apology will, furthermore, 
draw attention the injustices’ damaging expressive messages discussed in the last chapter 
(and which I detail in 2.3). In our context, then, a comprehensive apology for historical 
injustice will necessarily address significant causes and legacies of this wrong. This gives us 
an opening through which we can find appropriate standing for contemporaries. 
  Calling such an apology ‘comprehensive’ draws attention to how we are talking about 
an ensemble of wrongs that together characterize the modalities of colonialism. Historical 
injustices are but one part of an enduring pattern. These injustices are “beginnings and 
emblems of a continuing process” (Vernon 2012, 113). Their effects are reproduced over 
 
53 This is a widely shared view. See for example: Chrisjohn and Wasacase 2011; Henderson and Wakeman 
2009; Henderson 2012; Dorell 2009; Dominello 2017; Funk-Unrau 2014; Nobles 2008; Weyeneth 2001. 
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time by both the state and its citizens in the form of enduring injustice. The state’s erasure of 
history and its failure to redress historical injustice is not simply a result of the ongoing 
agency of the state. This expression of agency is facilitated and encouraged by an ingrained 
disregard on the part of non-Indigenous citizens for the claims of victimized parties’ calls for 
justice, a disregard for what offended groups see as part of the meaning and significance of 
historical injustice. In a sense, it is all of a piece. Historical injustices are profoundly 
dehumanizing events which represent microcosms of colonialism. An apology for historical 
injustice is not just about the injustice itself, but also for what it means and represents in the 
context of colonial history. Citizens of a culpable state are complicit in the ongoing 
reproduction of the damaging social meaning of a historical injustice as well as the 
perpetuation of dignity-affecting disregard for calls for redress. They are involved in the 
ongoing process of which the historical injustice is an important symbol. This gives them a 
kind of standing which allows their endorsement to have meaning with respect to historical 
injustice itself, for in repudiating the logic of colonialism they likewise repudiate an essential 
component of historical injustice: the disrespect that attends it.  
  Admittedly, this is not the sort of standing that comes with causal responsibility for 
historical injustice, but rather a standing to condemn a dehumanizing pattern of practices 
which non-Indigenous citizens facilitate and contribute to. A historical injustice is one pillar 
supporting a broader edifice of wrongs which non-Indigenous citizens help to build and 
maintain. Similarly, a comprehensive apology is an edifice built of discrete components, all 
of which are necessary to send its desired messages. Comprehensive apology requires, 
among other things, an acknowledgement that all the wrongs addressed are in fact wrong, 
and some demonstration of contrition and/or disavowal of these wrongs and the justifications 
that underwrote them. Contemporaries can contribute to the efficacy of apology by endorsing 
these messages. Indeed, the last chapter outlined in detail why they should. Such 
acknowledgement requires participation: an endorsement of the explicit acknowledgement 
that a historical injustice was indeed wrong, and a disavowal both of its legitimizing 
principles and expressive messages. It requires, in short, an endorsement of the apologetic 
message in its entirety, and not just those elements for which contemporary non-Indigenous 
citizens are causally responsible, for historical and enduring injustices cannot be narratively 
untangled one from the other.    
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  We have, then, a hybrid solution. Both the state and its non-Indigenous citizens must 
apologise for injustice, both historical and enduring. It is true that only the state can 
apologize directly and without qualification for the constative element of an apology 
regarding historical injustice. But an apology for this on its own would fall well short of the 
requirements of a comprehensive apology designed to promote reconciliation. The marriage 
of the institutionalist and individualist accounts makes more sense when we consider what 
apology, in broad terms, is supposed to do. As Thompson (2012) argues,  
  Apology is supposed to be a remedy for the lack of trust and alienation that is likely 
 to be felt by those who have been subject to injustice. It is supposed to clear the 
 ground for better political and social relationships. But if those to whom an apology is 
 given have reason for distrusting the attitudes and intentions of their fellow citizens 
 … they will also have reason to suspect that the apology does not signify a 
 commitment to just treatment in the future. (219). 
What this points to is the conclusion that official apology needs to be representative of the 
attitudes and sentiments of non-Indigenous citizens. It cannot emanate from the state alone. 
This has enormous implications for what is required for reconciliation. Significantly, it also 
points to the importance of indicators of sincerity accompanying official apology. These 
indicators will have to go beyond perceived representativeness of the apologetic message in 
non-Indigenous citizens. I take up these points in the next chapter when I discuss concrete 
reparative initiatives that should accompany official apology.    
2.3 What should an official apology aim to do? 
All authors agree that apologies aim to do something. Broadly speaking, they aim to 
communicate a message of some kind, inspire some response in the recipient, and create or 
restore desirable social relations. This is partly why a functionalist account of official 
apology is fitting: by focusing on what apology is trying to do, we can rescue collective 
apology from metaphysical peril while simultaneously promoting its desired effects. 
DeGreiff (2008) notes that there are two overarching theoretical accounts of what apology of 
this kind aims to do. One account suggests that apologies are about rebalancing power 
between parties formerly at odds. The commission of a wrong effectively disempowers 
victims. The issuing of an apology empowers victims by symbolically disempowering 
perpetrators, thereby restoring a moral equilibrium. The other account sees apologies as 
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norm-affirming: by affirming previously violated moral norms apologies contribute to 
reconciliation by engendering trust that both parties will respect them (129-130). As I argue 
in the next chapter, there is reason to believe that both accounts are correct.  
 While official apology can affirm norms and empower victims, these aims remain 
ambiguous. What norms are affirmed? How do apologies empower? While the brief analysis 
of the functions of the various components of apology (2.1.2) may offer some guidance, 
these are hardly universally acclaimed. The more terrestrial proposed aims of official 
apology found in the literature make for a motley list of moral goals. These range from 
engendering trust (DeGrieff 2008) to altering terms of membership (Nobles 2008); from 
providing acknowledgement (Govier 2003) to restoring dignity (Howard-Hassman 2012); 
from asserting moral norms (Cohen 2017; Smith 2008) to inspiring forgiveness (Wenzel 
2018); from “re-covenanting” a nation (Celermejer 2013) to establishing a public record of 
wrongdoing (Tavuchis 1991); from educating the public (Weyeneth 2001) to inspiring hope 
for a better future (Walker 2013). It seems that apology is a panacea, of sorts, for 
reconciliation. But surely an apology, by itself, cannot hope to do all these things.  
  This brief glimpse into competing understandings of the functions of official apology 
demonstrates unequivocally that there can be no one-size-fits-all template for what 
constitutes a meaningful official apology. The source of these many and varied 
understandings of effective official apology lies in the diversity of contexts in which calls for 
apology arise. What it takes for official apology to be meaningful, and what its aims should 
be, must reflect the context in which it is offered and those wrongs that it aims to right. While 
all of the elements of apology have moral aims that cannot be forgotten (see 2.1), 
circumstances dictate goals additional to those sought by meeting official apology’s core 
requirements. While authors regularly argue for what apology should have as its principal 
aims, they are sometimes not explicit about why apology should accomplish these things and 
not others. In what follows I aim to correct this tendency by justifying several aims that 
should be emphasized in official apologies in settler states.  
  Before getting to this it is necessary to take a brief detour to lay the groundwork. 
First, we need to explore the concept of ‘expressive messaging’ to demonstrate how 
injustices have impacts that go beyond their immediate harms. Only after we have come to 
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grips with this idea can I turn to an examination of the injustices described in the last chapter 
to see what expressive messages they send. By exploring these messages, we will be able to 
determine what moral aims can serve as corrective antidotes to them.  
2.3.1 Injustice and expressive messaging 
Apologies cannot change the past, but they can impact the present by altering the 
significance of historical and enduring injustice (Barkan and Karn 2006, 8). One way to do 
this is through repudiating the messages these injustices send. Since apology effects change 
primarily through messaging, the first thing to do is determine what its messages should be. 
To do this, we must pay attention to the expressive messages implicit in the perpetration of 
the injustices discussed in the last chapter. 
  Just as reparations have expressive and communicative functions (Walker 2013), so 
too do injustices. The perpetration of an injustice sends an implicit, de facto message of some 
kind or other – injustices express something. Your reckless neighbor totaling your car does 
not just deprive you of your car. It also sends messages, such as ones concerning how your 
neighbor thinks of you. Jeffrie Murphy’s (1988) analysis of expressive messaging through 
injustice is worth quoting at length to illustrate this idea:    
  One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they hurt 
 us in some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also messages – 
 symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoing has of saying to us “I count 
 but you do not,” “I can use you for my purposes,” or “I am here up high and you are 
 there down below.” Intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts (sometimes 
 successfully) to degrade us – and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely
  tangible and sensible. It is moral injury, and we care about such injuries. (25, 
 emphasis in original). 
While I’ll argue that there are other messages that injustices can convey, the quote from 
Murphy captures the basic idea. Apologies, as explicit and focused modes of communication, 
are singularly suited to repudiating the messages of injustice. By examining this aspect of 
what was morally problematic with the injustices in discussed chapter 1 we can get some 
idea of what messages they sent or continue to send. Armed with this knowledge, we can go 
further and determine what the primary moral functions of comprehensive official apology in 
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the context we are discussing should be.54 To prefigure my conclusion, the functions will be 
to discredit and repudiate the messages sent by the injustices we are discussing.  
 While there were many discrete injustices committed against Indigenous people in 
settler states specific to certain loci of colonialism, there are several that are common to 
states like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. These injustices fall under 
the headings described in the last chapter: historical and enduring injustice, as well as 
legitimating cultural orientations best encapsulated by the term ‘colonial mindset.’ In each of 
these contexts Indigenous peoples were viewed as ‘backward’ and as barriers to development 
(Vrdoljak 2008, 197-198). They were driven from their lands, forcibly assimilated, denied 
sovereignty, and deprived of cultural rights (ibid.). Often, children were abducted from their 
parents. Systemic patterns of oppression were pervasive. Attitudes of colonizers towards 
Indigenous people were uniformly negative. Ethnocide and cultural genocide were widely 
practiced (297-298; see MacDonald and Hudson 2012). Enduring injustice persists. The 
impact of these injustices on Indigenous peoples was – and is – profound. While appalling in 
themselves, these commonalities between settler states’ treatment of Indigenous people(s) 
nonetheless allow us to discuss some of the grossest forms of injustice at one remove from 
the circumstances of specific states. In determining which additional, context-dependent 
moral functions should be emphasized in settler states, we can thus offer a picture that will be 
applicable to a wide range of contemporary circumstances. While this method has limitations 
– it cannot, for instance, address all injustices in need of remedy in these contexts, nor can it 
determine a priori the sorts of things recipients may wish for in a comprehensive apology – it 
can identify avenues for repairing some of the most egregious. Further qualitative conditions 
for official apology will, of course, require greater attention to the particularities of each 
circumstance, and the specific needs or demands of recipients.     
2.3.2 Historical injustices - rehumanization 
Historical injustices are here understood as injustices perpetrated during discrete periods in 
history. They are harmful policies, practices or events of greater or lesser duration that had a 
 
54 This methodology is inspired by Smith (2008) and Dominello (2017), who effectively both argue “the harms 
acknowledged in an apology form the basis for determining the norms infringed. The measures of redress 
follow accordingly” (297). My interest is in expressive messages as outlined by Walker (2013) and Murphy and 
Hampton (1988), not norms.  
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beginning and an end. Examples of historical injustice are the expropriation of lands, the 
desecration of sacred sites, the violation of treaties, massacre or forced assimilation through 
the abduction of children. Notwithstanding debates about the appropriateness of assessing 
past actions against contemporary moral standards,55 most scholars agree that historical 
injustices are so-called for good reason: they were morally wrong. At a very basic level their 
immediate impact included significant harm to direct victims through death, dislocation, ruin 
and the interruption of valued ways of life. That these harms represent injustices is not in 
dispute, for they caused great suffering and transgressed moral principles thought inviolate. 
But, as I hinted in chapter 1 (1.2.4 and 1.4.2), these injustices were also wrong because of the 
expressive message they sent to victims about their inherent moral worth. To the extent that 
these injustices remain unredressed, this message continues to be delivered to descendants of 
direct victims and stands as an affront to their dignity.      
  What message was implicit in the perpetration of historical injustices? To answer this 
question, it is useful to try to answer another: what makes it permissible in the minds of 
perpetrators to expropriate land, violate a treaty, forcibly assimilate children into a dominant 
culture, commit genocide? What makes it permissible to treat other people as unworthy of 
respect, rights, and dignity? The quote from J. Murphy (above) points us in the right 
direction: surely such actions are only undertaken if perpetrators see victims as unequal, 
lesser and undeserving of respect. The view of perpetrators – that victims are lesser or 
inhuman – is implicit in the perpetration of injustice. A Govier (2003) argues,     
  […] to forcibly evict a community from its land without obtaining its informed 
 consent and making reasonable arrangements for its well-being, so that other people 
 can develop resources there or test their planes there, is to imply that the removed 
 community and its people simply do not matter—that their needs and interests and, 
 indeed, their very moral dignity and status as human beings, need not be taken into 
 account. It is to treat them as morally and politically negligible (84).  
To treat people in this way “expresses a message of lack of moral worth, because the victims 
are treated as though they simply do not count” (ibid.). Historical injustices dehumanize 
victims in part because their undertaking requires the presupposition that victims are lesser.  
 
55 For discussion, see: Murphy 2011; Sparrow 2000. 
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  In case we think that this dehumanization exists only in the minds of the perpetrators, 
or that the expressive messaging of historical injustice is but an academic construct, consider 
the words of Murray Sinclair, Chief Commissioner of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, discussing the impact on Indigenous people who were victims of Canada’s 
residential school system: 
  Well the impact was that for the longest time I believe that even Indigenous people 
 who had gone to the schools, the survivors themselves, believed that there was 
 something wrong with them. They accepted the church's version or the society's 
 version of who they were. They felt that they were not validated, they didn't come 
 from a people that were valid. And so it's very much like they came to see themselves 
 as the problem and that they had to overcome the problem by changing the way they 
 behaved and by trying to be part of Canadian society without utilizing their own 
 history and knowing their own language and knowing their own culture. And there 
 were many generations of Indigenous people, mine among them, who were raised by 
 parents and grandparents who did not want them to know the language and did not 
 want them to know the culture and did not want them to practice their cultures, such 
 as going to powwows or dressing up in Indigenous regalia because they didn't believe 
 that that was right. That they'd come to believe that was wrong and that they were 
 going to go to hell. (Sinclair 2018) 
The residential school system, in addition to all of its direct harms to victims, also sent a 
message that Indigenous people were unworthy of respect, lacked human dignity and that 
their culture was inferior. For many victims, Indigenous identity became a source of shame 
and contempt (Celermejer 2006, 160). In a word, the residential school system, like many 
historical injustices, dehumanized victims. As is evident from Sinclair’s statement, this 
message was at least sometimes internalized in the minds of victims and their descendants.  
  As Gill (2000) argues, this “badge of inferiority” placed on victims by Western settler 
states has had a profoundly negative impact on Indigenous people(s) (22). Yet even where 
the expressive message of historical injustice was not internalized by the offended group, it 
nonetheless caused dignitary harm. That is, it is not necessary that this message be 
internalized for it to dehumanize. Hampton (1988) makes a distinction between being 
“literally degraded” – as in the case of those who internalize the message and consider it 
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warranted as a reflection of their actual low moral worth – and “demeaned” – as in the sense 
of being treated in a way that the victim considers inappropriate given her actual high moral 
worth (44-45). That is, victims can be dehumanized in both “subjective” and “objective” 
senses (ibid.) In either case, the victim is treated in a manner that is not befitting of someone 
with moral status.  
  If historical injustice dehumanized through its expressive messaging, official apology 
must rehumanize through its message. Some argue that this is the most important task of 
official apology (Coicaud and Jibecke 2008). Partly this rehumanization is a matter of 
acknowledgement (see e.g. Govier 2003; 2009). Historical injustices were a violation of the 
humanity of victims. Apology must acknowledge that victims were never underserving of 
respect and that their humanity was wrongly denied them, that in fact their treatment was 
never justified (Gill 2000, 23). In this way, official apology can affirm that humanity (Govier 
2009, 40-41). To do so, it must aim to restore the dignity and moral standing of victims by 
acknowledging the reality of historical injustices and their wrongness, and by explicitly 
disavowing the justifications for these actions. As I elaborate later (3.3), it is partly through 
the very act of apologizing that the moral standing of victims is affirmed. “When offenders 
treat their victims as moral interlocutors, they treat them with respect. They treat them as 
humans deserving dignity rather than a mere means to some end” (Smith 2014, 39). In this 
way we can see the symbolic power-rebalancing nature of official apology. The first moral 
aim of comprehensive official apologies for historical injustice, then, should be 
rehumanization. As I argue in the next chapter, rehumanization through apology requires 
substantive measures to succeed. 
2.3.3 Enduring injustice: vindication through historical correctives 
The last chapter outlined several types of enduring injustice that are non-contingently related 
to historical injustice. These enduring injustices subsist in settler states and are rightly seen as 
barriers to reconciliation. As I argued, they are barriers not just because victims continue to 
suffer from them, but also insofar as they are stark reminders of those colonial-style policies 
of settler states that are continuous with those of the past (Sparrow 2000, 346). The fact of 
their persistence is evidence that settler states continue to view offended groups as exceptions 
to the principles of justice that these states purport to espouse.  
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  The first type of enduring injustice cited in the last chapter concerns wrongs which, 
though not direct causal effects of historical crimes, are nonetheless non-contingently related 
to them. The ongoing failure to rectify a discrete injustice was cited as an example. Failing to 
rectify an injustice is a distinct wrong for which the state bears responsibility. The effects of 
the failure to rectify an injustice – for example the inability of victims to pursue their cultural 
practices because of the expropriation of lands – are also sites of direct responsibility (see 
Vrodljak 2008). The second type of enduring injustice discussed in the last chapter concerns 
the ‘automatic effects’ of historical injustices. Automatic injustices are those which cannot be 
attributed to any other cause than a historical wrong (Thompson 2001, 118; see Sher 1981). 
They are causal effects of historical wrongdoing. Certain structural injustices stemming 
causally from historical injustices were cited as the primary examples. As noted, for both 
types of injustice there is a non-contingent connection to a chronologically prior injustice; the 
historical crime is the sine qua non of their reality. History is thus indispensable for an 
understanding of the origins of these enduring injustices, for there is both a historical and a 
contemporary component to them (Spinner Halev 2007, 578). To reiterate one of the 
conclusions of sec. 2.2.4, to be meaningful, a comprehensive official apology cannot ignore 
these enduring injustices because they are part of the broader context that informs the 
meaning and significance of historical injustice. 
  The last chapter discussed how paying attention to the expressive message sent by the 
subsistence of enduring injustice can help us to understand how the meaning of a historical 
injustice to a victimized community can loom so large in the collective psyche (sec. 1.2.4 and 
1.4.1). The expressive message of disrespect intrinsic to the undertaking of a historical 
injustice is itself an injustice. This message is reinforced, reproduced and perpetuated by the 
secondary enduring injustices which follow. As I argued, this is because the mere fact of the 
denial of reparations represents the state’s view that the offended community counts for less. 
It is “an insult to the dead and the living” (M. Murphy 2011, 57). Similarly, the mere fact of 
the existence of structural injustice represents a failure of the state to take seriously both the 
impact of its actions and the concerns of the oppressed. Together, these enduring injustices 
compound the wrong which engendered them (Butt 2013; Sher 2005). This is partly because   
  [t]o be a member of a group subjected to unredressed systemic and intergenerational 
 oppression is typically to live both with the inertial effects of this kind of diminished 
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 status and with widespread and normal social denial of either the detailed history of 
 the oppression, or the persisting effects, or both. (Walker 2010, 536-537). 
At bottom, then, the persistence of these injustices indicates a failure of the state to take 
history seriously. As argued in chapter 1, it is a failure in the administration of justice that 
demonstrates disrespect for Indigenous people. By denying justice, the state effectively 
erases history, denies accountability, and obscures from view the legitimacy of calls for 
justice.  
  This denial of justice is continuous with the colonial practices of the past, for it 
expresses what Govier and Verwoerd (2002c) call “moral contempt” towards victims: “[i]f a 
society pays no heed to brutalities and offenses suffered by many of its citizens, it further 
damages these vulnerable people because moral contempt can be as devastating as the 
original wrong itself” (71, emphasis in original). While moral contempt is ultimately based 
on a presupposition of the moral or cultural inferiority of victims, its message differs from 
that of historical injustice because of its ongoing nature. It is a continually reproduced 
communication of contempt for the claims and interests of offended parties. Implicit to 
ongoing moral contempt is not only the idea that the needs and interests of victims do not 
matter so much as those of responsible parties, but also the idea that victims’ understanding 
of history is baseless. For if – as these responsible states purport to believe – victims and 
perpetrators are moral equals, then the injustices at issue would have been redressed. To 
foreshadow the next chapter, this is because the justification for redress stems from an 
assessment of what is due as a matter of justice between moral equals based on backward-
looking assessments of moral responsibility – that is, based on history (3.2). To counteract 
this disrespectful message through apology it is necessary to acknowledge the reality of 
enduring injustices, validate victims’ understanding of them, explain their origins in detail, 
and in so doing place blame for them in the right place. In short, to combat moral contempt 
an important function of official apologies is to issue what Tsosie (2006) calls a “corrective 
to history” (193). 
  Correcting history is about changing national narratives and mythologies by exposing 
the truth publicly. To do so, official apology must offer a re-evaluation of enduring injustice. 
There are two ways that official apology can issue a corrective to history that are especially 
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salient here. The first is through acknowledgement that the denial of redress for historical 
wrongs represents a distinct injustice for which the state bears responsibility. To do this, the 
official apology must acknowledge to offended parties – and the public at large – that they 
were always justified in their calls for the redress of historical wrongs. This will of necessity 
entail an acknowledgement of historical injustice and its wrongfulness. Indigenous people 
have consistently demanded justice for the wrongs they have suffered. Implicit to the denial 
of justice is the state’s view that historical injustices did not merit attention and that victims’ 
understanding of it was wrong. Repudiating this message of moral contempt requires a re-
evaluation of history. This, in turn, requires an airing of the historical record, for we cannot 
acknowledge the wrongness of an action without first delineating what it involved. As 
Walker (2010) argues, “[t]ruth being told about wrongs is obviously a condition of 
addressing them through repair” (530; see also Spinner-Halev 2007; Govier 2003).  
  Some authors contend that the airing of the historical record is the primary purpose of 
official apologies. For example, Tavuchis (1991) argues that “the major structural 
requirement and ultimate task of collective apologetic speech is to put things on record, to 
document as a prelude to reconciliation” (109, emphasis added; see also James 2008). The 
record is the “apologetic fact” (Tavuchis 1991, 102). But as Tavuchis acknowledges, this 
airing also has an instrumental function: it is meant to allow for the assessment of moral 
claims and to establish accountability for wrongdoing (103). Thus, by delineating a historical 
injustice in detail an official apology sends what Walker (2013) calls a “vindicatory 
message” to victims (208): “[i]t communicates the reality and wrongfulness of the event in 
question, as well as a responsibility for the wrong or its repair and an obligation to make 
amends as a matter of justice” (212). A corrective to history will send a vindicatory message 
key to the repudiation of the moral contempt associated with the denial of redress. By 
acknowledging what happened the state can no longer deny its responsibility, either 
implicitly or explicitly. In effect, this acknowledgement of history will in turn acknowledge 
that not only was the historical injustice wrong, but so too was the denial of redress.  
  The second way that an official apology can issue a corrective to history is by 
locating the responsibility for contemporary structural injustices in the right place. If truth is 
a prerequisite for repair, we need first to know the origin of enduring structural injustice. 
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This is because if the current social challenges facing many Indigenous communities are 
judged in a vacuum without reference to history, blame for the social ills affecting 
Indigenous people(s) may fall in the wrong place. As we saw in chapter 1, many Indigenous 
populations in settler states continue to suffer from, for example, higher rates of poverty 
(Best Resource Centre 2011), incarceration (Statistics Canada 2014) and suicide 
(Government of Canada 2018). As recently as 2010, 24% of urban Canadians believed that 
Indigenous people were themselves responsible for these problems (Environics, 155; see also 
Lashta, Berhal and Walker 2016; Brockman and Morrison 2016). Attitudes in Australia are 
much the same (see Moran 2009). Thus, a significant minority of non-Indigenous people 
deny that settler states are morally responsible for structural injustices affecting Indigenous 
peoples. This narrative, once dominant in many settler states, holds that Indigenous people 
somehow brought these problems on themselves. Yet any cursory examination of the 
provenance of these ills suffices to show that their genesis lies in the policies of the settler 
states which uprooted Indigenous people and disrupted their ways of life (e.g. Royal 
Commission 1996a, 15 and 132).  
  Since structural injustices resulted from historical injustices, this must be explicitly 
acknowledged in order to repudiate the moral contempt implicit in the state’s failure to 
address systemic problems. As I argued above (2.1), it is a requirement of official apology 
that perpetrators accept unmitigated responsibility for the wrongs at issue. Clearly delineating 
the cause and effect relationship between historical injustices and their enduring impact is 
thus a necessary condition for meaningful comprehensive apology in this context. In order to 
accept blame – and to counteract the tendency of some to assign blame to the wrong party – a 
clear spelling-out of the course of history is required in a meaningful apology. This will 
vindicate Indigenous peoples’ understanding of history and publicly acknowledge the 
responsibility of the state for contemporary structural injustice. The next chapter will explore 
ways in which correctives to history can be realized in substantive ways.    
2.3.4 Cultural orientations and the colonial mindset: engendering trust  
In the last chapter I identified a further enduring injustice which subsists in the present: 
systemic colonial orientations which legitimized historical injustice in the first place. As 
many authors have pointed out, all injustice takes place in a broader system of social 
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meanings, cultural orientations and attitudes (Celermejer 2013; Dorrell 2009). The colonial 
project that sought to assimilate, annihilate, or deny identity to Indigenous peoples survives 
in altered but recognizable form in the present. Indeed, as I noted in the last chapter, one need 
only consider what the lack of clean drinking water or access to adequate health care says 
about settler societies’ perspective on Indigenous peoples’ full and equal membership in the 
moral community to see how these cultural perspectives are far from erased (Sparrow 2000, 
351). The subsistence of the enduring injustices revisited above are also evidence that 
colonial attitudes persist in the present. The enduring injustice under consideration here, then, 
is best described as a persistent ‘colonial mindset’ on the part of settler states.  
  Perhaps it is because these cultural orientations, patterns and attitudes are part of the 
invisible background of the colonial worldview that they are often overlooked in discussions 
of the redress of historical injustice. To hark back to Calhoun’s (1989) discussion (1.2.6), the 
colonial mindset is part of the abnormal moral context that characterizes settler society. In 
providing a foundation for the pervasive colonial mentality, these features of the colonial 
mindset disappear from view. Perhaps, also, the difficulty in coming to grips with ephemeral 
notions like ‘cultural orientations’ and ‘patterns of oppression’ plays some role in the relative 
lack of attention that this form of enduring injustice receives. Celermejer (2013) reflects on 
these difficulties by asking “[h]ow can we put a spotlight on the wrong that lies at the feet of 
all of us who silently or implicitly consent to a world where particular acts of grave 
wrongdoing are rendered normal and even invisible?” (46). While these systemic outlooks 
may be hard to articulate, we can get some idea of the sort of colonial mentality I have in 
mind by exploring the origins of the worldview that made colonial injustices possible.   
  As noted above, it was through the purported cultural inferiority of Indigenous people 
that Western states justified their disregard for Indigenous rights. Even Stephen Harper’s 
much-maligned 2008 apology for the residential school system in Canada acknowledges this, 
stating that the aims of assimilation or elimination of Indigenous people “were based on the 
assumption that Indigenous cultures and spiritual beliefs were inferior and unequal” (Harper 
2008). The view of non-Western peoples as inferior and beyond the borders of moral 
consideration is epitomized in the frequently discussed Doctrine of Discovery, espoused to 
greater or lesser degrees in the legal traditions of, among other states, the United States, 
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Canada and Australia (Frichner 2010, 19). The legal instruments that evolved from the 
Doctrine of Discovery provided a justificatory background for the historical annexation of 
Indigenous lands. The justification for this doctrine was both religious and moral, and 
ultimately based on this conception of Indigenous peoples as innately inferior. In a sense, the 
alleged inferiority of Indigenous peoples was an invitation to conquest.            
  As I showed in the discussion of the expressive message sent by historical injustice, 
colonial mindsets tend to lead to wrongs that implicitly dehumanize Indigenous peoples. But 
there is far more to this mindset than a denial of humanity. Settler-colonialist mindsets entail 
what Wolfe (2006) calls a “logic of elimination” (387). The logic of elimination “strives for 
the dissolution of native societies” and imposes an “organizing principle of settler colonial 
society” – a structure – which may require “the breaking-down of native title into alienable 
individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization 
in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate 
biocultural assimilations” (388). As Vrdoljak (2008) notes, “[t]he devaluation and negation 
of Indigenous cultures was central to the civilizing mission of international law and nation-
building of states” (227). Assimilation or annihilation was the goal. Consider Duncan 
Campbell Scott’s oft-cited comments on Bill 14, the legislation formally initiating the 
residential school system in Canada: 
  I want to get rid of the Indian problem… Our objective is to continue until there is 
 not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and 
 there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department… (Scott 1920.) 
It is this colonialist mindset that persists in settler states, though of course in a milder or at 
least camouflaged form. The denial of redress for historical wrongs, the failure to make 
restitution, and the subsistence of enduring injustices are all evidence of this. While settler 
states have recently attended to Indigenous peoples’ grievances to greater or lesser degrees, 
the fact that most apologies tend to isolate injustices from the intergenerational colonial 
project in which they occurred, instead portraying them as aberrant episodes in the history of 
otherwise peaceful nation-states, is evidence that these apologies often serve only to cleanse 
national myths of their unsightly blemishes (Dorrell 2009).56 As Henderson and Wakeham 
 
56 See also: Wakeham 2012; James 2008; Blatz, Schumann and Ross 2009. 
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(2009) argue in a discussion of Harper’s 2008 apology to Indigenous victims of the 
residential school system,  
  [t]he absence of the word “colonialism” from the prime minister's apology enables a 
 strategic isolation and containment of residential schools as a discrete historical 
 problem of educational malpractice rather than one devastating prong of an 
 overarching and multifaceted system of colonial oppression that persists in the 
 present. (pg. 2) 
Colonial mentalities, then, persist today to greater or lesser degrees.  
  What implicit or de facto message does the maintenance of colonial mindsets and the 
furtherance of the policies inherent to the “logic of elimination” send to Indigenous peoples? 
It is not just that the state views Indigenous peoples as exceptions to certain important 
principles of justice, though that is certainly part of it. Simply put, it is that the state and its 
non-Indigenous citizens cannot be trusted. It was collective norms and beliefs that made 
historical and enduring injustice possible (Celermejer 2006, 155). If these have not 
substantially changed, trust is not warranted. There has been no substantive alteration to the 
modalities of settler-Indigenous relationships besides some attempts at acknowledging 
Indigenous peoples as distinctive and token nods to sovereignty or self-determination 
(Wakeham 2012, 213). There is thus no guarantee that future behavior will be substantially 
different (see Muldoon 2009). Indigenous citizens continue to suffer oppression at the hands 
of states characterized by a long tradition of colonial practice. Trust in the state is justifiably 
lacking in light of its record of broken promises, its failure to take historical and enduring 
injustice seriously, its use of half-measures in the form of pro forma apologies and truth 
commissions that serve only as a “politics of distraction” (Woolford 2004, 430; 2013, 469; 
see Corntassel and Holder 2008). 
  To be meaningful in the context of reconciliation, then, a comprehensive official 
apology must aim to engender trust. This is the antidote to mistrust. Trust involves a belief 
that offenses will not reoccur, and thus that the colonial mindset is expunged. To engender 
trust, the apology must send the message that the state and its non-Indigenous citizens are 
trustworthy. To do this, though, the apology must communicate a genuine change in outlook 
on the part of the deliverer: the state and its non-Indigenous citizens. Here again we can see 
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why motivations matter in reconciliation: if an apology is perceived to be an instrument of 
political expediency, it will not engender trust. Trust demands an expectation of shared 
normative commitments (DeGreiff 2008, 125; see MacLachlan 2015; 2018). These 
normative commitments must be made by both individuals (through endorsement) and the 
state in order to engender trust (see DeGreiff 2008, 126-127). This means that substantive 
negotiation and intercultural dialogue will be required before we can determine which 
normative commitments must be adhered to. 
  Here we can see the norm-affirming dimension of official apology coming into view. 
In affirming shared norms, the apology will entail a vow not to repeat the offenses that are 
the subject of the apology. As we saw (2.1), a promise of forbearance is a prerequisite to a 
meaningful official apology. As Funk-Unrau (2014) notes about Harper’s 2008 apology, “the 
legitimacy of the federal apology was ultimately conditional upon the extent to which the 
words of acknowledgement and remorse accurately reflected current postcolonial 
relations…” (149). It is partly for this reason that the apology was arguably a failure. As I 
will argue in the next chapter, the requirement that the apology follow rather than precede 
these changes in political dynamics and attitudes means that many official apologies in the 
context of settler states have been damagingly premature.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Official apology was our trial by fire for the complicity approach. To those who would argue 
that official apology for historical injustice just does not make any sense, we can now 
respond by pointing out that it does not matter so much that individual perpetrators may be 
long dead. I argued that a state can apologize in a manner analogous to interpersonal 
apologies provided it fulfils the same functions. Yet I also showed why we should understand 
official apology as emanating from both the state and its non-Indigenous citizens. A 
meaningful official apology requires comprehensiveness: to effect real change, the apology 
must address interrelated injustices in parallel. Since contemporaries are implicated in several 
of these, this allows us to secure the apologetic meanings necessary for effective apology by 
incorporating apology for enduring injustice into apology for historical injustice. The hybrid 
solution to the question of how we should conceive of the apologizer shows that 
contemporaries do indeed have a meaningful sort of standing to apologize for not just 
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enduring injustice, but also historical injustice itself. While not causally responsible for a 
historical wrongdoing, contemporaries are responsible for the meanings and legacies that are 
inextricably bound up with it. Their endorsement of the apologetic message in its entirely 
will thus help to fulfil the sincerity requirement of apology. Additionally, the discussion of 
the wrongs that official apologies seek to right in this context bring to light several moral 
functions appropriate to the context in view. These moral functions are our launch pad in the 
next chapter. First, since historical injustice dehumanized victims, apology must rehumanize. 
Second, since enduring injustice represents an erasure of history, the apology must send a 
vindicatory message by issuing a corrective to history. Third, since colonial mindsets persist 
in the present, the apology must affirm shared norms and communicate a genuine change in 
the attitudes and cultural orientations which legitimized injustice in the first place; this will 
engender trust. As I demonstrate in chapter 3, the delivery of an effective official apology of 
the type I have advocated will require substantive actions and commitments on the part of 
settler states and their non-Indigenous citizens in the form of reparative initiatives that 
collectively lend the apology meaning. 
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Chapter 3 Processes of Reconciliation 
Introduction: sincerity, apology and redress 
A frequently cited criticism of official apologies in the context of settler states is that they are 
cynical maneuvers designed to pacify offended parties at little cost to the state (Marrus 2007, 
90). Disingenuous, insincere, apologies are derided as “lip service” (Weyeneth 2001, 29) and 
characterized as “symbolic cop-outs” (Thompson 2008, 32), “cheap grace” or “crocodile 
tears” (MacLachlan 2018, 359). In this context, say some, official apologies are yet another 
implement in the toolbox of the ‘politics of distraction,’57 diverting attention from potentially 
transformative projects involving redress, restitution or self-government (Corntassel and 
Holder 2008). Critics argue that we should therefore take apologies from ostensibly repentant 
settler states with “a block of salt” (Chrisjohn and Wasacase 2011, 197). The objection is that 
official apologies, driven by underlying motives and undertaken for reasons of expediency, 
are simply not sincere.58 They are cheap alternatives to real change. These powerful 
criticisms cannot be ignored, especially given that they are sometimes borne out.59 
Considering these critiques, it is hard to see how apology might promote reconciliation. 
  Just because official apologies are sometimes insincere does not mean that they have 
to be. This chapter is about how states can help to make them sincere. As we saw in the last 
chapter, there are ontological difficulties here. The state is not a person like you or me. It 
cannot respond to skepticism with an exclamation like “no, I really mean it! I swear!” The 
state can only demonstrate sincerity indirectly, through evidence of other kinds (McGary 
2010, 551-552). Yet the sort of evidence required is not clear. Is it reparation, reform, 
changed behavior, restitution, compensation? Is it all of these? The findings of the last 
chapter offer some insight. Consider that if an apology is sincere, then the apologizer would 
be glad if its aims were achieved. If I apologize to you for a hurtful insult, and if you trust in 
my sincerity, you can rationally conclude that I would be glad if your self-esteem were 
restored. Likewise, if a comprehensive official apology for historical and enduring injustice 
 
57 I believe this expression is from Woolford 2004, 430. 
 
58 I will use ‘genuine’ and ‘sincere’ interchangeably.  
 
59 I discuss this in greater detail in sec. 3.5. See e.g. Alfred 2011; Dominello 2017; Henderson and Wakeham 
2009; Short 2005.  
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is sincere, we can infer that the state hopes to achieve the moral goals of its apology. Since 
this is so, it follows that one way to measure sincerity lies in what the state does to promote 
these goals. In this context, because the state is what it is, words are not enough; redress is 
required for effective official apology.  
  While this chapter responds to the insincerity objection, a note on its place in the 
broader project is in order. Recall that this dissertation is built on the following conditional: if 
official apology is involved in reconciliation, whatever is required of the former will be a 
component of the latter. That is, if the hypothesis in the conditional is true, whatever is 
required to make official apology sincere should be understood as part of the process of 
reconciliation. By answering the insincerity objection, then, we can simultaneously sketch 
some necessary conditions for reconciliation conceived as a process.  
3.1 Official apology – speech act or more? 
Many scholars caution against thinking of official apologies too narrowly as a speech act.60 
Instead they argue that official apology is a process in which the speech act is but one 
component (Marrus 2007, 81). Accustomed as we are to interpersonal apology, this may 
strike us as a bit strange. In interpersonal contexts a full and effective apology is usually 
achieved with words alone, unattended by anything more. Expanding our understanding of 
official apology to conceive of it as something beyond words might seem a bit suspect, for an 
apology seems to be a speech act par excellence. But there may be something to the idea that 
official apology involves more than words. On closer analysis it is plausible to consider even 
a discrete instance of interpersonal apology as something beyond a speech act. Oftentimes 
we do not judge apologies by their wording alone. For instance, tears or a handshake can lend 
an apology meaning. Maybe this is part of the ‘process’ of apology. That said, we can easily 
distinguish the various elements of apology conceived as a process from the discrete act of 
apology as it is generally understood. Is a tear really part of an apology, or is it just a 
complement to it? 
  As I argued in the last chapter (2.1.1 and 2.1.2), even though the core components of 
official and interpersonal apologies are nearly identical, this does not mean that they need to 
 
60 For examples of authors who tend in this direction, see: Dominello 2017; James 2008; MacLachlan 2010; 
Smith 2014; Thompson 2008; Tsosie 2006. 
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be realized in the same way, nor does it mean that the two forms of apology are coextensive 
in all particulars. Some scholars run with this idea, arguing that, to do its moral work, official 
apology requires much more than words: not only do its design and method of delivery 
matter, but measures of redress must be delivered in concert (Barkan and Karn 2006, 18). For 
this reason, they argue, it is better to understand the concept of official apology expansively 
as something that extends beyond words to include such things as negotiation, ceremony, 
reform and reparations. For instance, Cels (2015) and Saito (2016) draw our attention to the 
role of performance in official apology: it is not just the words that matter, but also the 
timing, place and ceremonial pomp of the apology. Perhaps this is the political analogue of a 
tear? Thompson (2008, 42; 2012, 220) and Lazare (2004, 205) suggest that preliminary 
negotiation of the content of an apology is itself an intrinsic part of a genuine one. Similarly, 
Govier and Verwoerd (2002d) argue that fulfilling the forward-looking aspects of official 
apology – such as commitments to reform, make reparation or forbear from further 
transgression – is so integral to the success of apology that these should be seen as part of its 
“process” (139; see also DeGrieff 2008, 133; Tavuchis 1991, 45). Still others wonder if an 
official apology without reparations qualifies as an apology at all (see MacLachlan 2010, 
376; Howard-Hassman 2012, 40). 
  This argument jibes with the functionalist approach defended in the last chapter, 
which demands we judge apology by what it is doing in terms of accomplishing or promoting 
its moral functions. For this reason, it is worthwhile to consider if official apology is a 
process instead of a simple speech act. Recall that an effective official apology is one that is 
promoting its moral functions. To perform these functions, an apology must be sincere, for 
an insincere or strategic apology will be perceived as a cynical gesture, further exacerbating 
tensions (M. Murphy 2011, 51; Weyeneth 2001, 34; Nadler and Liviatan 2006; see 2.1 – 
2.1.2). Collectives such as states cannot show sincerity through (potentially artificial) 
remorse on the part of the mandated deliverer, but only by other means: endorsement by 
settlers and, as this chapter will argue, through measures of redress. Endorsement combined 
with measures of redress can help to promote the moral functions in question. Thus, since we 
are judging the apology by what it does, the process of providing redress and securing 
endorsement can be considered a part of the process of an effective apology. 
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  This argument, however, does not withstand scrutiny. After all, as I noted above, it is 
not hard to make a distinction between an apology considered as a speech act and those 
measures that lend it greater credibility. On this line of thought, an interpersonal apology is a 
speech act; tears lend it substance. Indeed, most authors tend to conceive of apology 
primarily as a speech act (Cels 2015, 352). This is a reasonable approach, for holding that an 
official apology is a speech act and redress has an odd consequence. The latter understanding 
of the concept threatens to subsume everything from reparations to reform to restitution 
under the heading of ‘apology,’ a conclusion so hard to swallow that it comes close to 
constituting a reductio. Indeed, if (as some do) we consider redress of these kinds to 
collectively comprise reconciliation considered as a process, then the argument would entail 
that official apology itself is reconciliation. Surely this goes too far.    
  Nonetheless, the apology-as-process view offers an important insight to carry 
forward. Even though official apology is not a process involving measures of redress, it is 
surely not wrong to say that, just as a tear serves to promote the functions of interpersonal 
apology, so too can measures of redress help to promote those of official apology. While 
distinct, apology and redress complement and enhance each other. Even those who analyze 
official apology primarily as a speech act concede that redress functions to lend substance to 
apology (James 2008, 139). As MacLachlan (2015) argues, the success of an apology 
depends on convincing recipients that the apologizer is sincere in the messages of apology 
conveyed by meeting its core requirements (444). If this is so, then the ontology of a state – a 
collectivity without a group mind – suggests that measures that go beyond speech are 
required in political contexts. For this reason, I will argue that one way to make official 
apology sincere is to undertake those measures that would be expected to follow from the 
authenticity of these messages. Words are simply not enough in arenas that are necessarily 
impersonal. When we are assessing an official apology, it is important to consider what 
precedes and what follows from it (see e.g. Smith 2008, 233-235; MacLachlan 2013). Even if 
it is not a process, still we must judge it over time (see MacLachlan 2014, 25). The 
relationship between moral and material amends in this context is therefore very tight 
(Govier and Verwoerd 2002c, 73). We can characterize an apology unaccompanied by 
measures of redress as “limited-liability guilt management” in that it hits the right notes, yet 
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fails to effect real change (Epp 2003, 225). This is not in the spirit or the intent of a genuine 
comprehensive official apology. 
 As we will see, what the measures of redress accompanying official apology consist 
in will depend on what the apology aims to do. To illustrate through example, all apologies 
will aim to convey sincerity. Here monetary reparation is often cited as a valuable measure of 
the seriousness with which a deliverer takes their apology (Torpey 2003, 23; see Howard-
Hassman 2012, 40). And while money may be a morally “obtuse remedy,” it is nonetheless 
true that “victims often consider economic compensation the measure of sincerity for 
apologies” (Smith 2008, 237). However, money is but one way to promote the moral 
functions of apology. Post-apology behavior, for example, is a further indicator of the 
seriousness of the apologizer’s commitments (Flemming 2008, 101; Gill 2002, 14). 
MacLachlan (2014) argues that the political conditions that emerge after an apology are 
important for judging its success (26). And if one moral function of apology is to give 
offended parties reasons to trust responsible parties, post-apology behavior could be at least 
as important as the apology itself. Other suggested measures of redress include “symbolic 
compensation” such as memorials (Barsalou and Baxter 2007, 4; see Meyer 2006), 
educational scholarships as measures of acknowledgment (Thompson 2001, 135), or 
structural reforms that alter the modalities of the political relationships at issue as measures 
to promote trust (Dominello 2017; Reilly 2009a).  
 What the above discussion shows – and what the cumulative view in the literature 
appears to be – is that without action, words are empty.61 But, conversely, measures of 
redress in response to injustice without apology might be considered tantamount to an insult, 
for it is an instance of trying to force moral closure through material diversion (Boxill 1972, 
118).62 Without apology, the “respect account” discussed in the preface to this dissertation 
has not been squared (Vernon 2003, 545). In this way, a picture begins to emerge of a deep 
connection between official apology and redress: each depends on the other for its 
significance and meaning. An apology without redress may seem insincere. Redress without 
 
61 For example, see: Chrisjohn and Wasacase 2011; Hollinsworth 2011, 190; James 2008, 139; MacLachlan 
2010; Minow 1998, 117. 
 
62 Numerous authors make this point. See for example: Gill 2000, 23; Thompson 2018, 10; Hayner 2011, 178. 
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apology might even make matters worse, for beneficiaries may interpret it as evidencing 
disrespect or untrustworthiness (Blatz, Schumann and Ross, 2009; Nadler and Livatan 2006). 
Thus, while official apology does not encompass measures of redress, an effective apology 
nonetheless requires redress.  
  The rest of this chapter is devoted to identifying some measures of redress suited to 
promoting the primary moral goals of official apology (in this context) identified in the last 
chapter: rehumanization; vindication through historical correctives; and engendering trust. 
Since the types of redress that accompany apology are dependent on what the apology aims 
to do, these moral functions are useful reference points for exploring appropriate forms of 
redress. I follow Brooks (1999; 2003) in viewing ‘redress’ as an umbrella term that 
encompasses the many ways in which responsible parties can seek to address (human) 
injustice in the interest of victims (and justice generally).63 These include reparations, 
compensation, settlements, restitution and reform. Measures of redress are backward-looking 
in that their justification stems from events, processes or institutional structures of the past 
(recent or distant), but they can also be forward-looking insofar as they can seek to 
rehabilitate victimized parties (Brooks 2003, 108-109; Lean 2014, 187; Thompson 2018, 79). 
It is worth signaling here that each of the mechanisms of redress that I defend will work to 
promote more than one of the moral functions of apology. While there is significant overlap, 
this is all the better. As Crocker (2003) notes in his discussion of reconciliation, “the 
achievement of one or more of the goals [will] itself be a means… to the realization of one or 
more of the others” (56).  
3.2 Apology, sincerity and reparations 
One form of redress that gets a lot of attention is reparations. A considerable camp argues 
that reparations in conjunction with apology help to advance reconciliation; others see 
reparations primarily as an indicator of the sincerity of official apology. Yet associating 
reparations with apology is contested because of its alleged potential to vulgarize its moral 
messaging. According to Griswold (2007), “linking reparations with apology taints the moral 
standing of apology – for it may come to seem to be ‘all about the money’” (152-153). Far 
 
63 Many use the term ‘reparations’ or even ‘restitution’ instead of ‘redress’ to encompass a wide variety of 
measures aimed at correcting injustice. However, I avoid this because not all measures of redress contain moral 
messages, which I will argue are intrinsic to reparations. 
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from legitimizing an apology, reparations undermine it: “The purposes, language, and 
procedures of reparations are considerably different from those of apology, and belong to a 
different moral sphere” (153). Flemming (2008) echoes this view, arguing that money cannot 
serve as a proxy for crimes against humanity and violations of dignity (96). Reparations, she 
contends, “make a commodity of a past injustice” (99). When dealing with past injustice we 
should instead atone through apology, for “[w]e cannot trade human dignity for financial 
gain or monetary redistribution” (98).  
 The view of reparations implicit in this criticism is impoverished. At best, the 
objection is cautionary insofar as it warns against the potential for reparations, considered 
broadly as an instrument of repair, to have their power diluted if we do not keep in mind 
what they are for. In conceiving of reparations in purely monetary terms, this account begs 
the question of their nature and denies their transformative potential. To link reparations to 
apology is not to suggest that we can attach a monetary value to injustice or suffering. Nor is 
it to suggest that a market-like transaction is what reparations are about. There is no amount 
of money that can undo grave wrongs. Seeing reparations as a commodification of injury is 
therefore a non-starter. Instead, we should understand reparation more loosely as an effort to 
“make the victim whole,” where what makes the victim ‘whole’ depends on victims, the 
nature of the injury and what is required to alleviate its impacts (Hill 2002, 396). Reparation 
is not just about material amends, but also has psychological, political, social, and moral 
dimensions for victims (Walker 2013, 212). Reparations are communicative devices. Since 
the last chapter argued that actions send expressive messages, we should acknowledge that 
tendering reparations can likewise send messages. While reparations sometimes come in 
monetary form, we should not read this as a bill coming due. Rather, reparations are better 
understood as an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and a signal that the wrongdoer aims to 
make amends and establish just relations. If this is so, there is no reason to think that 
reparations need always come through monetary redistribution. 
  Margaret Urban Walker is the best expositor of this rich view of reparations. Walker 
(2013) argues that reparations “consist in acts, on the part of those responsible for the wrong 
or its repair, of intentionally giving appropriate goods to victims of that wrong in order to 
acknowledge the wrong, their responsibility for the wrong or its repair, and their intent to do 
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justice to the victim precisely for the wrong” (205). For Walker, it is neither the nature nor 
the value of the reparations offered that are of primary importance in reparative acts, but 
rather the messages sent by their tendering. “It is the meaning of the interaction, and not only 
or by itself what is tendered in it, that puts the repair in reparation” (208). In justifying 
reparations by reference to the injustice that triggered the call for them, reparations 
(minimally) communicate de facto messages of acknowledgment, both of that wrongdoing 
and that victims were deserving of better treatment. 
  It is illuminating to contrast this view of reparations with that implicit in the 
‘vulgarization’ criticism mentioned a moment ago. According to Brooks (2003), “[r]esponses 
that seek atonement for the commission of an injustice are properly called reparations. 
Responses in which the government does not express atonement are more properly called 
settlements” (107, emphasis in original). While the theological language of atonement may 
be infelicitous, the point is that when talking about reparations we are not just talking about 
material amends, but moral amends too. Reparations and settlements are distinguished by the 
fact that while the former entails an admission of responsibility and the acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing, the latter does not (ibid; see also Lean 2003,172; Minow 1998, 103; Zutlevics 
2002, 72). A consequence is that while reparations have intrinsic moral content, settlements 
do not (see Walker 2010; 2013). Reparations come in a wide variety of forms and, despite the 
historical meaning of the term, examples include not just cash payments, but also affirmative 
action, educational programs or even the renaming of parks, all of which serve an array of 
moral aims (Brooks 2003, 108; see also Torpey 2003, 3-4).64 The view of reparations 
expressed by the naïve criticism describes settlements, not reparations. Settlements are 
compromises, not an effort to make a victim whole (Brooks 2003, 107).    
  The justification for reparations that attends this normatively rich view is salient to 
their relationship to official apology. The justification, says Boxill (1972), is “primitive”: 
every person (or group) is equal in moral standing, with an equal right to pursue what they 
think valuable (116-117). When these interests are injured through wrongdoing, reparations 
are required not only to counteract the ill-effects of injustice, but also to affirm victims’ 
 
64 Note also that reparations can come in either individual or collective forms, despite the fact that western 
jurisprudence tends to favor individual packages.  
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moral standing. Others suggest that the justification for reparations is even more primitive: 
wrongs deserve righting (Minow 1998, 104). But Boxhill’s (1972) view gives some 
substance to this latter intuition. In committing a wrong, perpetrators offend the basic dignity 
and deny the moral equality of their victims insofar as the wrongdoing carries with it the 
message that the interests of victims do not matter so much as those of perpetrators. Without 
acknowledging this view as mistaken, this message is not counteracted. “Without the 
acknowledgement of error, the injurer implies that the injured has been treated in a manner 
that befits him; hence, he cannot feel that the injured party is his equal” (118). Such 
acknowledgment is intrinsic to reparations, for it is this error that justifies them in the first 
place. That money, goods or actions are incommensurable with the loss and suffering 
occasioned by injustice is what motivates Walker (2013) to argue that all reparations are 
symbolic, even monetary ones (211; see also Minow 1998, 103). Reparations, before they are 
anything else, are vehicles for sending moral messages. 
  Understanding reparations in this way allows us to explore how they work in synergy 
with apology. Apology and reparations share many features. Both seek to acknowledge 
wrongdoing and to restore dignity and humanity to wronged parties. Both are justified with 
reference to past wrongdoing. Indeed, many consider apology itself to be a vehicle of 
reparation, and on the above reading it fits the bill (see Thompson 2018, 81 and Minow 1998, 
112). It should thus come as no surprise to the reader that I am suggesting reparations are 
useful tools for advancing the moral functions of official apologies. Reparations can promote 
these functions in a ‘concrete’ way that lends credibility to apology. Yet it remains for me to 
demonstrate why reparations of a more substantive kind are critical complements to effective 
official apology. Why is apology not enough? For that matter, why is restitution, reform, or 
compensation not enough? The answer has to do with the importance of sincerity in an 
official apology.   
  As we saw in chapter 2, ‘sincerity’ in this context minimally demands that (a) official 
apology demonstrate a genuine desire to develop new relationships by making amends for 
past wrongs that stand in the way of them; and (b) that the apology show serious commitment 
to forbear from further transgressions. In interpersonal contexts, the perception that an 
offender is experiencing remorse (or conveying some cognate emotion) is often enough to 
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convince recipients of sincerity. Indeed, this is the primary function of remorse. But, as we 
saw in 2.1.2, the requirement of remorse is not amenable to transposition to the political 
realm for reasons having to do with the ontology of collectives like states. For this reason, 
reparations will play an indispensable role in proving state sincerity. Far from being useful 
complements to official apology, reparations are required to get it off the ground in the first 
place. This is not to elide the distinction between apology and those substantive measures 
which lend it credibility, but instead to say that an apology cannot be effective without these 
complements. As I argued in the last chapter, without sincerity an apology will be hollow. 
What I suggest now is that without reparations, the apology will be perceived as insincere. If 
addressees question the sincerity of the apology, it will not be effective. Reparations are 
prerequisites for a sincere – and hence effective – official apology.  
3.2.1 State sincerity and reparations 
To see why reparations are prerequisites for sincere collective apology we need to return to 
my account of the composition of the ‘apologizer’ defended in the last chapter. As I argued at 
length (2.2.1 – 2.2.4), collectives such as states are ontologically dependent on the people 
that compose them. What a state does is dependent on what its citizens do, no matter whether 
we consider ‘the state’ as inclusive or exclusive of citizens. Since comprehensive state 
apologies concern several injustices to which non-Indigenous citizens are party, for a state to 
apologize in a sincere way these individuals must get on board. To re-capitulate, this is not 
only because these individuals have things to be sorry for, but also because empirical 
evidence suggests that the perceived sincerity of the messages of collective apology is (in 
part) a function of the perceived representativeness of the views of the individuals that 
compose the apologizing group (Wenzel et al. 2017; Philpot et al. 2008, 485-486; Blatz, 
Schuman and Ross 2009). That is, perceived sincerity is partly a function of how many 
individual members of a collectivity endorse the message of the apology. This endorsement 
represents individuals’ acknowledgement of their contribution to injustice while allowing the 
apology to concern collective- as opposed to individual-level wrongs. If apology is supposed 
to engender new political relationships between groups, and if groups are composed of 
people, then the success of the apology stands or falls on whether or not the sentiments 
expressed are shared – and seen to be shared – by the constituents of the offending group.  
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  Endorsement from co-responsible citizens, however, is not enough to prove the 
sincerity of a comprehensive official apology. This conclusion is a consequence of both the 
two-level conceptual distinction between states and their composite members espoused in 
chapter 1 (1.2), as well as the view of the composition of the apologizer just mentioned. As 
we saw, for both normative and ontological reasons we need to understand official apology 
in our context as coming from both co-responsible citizens and the state (here considered as 
the sum of its institutions). This hybrid solution to the dilemma of how to characterize the 
apologizer is necessary for securing the apologetic meanings required to address both the 
historical and enduring injustices at issue in a comprehensive official apology, as well as for 
respecting the fact that the state and its non-Indigenous citizens are distinct though jointly 
responsible agents. Parties require standing – that is, responsibility for injustice – to 
apologize in a manner that conveys these meanings and thus promotes the moral functions of 
apology. The state and co-responsible citizens are responsible for injustice: the state is 
responsible for emergent and collective wrongs, individuals for their contributions to them. 
To fully address these injustices, each type of agent must be involved in the apology. 
Importantly, both types of agent need to be sincere for the apology to be effective. The view 
defended in the last chapter addresses the sincerity component of apology for only the first 
type of agent – individuals – and bracketed the sincerity component for the second – the 
state.  
  The idea that reparations tendered by the state can demonstrate the sincerity of an 
apology is not new. Indeed, as can be gleaned from the discussion above (3.1), if there is any 
agreement in the literature on official apologies, it is that reparations of some kind or other 
are required to lend credibility to them (James 2008, 139). Not acknowledged, though, is that 
espousing a normatively rich view of reparations is necessary for this function. Apology is a 
moral instrument with moral goals. The naïve view of reparations sees reparations as a type 
of settlement – a commodification of injuries (Flemming 2008, 99). Cynical underlying 
motives in apology discredit its moral messaging, and settlements effectively constitute 
payouts. A payout has no necessary moral content and cannot demonstrate sincerity. To show 
sincerity, reparations must have moral content. Reparations are, in the broadest sense, 
gestures of goodwill that show in a concrete though indirect way how seriously the offender 
takes the apology (Lazare 2004, 127). By making reparations, the state signals its 
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commitment to change, its acknowledgement of wrongdoing and its admission of both causal 
and reparative responsibility.  
  We can dig a little deeper here to understand just how morally significant reparations 
can be when they serve as complements to apology. Like an apology, tendering reparations is 
a gesture of respect that affirms the moral equality of victims and perpetrators (Boxhill 1972, 
116). As we saw in the last chapter (2.3.1), the perpetration of an injustice sends the message 
to victims that their interests do not matter or that they are of lesser moral worth: they are 
ways of saying “I count but you do not”; “I am here up high and you are there down below” 
(J. Murphy 1988, 25). Through apology, however, the wrongdoer elevates the interests of the 
victim above their own (28). It is a gesture of humility that empowers victims through an 
affirmation of their moral equality. Reparations send the same message in a ‘concrete’ 
(though still symbolic or communicative) way. To see why, consider that when an offender 
commits an injustice, they impose a cost of sorts on victims, a cost that most often results in a 
gain for the perpetrator. The implicit justification for this is the view that while the interests 
of perpetrators matter, those of victims do not. Yet when a perpetrator imposes a cost on 
themselves in the form of reparations – a cost which is borne in the interest of victims – there 
is a message of respect attendant upon it, for it represents an inversion of the prior moral 
calculus, an inversion which serves as a corrective to it. 
  Vernon (2012) hits the nail on the head in his discussion of this aspect of reparations 
and their connection to apology. Vernon argues that when we make reparations, “we express 
respect for someone by putting ourselves out or suffering some inconvenience on his or her 
behalf” (83, emphasis in original). By putting ourselves out we demonstrate our good faith 
and our sincerity (84). If reparations were simply a settling of damage accounts, as the naïve 
view rejected above suggests, this would not be so. By imposing a morally significant cost on 
ourselves in the form of reparations, we communicate that the interests of victims matter just 
as much as ours. Yet to effectively communicate this message, argues Vernon, it is crucial 
that reparation not come too cheaply. This is an important caveat when we consider that one 
reason apologies are dismissed is because they are perceived to be maneuvers that impose no 
cost on offenders. As Vernon reminds us, “words are cheap – free, in fact” (83). Thus, if the 
tendering of reparations is to send a message of respect it is necessary that the cost imposed 
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on offenders be substantial enough that it can really be said to ‘put us out.’ In the case of 
monetary reparations, for example, payments “must represent a loss to the payer that can be 
taken as a measure of the payer’s seriousness, even if not as a measure of what the payee 
lost” (which, in any case, is incommensurable with money) (143). Such costly undertakings 
parallel the humbling aspect of apologizing.  
  Judging the above elucidated understandings of reparations on the one hand, and our 
understanding of sincerity on the other, we can see how the tendering of the former supports 
the proving of the latter. As in an apology, states offer reparations “in order to acknowledge 
the wrong, their responsibility for the wrong or its repair, and their intent to do justice to the 
victim precisely for the wrong” (Walker 2013, 205). As we saw, sincerity in this context 
requires that (a) the apology demonstrate a genuine desire to develop new relationships by 
making amends for past wrongs that stand in the way of them, and that (b) the apology show 
serious commitment to forbear from further transgressions. Given that reparations are always 
a morally laden response to wrongdoing, our rich view of reparations means that they serve 
to both acknowledge that wrongdoing and take responsibility for it. They are, then, an 
attempt to make amends for past wrongs that stand in the way of new relationships. 
Likewise, reparations, when costly to the offender, are a gesture of respect that indicates the 
she will not repeat her transgressions, for reoffending would flagrantly contradict the 
previously affirmed respectful stance towards victims. Less commendably, a repeat of 
offenses would impose further costs in terms of reparations, costs an offender would hope to 
avoid. They thus indicate a serious commitment to forbear from future transgressions. 
  Given that reparation is how the state demonstrates sincerity, the question now is 
what these reparations should look like. As tailored responses to specific wrongs, they cannot 
be just anything. Since a sincere apology would entail that the state seeks to achieve 
apology’s goals, we can get insights for an answer to this question by looking at how to 
achieve them.   
3.3 Rehumanization through apology and (indeterminate) reparations  
In the last chapter I argued that one of the primary moral functions of official apologies to 
Indigenous peoples in settler states is ‘rehumanization’ (2.3.2). Grave wrongs have 
expressive dimensions that send messages of a damaging kind. Since historical injustice 
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dehumanized by sending the message that victims are of lesser moral worth, apology must 
rehumanize.  
  The last chapter explained how historical injustices can dehumanize victims in (at 
least) two ways. As we saw, Hampton (1988) makes a useful distinction between victims 
who are “literally degraded” – as in the case of those who internalize the disrespectful 
message of injustice and consider it warranted as a reflection of their actual low moral worth 
– and “demeaned” – as in the sense of being treated in a way that the victim considers 
inappropriate given her actual high moral worth (44-45). We can consider these injuries to be 
“subjective” or “objective”, respectively (45). In either case, the victim (or victim group) is 
treated in a manner that is not befitting of a party with moral worth. The message is that 
victims count for less. 
  Dehumanization can occur in many ways, but, obviously, to ‘dehumanize’ someone is 
to treat them as though they are less than human. Rather than digress into an Aristotelian 
discussion of the essential feature(s) of humans, I take it for granted that all persons are of 
equal moral worth; all have full moral status. Since this is so, from the perspective of 
morality no person’s interests are any more important than another’s. It follows that, 
minimally, to dehumanize someone is to treat them as though their interests are objectively 
less important than one’s own in virtue of their moral inferiority. The corollary of this is that 
to rehumanize is to affirm that a victim’s interests are as important as one’s own in virtue of 
their moral equality. Howard-Hassman (2003) refers to the idea of rehumanization I explain 
here as an acknowledgement of “moral integrity,” or the basic moral equivalence and 
competence of all people (193). Govier (2009) refers to this as “existential 
acknowledgement” (37).  
  On the last section’s reading of reparations, apology is itself a vehicle of reparation. 
As is the case with all reparations, part of the power of apology lies in its ability to 
rehumanize through the recognition of the moral equality of victims (Coicaud and Jibecke 
2008). It does so through various forms of acknowledgement. “To acknowledge that people’s 
rights have been violated is to recognize, in turn, that they have been treated as less than 
moral equals” (M. Murphy 2011, 53). The message is that the interlocutors are moral equals. 
For Govier (2003), acknowledgement consists in “explicit verbal spelling-out or other form 
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of marked awareness” (71; see also Govier 2009). The need for “explicit verbal spelling-out” 
is part of why I argued in the last chapter, contra some scholars, that any other form of 
reparation, in itself, is not tantamount to an apology (2.1.2). Clearly, apology is an excellent 
vehicle for sending explicit messages, for it consists largely in statements of 
acknowledgement that correspond to the fundaments of apology as described in 2.1.1. This is 
why some argue that it is primarily through acknowledgement that apology gets its moral 
powers. “To receive acknowledgement that these things did happen, that they were wrong 
and should not have happened, is to receive confirmation, validation, of one’s dignity and 
status as a human being, and a moral being of equal worth” (Govier 2003, 85). Through 
apology, victims are rehumanized in both the objective and (where applicable) subjective 
senses.  
  Apology is a necessary response to injustice because, in addition to what we can term 
‘concrete’ injuries such as physical harm, there is a moral injury to dignity attendant upon it 
that requires attention. In the very act of making an apology the deliverer necessarily 
acknowledges victims’ standing as moral agents and moral interlocutors (MachLachlan 2015, 
452; Smith 2014, 39). In admitting to moral fault, the wrongdoer symbolically brings 
themselves low as a corrective to the previous message of moral superiority, a corrective 
complemented by the parallel loss to perpetrators occasioned by the tendering of additional 
reparations. This humility contributes to the restoration of dignity in victims, dignity 
objectively or subjectively impacted through injustice (Lazare 2004, 116). It affirms a “moral 
equivalence” between victim and perpetrator (Howard-Hassman 2003, 204). When this 
acknowledgement of moral equivalence is lacking there is a “second wound of silence” 
(Govier and Verwoerd 2002c, 71), a “standing victory” of injustice that is a “moral fact” 
suggesting the injustice was justifiable (Philpot 2012, 38-39). In failing to apologize, “we are 
by our denial negating [victims] as persons whose needs and interests matter and who 
deserve our concern” (Govier and Vewoerd 2002c, 78). For these reasons, restitution, reform, 
settlement and additional vehicles of reparation are not sufficient for rehumanization. An 
“explicit verbal spelling-out” through apology is needed. 
  It is worthwhile to consider another way in which official apology can rehumanize: 
ceremony. This facet of apology draws attention to the role of performance, or what some 
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commentators call the ‘ritual’ of official apology. The symbolic aspects of official apology 
may be at least as important as the reparations that accompany it (MachLachlan 2013, 199). 
To do its work, an official apology cannot simply affirm respect; it must also be respectful 
(Coicaud and Jonnsson 2008, 87). As noted in the last chapter (2.1.2), official apologies must 
always be delivered in a public setting. The meaning of the apology will be impacted by how, 
where, by whom and to whom it is delivered. While the apology must be victim-centred, it is 
nonetheless true that it is partly tailored for public consumption because it is meant to 
publicly acknowledge and affirm its various messages. If this were not one of its goals, it 
would not be an official apology. This feature of official apology can work to its advantage 
in achieving its moral function of rehumanization. A respectful official apology requires that 
the various ‘actors’ in the ‘performance,’ as well as the location and ‘mis en-scène,’ be 
appropriately chosen (Saito 2016). Cels (2015) understands ‘performance’ as the 
combination of both the speech – the apology proper – and the dramaturgy – the ritual or 
ceremonial aspects of the apology (356). By choosing the actors, place and words properly, 
the apology can symbolically rehumanize victims. Both Cels and MacLachlan (2013) use the 
example of Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology for Canada’s residential school system to 
illustrate this point. After a process of negotiation during which the content of the apology 
was decided, Chief Phil Fontaine of the Assembly of First Nations, in full ceremonial 
headdress and standing alongside representatives of Canada’s First Nations, Métis and Inuit 
populations on the floor of the house of commons, received and responded to the apology 
from Canada’s highest political figure. “The staging and scripting of this apology visually 
demonstrated the moral inclusion of the victims in the same forum… thus enabling them to 
actually function as primary interlocutors who could literally contribute to the moral 
discourse” (Cels 2015, 357). The very public nature of official apologies, then, can be 
harnessed for the purposes of rehumanization. 
3.3.1 Rehumanization through (indeterminate) reparations    
While apology contributes to rehumanization, I have argued that words alone are not enough 
to achieve the moral functions of apology. Above (3.2) I emphasized the role of more 
substantive forms of reparations in conveying sincerity. But we should not forget that this is 
not all they can do: reparations also affirm moral status and communicate a respectful stance 
towards offended parties (see 3.2.1). For this reason, substantive reparations play an 
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indispensable role in concretizing the rehumanization sought through apology. What these 
reparations should look like is an open question, and suggestions run the gamut from 
financial redistribution to erecting monuments, from endowing educational scholarships to 
changing curricula. Yet, beyond the proposal I make in the next section, what these 
reparations should consist in, exactly, is a topic that I cannot say very much about. As a 
settler who has not suffered the injustices at issue, I am not in a position to expound on this 
question in any detail. For while reparations simpliciter are justified on backward-looking 
grounds, what form they take is often dictated by forward-looking ones. For this reason, 
Brooks (2003) terms (collective) reparations ‘rehabilitative’ (108). If, as I have suggested, we 
consider reparations in this context as an effort to make victims ‘whole’ rather than an effort 
compute the financial value of suffering, then it stands to reason that victims will be best 
placed to determine what being made ‘whole’ might look like (see Hill 2002). Those who 
owe reparations cannot – at least should not – dictate what form they take. What reparations 
look like, their magnitude, whether they are individual or collective – all depends on those to 
whom they are given. I can therefore only say that while substantive reparations are 
necessary for the function of rehumanization, it is only through dialogue with injured parties 
that we can determine their nature. This seems especially true when we consider that certain 
effects of historical injustices may be known only to victims, and thus it is only they who can 
fully communicate the nature of these harms and what is required for their repair. 
  The indeterminacy of the forms of appropriate reparation might be considered a 
weakness of my analysis, but it does not need to be. As with negotiating the content of 
official apologies, negotiating forms of reparation is itself valuable. This idea relates to 
Walker’s (2013) insight that “it is the meaning of the interaction… that puts the repair in 
reparations” (208). While reparative gestures or programs involve concrete actions, these are 
also rightly seen as the result of a process of negotiation and interaction between victims and 
responsible parties. This process of negotiation, if undertaken in a spirit of respect, can serve 
as an exemplification of the modalities of the relationship sought through reparative acts: it is 
both a model and a sort of test procedure for what is to come (222).65 Negotiation is key to 
ensuring that reparations embody and promote what they hope to achieve. It is also important 
 
65 For an example of a successful process of this type see Phillips and Johnson 2003.  
  117 
 
 
 
for ensuring that the reparations fit the needs of offended parties. Far from being a 
shortcoming, the indeterminacy of the forms of the reparations I have argued are necessary 
for official apology is a virtue.  
3.4 Correctives to history and truth or historical commissions    
In the last chapter I explored the expressive messages sent by the subsistence of enduring 
injustices. I drew attention to two forms of enduring injustice that are harmful in both 
concrete and communicative ways. First is the ongoing failure to redress historical injustice. 
This is a new and distinct site of direct responsibility on the part of the state which has 
material, symbolic and psychological ramifications for descendants of direct victims, as well 
as implications for the cultural survival of their communities. Second are the structural 
injustices that constitute some of the automatic effects of historical wrongdoing. These have 
damaging and measurable effects on the well-being of historically victimized groups and the 
people that compose them. Failing to address enduring injustice of both kinds represents an 
erasure of history and sends what is in effect a message of moral contempt to victims. Moral 
contempt is a continually reproduced communication of contempt for the claims and interests 
of victims. Implicit to ongoing moral contempt is not only the idea that the needs and 
interests of victims do not matter so much as those of responsible parties, but also the 
suggestion that victims’ understanding of history is baseless. For if (as responsible parties 
purport to believe) victims and perpetrators are moral equals, then redress for the injustices at 
issue would have been forthcoming. This is because the justification for redress stems from 
an assessment of what is due as a matter of justice between moral equals based on backward-
looking assessments of moral responsibility – that is, based on history. A denial of redress is 
a denial of history, and “to have part of one’s history ignored is a kind of affront, and when 
that history involves suffering at the hands of others to ignore it is to imply that the group 
that suffered is lacking in worth” (Vernon 2012, 151).    
  To be effective, a comprehensive official apology cannot ignore enduring injustices 
because they are part of the broader context that informs the meaning and significance of 
historical injustice in the context of ongoing colonial practices. Nor can it ignore the moral 
contempt associated with the historical reluctance to address these injustices. As I argued in 
chapter 2 (sec. 2.3.3), one of the moral functions of official apology to emphasize in this 
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context is the repudiation of the message of moral contempt. One way to do this is to issue 
correctives to history. Correctives to history contribute to the sincerity of apology insofar as 
they support its comprehensiveness. Taken together, acknowledging the reality of enduring 
injustices, validating victims’ understanding of them, delineating their origins in detail, and 
placing reparative responsibility on the shoulders of responsible parties all serve to 
demonstrate the depth of perpetrators’ contrition, and their understanding of the impact of 
wrongdoing. Such acknowledgement will inform social discourses which either deny or 
downplay the significance of historical injustice and its legacies, and offer hope that harmful 
patterns of interaction will transform. In effect, this acknowledgement of history will in turn 
acknowledge that not only were historical injustices wrong, but so too were the denial of 
redress and the failure to address their structural legacies. The facts will speak for themselves 
and compel action (Waziyatawin 2011, 176). 
  While I argued in the last section that it is inappropriate to determine a priori what 
form reparations should take, it nonetheless appears that there is one vehicle of reparation 
that is a precondition for (effective) official apology in the context of settler states. Issuing a 
corrective to history through apology means acknowledging that national narratives which 
ignore the injustices of the past (and present) do not reflect the facts of history. The most 
crucial element of any apology is the acknowledgement of the offense(s) at issue. “Clearly, 
without such a foundation, the apology process cannot even begin” (Lazare 2004, 75; see 
Marrus 2007, 79). We need to know the truth of what happened if we are to apologize for it. 
At least in this domain, the truth is a prerequisite for repair (Walker 2013, 530; Cairns 2003, 
67; Crocker 2003, 45). Detailed acknowledgment is essential to official apologies because 
these concern emergent and collective wrongs spanning extended periods of time and 
involving many actors and structural forces. Not even perpetrators are fully aware of the 
complexities involved. As I’ve stressed, the success of an apology depends in large part on 
its ability to convince recipients that the deliverer has met all the conditions of apology. If an 
official apology is to fulfil the requirement that it acknowledge the offenses at issue, then, far 
more detail and nuance is going to be required than in interpersonal contexts, for this level of 
detail will be required to convince recipients that the requirement really has been fulfilled 
(Smith 2008, 169-170). To avoid coming across as perfunctory, a careful process of 
investigation is required as a basis for this component of the apology (Teitel 2006, 107). As 
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Rotberg (2006) argues, “[a]pology acts in a vacuum if there is no investigative underpinning 
to anchor and support such contrition… The more rigourously such information is obtained, 
the more effective apologies can be” (47).  
  A truth or historical commission is the best form this “investigative underpinning” 
can take. According to Hayner’s (2011) authoritative account, a truth commission has five 
essential characteristics. It (1) is focused on the events of the past; (2) scrutinizes events or 
patterns of events that took place over a span of time; (3) “engages directly and broadly with 
the affected population, gathering information on their experiences”; (4) has a clear mandate 
with a fixed temporal duration with the aim of producing a definitive final report; and (5) is 
official in that it is given its powers by the state under investigation (11-12). Hayner argues 
that truth commissions have five core aims or functions. First, they seek to create a record of 
the past. Second, they have the aim of “hearing, respecting, and responding to the needs of 
victims and survivors,” giving them a previously silenced “public voice” (21). Third, by 
exposing wrongdoing and establishing accountability they can help to counter impunity and 
reduce the likelihood of further transgressions like those under review. Fourth, most truth 
commissions identify specific institutional or structural causes of injustice, thereby allowing 
them to suggest necessary reforms. Finally, some truth commissions are conceived so as to 
promote ‘reconciliation,’ (whatever that may be) (20-23). Judged by these components, not 
only will a commission along these lines provide a compelling and reliable evidentiary basis 
for apology, but, because of its attention to history, it will also offer valuable information that 
can inform subsequent projects of redress.66 The upshot for us, then, is that a commission can 
serve as a powerful complement to the acknowledgement of wrongdoing essential to 
apology, while also signaling the seriousness of the apologizer’s intention to do justice.  
  As I explain below, it is primarily for normative reasons that my account demands we 
understand truth or historical commissions as a form of reparations. This is because, first, 
understood as reparations commissions can contribute to demonstrating the sincerity of an 
official apology. Second, seeing commissions through the lens of reparations allows us to 
defend the selective emphasis commissions place on certain aspects of a state’s history. Yet, 
bracketing these normative motivations for a moment, we can take issue with Hayner’s 
 
66 This suggests that truth commissions must precede apologies. See Dorell 2009. 
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(2011) contention that it is implausible to conceive of truth commissions as reparations. 
Hayner suggests that understanding them this way stretches the concept of reparations too 
far, for victims generally understand reparations as “responding to the specific harms and 
damages suffered” (165, emphasis added). Yet, like all reparations, truth commissions are a 
response to specific harms and damages; they are “intentionally reparative actions in the 
form of goods (material and interactive) given to those wronged by parties who acknowledge 
responsibility for wrongs and whose reparative actions are intended to redress those wrongs” 
(Walker 2010, 529). The only significant difference between ‘concrete’ reparations (such as 
monetary redistribution) and a truth commission is in how each contributes to improving the 
condition of offended parties. Concrete reparations such as financial redistributions are 
primarily used to improve the condition of injured parties in material ways. Truth 
commissions serve to improve this condition in less tangible ones.  
  As Walker (2013) argues, in a context of widespread social denial or whitewashing of 
historical wrongdoing and its legacies, victims are saddled with the burden of making their 
claims for redress, or telling their stories, in the face of skepticism. The uses to which the 
truth can be put, then, “include the ability by victims and by others who support them to 
claim both the truth of what has happened and the basic credibility of victims and witnesses, 
[and] their standing to give accounts that reasonably require consideration by others” (538). 
As an example, consider that since the 1996-2003 South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission no white South African has been able to (reasonably) deny the injustices 
suffered by the victims of apartheid. Another count in favor of the commission-as-reparations 
view is that, like all reparations, commissions serve to presage just relationships by 
exemplifying the modalities of the relationship that reparative acts seek to engender. A good 
truth commission will thus embody what it is trying to achieve (Guttman and Thompson 
2000, 23). The South African commission again offers a compelling example. As we saw 
above, truth commissions have the aim of “hearing, respecting, and responding to the needs 
of victims and survivors” (Hayner 2011, 21). When the state and victims or victim groups 
engage each other respectfully in a non-adversarial context, truth commissions such as South 
Africa’s – where all hearings were televised – serve to promote through example a 
relationship premised on just interaction between moral equals (see Walker 2010, 540). The 
public setting in which victimized individuals engage in a moral interlocution with the state 
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likewise serves to promote the rehumanizing function of reparations (and apology).67 All this 
is to say that, contra Hayner, is it plainly not farfetched to consider a truth or historical 
commission a form of reparations. And by conceiving of truth commissions thus we are 
imbuing them with a moral character that is congenial to the purposes of apology. If we 
consider these moral aspects of commissions-as-reparation it is easy to see why some 
consider them the “heralds of apology” (Rotberg 2006, 42). 
 In this context, truth commissions are essential to effective official apology not only 
because they serve as sincerity-bolstering instruments of substantive reparation, but also 
because they inform the correctives to history apology calls for. As noted in chapter 2 (sec. 
2.3.3), to counteract the message of moral contempt implicit in the failure to address 
enduring injustice the state must issue a corrective to history through official apology in at 
least two ways. First, by acknowledging that the failure to redress historical injustice was (or 
is) an injustice unto itself. Second, by acknowledging that responsibility for enduring 
structural injustices lies with the state and its co-responsible citizens. Without detailing these 
historical correctives, an official apology will fail to meet the requirement that it properly 
acknowledge offenses. As an inadequate apology, it will appear perfunctory, failing to 
repudiate the moral contempt associated with enduring injustice. 
  Consider how far-reaching the practical implications of a robust historical corrective 
go. First, acknowledgement that the denial of redress for historical wrongs represents a 
distinct injustice for which the state bears responsibility requires an acknowledgement that 
victims were always justified in their calls for the redress of historical wrongs. Implicit to the 
denial of justice is the state’s view that historical injustices did not merit attention and that 
victims’ understanding of it was wrong. Repudiating this message requires a re-evaluation of 
history. This, in turn, requires a full airing of the historical record, for we cannot 
acknowledge the wrongness of an action without first delineating what it involved. A truth 
commission with a broad mandate is required to inform subsequent re-evaluations. 
Acknowledging what happened forces the state to acknowledge that not only was the 
historical injustice wrong, but by consequence so too was the denial of redress. Chile’s 
 
67 This is a widely noted virtue of truth commissions. For example, see: Govier 2003, 67; Du Toit 2000, 128; 
Minow 2000, 246; Dyzenhaus 2000, 473-474. 
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National Commission of Political Imprisonment and Torture, for example, resulted not just in 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, but also subsequent (long-denied) redress for victims of 
torture and false imprisonment (Hayner 2011, 61-62). In the settler-state context, analogous 
forms of acknowledgment can help to undo the damage done by generations of moral 
contempt. As Maier (2014) notes, “[t]he truth commission may not be able to provide justice 
in the sense of rendering retribution, but it at least avoids the accumulated injustice of 
denying recognition of suffering” (267).  
  The second type of historical corrective is no less involved. Locating the 
responsibility for contemporary structural injustices in the right place demands thorough 
investigation. Emphatically acknowledging that victims are not responsible for the wrongs at 
issue is an important aspect of any apology (Lazare 2004, 58). It may be even more important 
in political contexts, where public acknowledgment plays a role in vindicating victims. Given 
that both acknowledgment of responsibility and acknowledgement of the offenses at issue are 
necessary components of apology, clearly delineating the cause and effect relationship 
between historical injustices and their enduring structural impact is a necessary condition for 
meaningful comprehensive apology. To accept blame – and to counteract the tendency of 
some to assign blame to the wrong party – a clear spelling-out of the course of history is 
required. This is the job of a truth commission, and its findings should feature in any serious 
apology. This airing will serve to promote crucial functions. First, it will vindicate 
Indigenous peoples’ understanding of history and publicly acknowledge the responsibility of 
the state and co-responsible citizens for contemporary structural injustice. Acknowledging 
that structural injustice stems from historical wrongs is thus a way to empower victims 
(McGary 2010, 551). Second, this sort of investigation will help to reveal the “global truth of 
the broad pattern of events” and establish accountability for repair (Hayner 2011, 84). 
Understanding the past makes it less likely that systemic problems will persist (see Sparrow 
2000). By identifying systemic causes of current structural injustice this corrective to history 
can serve as a launchpad for reform. Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, in 
narrating the history of Indigenous-Crown relations from contact to the mid-1990s, and in 
suggesting reforms and exhorting Canadians to accept their reparative roles, is perhaps the 
best example of this (1996a; 1996b). 
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3.4.1 Truth or historical commissions and the liberal objection 
The upshot of the above discussion of correctives to history is that, as an evidentiary basis for 
apology, truth or historical commissions are indispensable for a sincere and effective one. 
However, despite the potential for truth commissions to complement and enhance the value 
of official apology, a powerful criticism of this idea lurks. As Guttman and Thompson (2000) 
note, “[a] commission typically seeks a historical verdict, a final judgement about what 
happened, intended to be accepted by all citizens” (34-35). Yet in the liberal-pluralist 
democracies of settler states like Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the United States a 
“historical verdict” or “final judgement” might be considered a deeply illiberal aim. In 
theory, at least, the state can no more compel people to give up their view of the past than it 
can demand they sign on to an officially endorsed one. As Maier (2000) cautions, “[t]rying to 
‘synthesize’ a narrative from diverse sources and voices is a dangerous exercise: reduction of 
many voices to one coherent story line means valuing some testimonies more than others, or 
privileging the significance of some stories more than others” (274). If a commission 
establishes a comprehensive moral and historical narrative it will come perilously close to 
providing what amounts to a polemical document promoting one view of what is right and 
wrong, one view of how we should interpret the past. This offends both liberal and 
democratic principles (Vernon 2012, 75-79). In liberal-pluralist states, no single agent is 
permitted to have the final word on how the facts should be interpreted. For this reason, 
Hayner (2011) arguably understates the case when she notes that “defining truth is 
contentious” (84).  
  The liberal objection has merit, but it elides crucial differences between what we can 
loosely term ‘types’ of truth. By distinguishing between the types of truth a commission 
might uncover (or produce), we can see why the liberal objection misunderstands the purpose 
of a morally defensible truth commission considered as reparation. Commissions can offer at 
least three types of truth. The first is “forensic” truth, which concerns “information about 
whose moral and legal rights were violated, by whom, how, when, and where” (Crocker 
2003, 44). These are the cold hard facts, or what Arendt (2005) would call “brutally 
elementary data” (302). The second is variously termed “personal” (Vernon 2012, 73) or 
“emotional truth,” which is “knowledge concerning the psychological and physical impact on 
victims and their loved ones from rights abuses and the threat of such abuses” (Crocker 2003, 
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44). These are the truths of human experience, either individual or collective. The third type 
we can term ‘interpretive’ truth. This type of ‘truth’ is truth-as-narrative, in which forensic 
and emotional truths are incorporated into a narrative fabric that weaves its way around the 
facts while pulling in strands of moral and political judgements that are external to them. It is 
the ‘synthesis’ Maier (2000) cautions against (274), or a story of the past imbued with 
evaluative assessments informed by the first and second types of truth. 
  As Hayner (2011) notes, the kind of truth a commission collects will depend on what 
it is aiming to do (81-82). For example, suppose we conceive of commissions as 
dispassionate bodies seeking a clearer picture of historical events. In this instance it would be 
difficult to defend its dissemination of anything beyond forensic truths. A commission of this 
kind might lack credibility if it offered any interpretive truth. Emotional truth, which is not 
subject to the same evidentiary standards as forensic truth, might well be discounted. Yet it is 
here where the normative value of recognizing commissions as reparations comes into play. 
As reparations, commissions are undertaken as precisely tailored responses to the wrongs at 
issue. The wrongs at issue concern not just historical injustice, but also the enduring 
injustices associated with the erasure of history, the denial of redress, and the historical 
silencing of the voices of offended parties. For this reason, a commission is entirely justified 
in prioritizing certain truths over others, as well as in extending its purview beyond the 
forensic. For it is by uncovering and promulgating these truths that we can begin to remedy 
these injustices, and remedying injustice is the point of reparations. If a commission does not 
emphasize the truths that offended parties consider important, it will not succeed as a vehicle 
of reparation because, as reparation, it must be responsive to the demands, needs or wishes of 
the parties that the state aims to make ‘whole.’ 
   Part of the purpose of a commission of this kind is to inform a subsequent official 
apology. As a form of reparation, apology, like all reparations, is meant to be a response to 
the injustices at issue. It is for this reason that a commission must determine the constative 
elements of an apology by prioritizing those issues that offended parties consider important. 
This will undoubtedly involve detailed forensic examination of what was done, to whom it 
was done, when, where, why and who was responsible. Yet it will also involve what we are 
calling ‘emotional’ truths garnered from testimony. Emotional truths emerge from people and 
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peoples who have suffered from the injustices that initiated the call for redress in the first 
place. These injustices are interpreted not just as brute facts, but as emblematic of a historical 
and ongoing relationship of domination. This imbues the injustices with a meaning, an 
interpretation, that deserves to be recorded, acknowledged and promulgated. As I argued in 
chapter 1 (1.4.2), acknowledgment should concern not just the effects of historical 
wrongdoing and the recognition that they are unjust, but about what the historical injustice 
symbolizes. The focus is not merely on a forensic accounting of the facts; it is also about 
what they are emblematic of, what they mean to those that were victims of injustice. If we do 
not recognize and validate this sort of truth then prospects for reconciliation appear very dim, 
because without acknowledging the continually reproduced modalities of colonialism and 
their effects, then it is not clear how we can hope to change them. 
  One might object that even state endorsement (or production) of forensic and 
emotional truths represents an illiberal attempt by a state body to impose a view of history on 
citizens who are justified in holding their own opinions on these matters. Yet just as liberal 
societies expect individuals to espouse foundational principles of political morality (Gutmann 
and Thompson 2000, 33), so too are they justified in encouraging citizens to believe in 
certain basic and undeniable forensic facts about history. After all, history needs telling, 
curricula need crafting. And whether individual citizens believe that publicly recorded 
emotional truths are justifiable responses to these forensic facts, it remains the case that 
offended parties believe these emotional truths. That is a fact in itself that can no more be 
denied than the brute facts of history, and it is precisely these emotional truths that need to be 
acknowledged in the interest of reparation.  
  It is only in the third type of truth where we run into the liberal’s worry. For while 
forensic and emotional truths cannot be denied, interpretive ones can be. In a liberal-pluralist 
society, individuals are within their rights to put whatever narrative tapestry around 
established forensic and emotional truths they wish. Yet, importantly for the prospects of 
reconciliation, the acceptance of the first two kinds of truth uncovered and disseminated by a 
commission will circumscribe the range of reasonable interpretive truths available to 
individuals. For example, Brophy (2006) suggests that while the Tulsa Race Riot 
Commission failed to provide a universally endorsed historical interpretation of the 1921 
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massacre, it nonetheless succeeded in shaping social discourse by uncovering certain 
undeniable truths about the past and its enduring legacies (246-250). In the context of settler 
states, commissions have the potential to guide historical readings in a like manner, thereby 
helping to transform prevailing interpretive truths of the past. And even if a commission were 
to reach a little far, offering its own interpretive truth in response to its investigations, so be 
it. For, as reparations, truth or historical commissions in this context are meant to respond to 
generations of silencing those who opposed prevailing national narratives of history. As 
Cairns (2003) argues, a commission can offer “history from below as a corrective supplement 
to the elite version […by] recognizing and inserting the voiceless and the forgotten into 
history” (82). 
3.5 Inspiring trust through reform and surrender of sovereign powers   
In chapter 1 I discussed an important enduring injustice which subsists in the present: 
systemic colonial orientations and attitudes which legitimized historical injustice in the first 
place (sec. 1.2.5). As I noted, and as many commentators have pointed out, all injustice takes 
place in a broader system of social meanings, cultural orientations and attitudes (e.g. 
Celermejer 2013; Dorrell 2009; Murphy 2011). While contemporaries may deny that these 
systemic outlooks persist, the colonial project that sought to assimilate or deny cultural and 
territorial rights to Indigenous peoples survives in altered but recognizable form to the 
present. Like the ongoing failure to redress historical injustice, ‘concrete’ structural injustices 
serve as indirect evidence that colonial attitudes persist. Evidence of the persisting settler-
colonialist mindset inspires mistrust of the state in historically victimized populations, for it 
points to how the modalities of colonialism endure. Thus, one of the most important moral 
functions of apology in this context is to engender trust in the state through the repudiation of 
colonialism and its associated practices (see 2.3.4). Since trust is a prerequisite for 
relationships premised on reciprocity and mutual respect, engendering trust is a necessary 
part of a multi-pronged effort at establishing these relationships.  
  Only a sincere apology will have any hope of engendering trust. Yet this task will be 
challenging given the state’s track record. Considering this record, mistrust of the state is not 
only warranted – it is the most rational attitude to have. Historical and enduring injustices 
were not aberrations, but part of a pattern of deliberate policies which sought to marginalize, 
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assimilate or eradicate Indigenous peoples (e.g. Spinner-Halev 2007, 585; Vrdoljak 2008, 
227; see MacDonald and Hudson 2012). This is part of why historical and enduring injustices 
have the meaning that they do. There is, furthermore, ongoing systemic discrimination 
towards Indigenous peoples demonstrated by sobering statistics on, for example, rates of 
incarceration, health outcomes or socioeconomic indicators, “empirical proof that the past is 
not behind us” (Tsosie 2006, 207; see 1.2.3). As we saw in the last chapter, this pattern of 
state behaviour stems from what Wolfe (2006) calls the “logic of elimination” which “strives 
for the dissolution of native societies” through the imposition of the structure of settler-
colonialism (388). The imposition of this structure and the violations attendant on its 
territorial expansion is one of the gravest wrongs of settler-colonialism (Moore 2019). Many 
scholars argue that the logic of elimination persists in a modern project which seeks to 
integrate Indigenous people into the political, social and arguably neoliberal order under the 
auspices of the state, a strategy which threatens the survival of Indigenous communities and 
cultures (see e.g. Woolford 2004; 2013; Alfred 1999; 2011; Coulthard 2007). An official 
apology will not succeed in inspiring trust by verbally repudiating the logic of elimination 
any more than Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau looking solemn on a stage would by 
itself convey sincerity. An official apology needs more to achieve its moral functions. This is 
especially the case when it comes to promoting trust. Generations of warranted mistrust have 
reinforced the idea that the state is not trustworthy. 
  Beyond the skepticism deriving from the state’s poor track-record, there are good 
reasons why many Indigenous people(s) doubt the intentions of apology – and indeed the 
motivations of the project of reconciliation more generally.68 Two of these stand out for their 
frequent mention. First, as we have seen, some scholars argue that apologies serve to limit 
liability by substituting words for action (e.g. Dominello 2017; Dorrell 2009; Chrisjohn and 
Wasacase 2011; Waziyatawin 2011). Some cite the weaknesses of many official apologies as 
evidence of the state’s prevarication or sidestepping (e.g. Henderson and Wakeham 2009). 
Recent efforts at reconciliation, say some, are forms of a “politics of distraction” (Woolford 
2004, 430). They fail to institute the real reform needed to address enduring structural 
injustice and redress historical wrongs (Corntassel and Holder 2008). But this criticism has a 
 
68 For a survey of these reasons, see Jung 2018. 
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deeper underpinning that gets to the very heart of the mistrust that will hinder any effort at 
reconciliation. This second critique hinges on the idea that all measures of reconciliation – be 
they apologies, truth commissions or other forms of redress of various kinds – are ultimately 
designed to reify state power and entrench the colonial dynamic in disguised form (e.g. 
Wakeham 2012; Coulthard 2007, 439).69 By seeking to close “a sad chapter in our history” 
(Harper 2008) the state effectively denies that the enduring injustices affecting Indigenous 
communities – in many ways continuous with those of the past – persist. The thought is that, 
in an effort to force a closure and draw a line between past and present, settler states “are 
increasingly using the conceptual architecture of transitional justice, including apologies, 
reparations, and TRCs, to reinforce the sovereign authority of the state over its Indigenous 
population” (Jung 2018, 256). The use of such strategies, says Coulthard (2007), “promises 
to reproduce the very configurations of colonial power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for 
recognition have historically sought to transcend” (439). This allows for a “move to 
innocence” congenial to settlers but which, in the eyes of Indigenous people, merely 
sidesteps the issues in need of attention (Jung 2018, 259-260). The worry is that while 
measures aimed at reconciliation may hit all the right notes, in neglecting to institute 
substantive reform and redress historical and enduring injustice they effectively fortify the 
status quo. As Coulthard (2014) notes elsewhere, “the reconciliation of Indigenous 
nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed 
to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority” 
(169). 
  Faced with these concerns it is no wonder that official apologies often fail to 
engender trust. Yet if official apologies in this context of mistrust cannot engender trust, or 
be perceived as trustworthy, then it is not clear that they can contribute to reconciliation at 
all. Trust is a key component to building the kind of healthy relationships envisaged by any 
feasible account of reconciliation. In this aspect trust has much in common with my 
discussion of the necessity of fulfilling the sincerity component of apology, for perceived 
sincerity is an indicator that recipients trust in the intentions of the apologizer (Nadler and 
Liviatan 2006). As we saw, the state can demonstrate sincerity through reparative acts, and it 
 
69 For similar arguments see Alfred 1999;2011; Coulthard 2014; Short 2003;2005; Moran 1998; Elgersma 2012. 
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is no wonder that Walker (2013) argues that one of the most important tasks of reparations is 
to inspire trust (209-210). Yet this emphasis on trust comes to the fore most of all in apology. 
As MacLachlan (2015) argues, “[w]e cannot describe the moral value of apology without 
referencing the moral value of trust” (446). Elsewhere she notes that “[t]he issue of trust – 
and its restoration – is central to the norms of apology” (2018, 367). The emphasis on trust is 
thus not a surprise in this context. Some of the most insightful works on reconciliation cite 
the establishment of trust of one kind or another as a key indicator of its achievement (e.g. 
DeGrieff 2008; C. Murphy 2010, 71-93). Some even seem to suggest that the 
(re)establishment of trust is reconciliation (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). On any useful 
reading, then, if apology is a part of reconciliation then it should seek to promote trust 
between parties.  
  Trust involves a belief that offenses will not reoccur, and thus that the colonial 
mindset that enabled and legitimized the injustices at issue is eradicated. Trust in the state 
therefore entails that its actions will be predictable because of its adherence to the norms of 
the political relationships sought. The moral function of engendering trust, then, attaches 
most prominently to apology’s forward-looking aspects: the promise to forbear from future 
transgressions, the commitment to reform and to redress injustice. In a context of widespread 
distrust of the intentions of the state, it is in these forward-looking aspects that some of the 
greatest difficulties arise (MacLachlan 2013, 194 and 198-200). For these components of 
apology come in the form of promises, and it is not obvious how the state can convey its 
trustworthiness before it has fulfilled what it promises to do. This is why some commentators 
argue that an official apology can only be judged retrospectively (Smith 2008, 234). We have 
then a sketch of a paradoxical architecture to trust-engendering apology. An official apology 
can only engender trust if it is trustworthy, yet we can only confirm it as trustworthy long 
after its delivery. From a functionalist perspective it seems that this temporal inversion is an 
inescapable conclusion, and so we must work with this handicap in mind: an official apology 
must become trustworthy over time. A retroactive proof of trustworthiness will by 
consequence retroactively prove an official apology’s sincerity. If, as I have argued, an 
official apology should be judged by how well it promotes its moral functions, and if 
measures of redress are essential complements of official apology, the question to ask now is 
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what measures of redress (beyond reparations) will serve to concretize the message of 
trustworthiness and make it reasonable to trust the state. 
3.5.1 Concretizing trustworthiness 
The key to making trust in the state rational will be to undertake substantive measures of 
redress specifically designed to put the lie to the worries about the authenticity of the 
forward-looking commitments of an official apology. These measures, like reparations, will 
serve to buttress the words of the apology by offering discernible indications that the apology 
– and hence the apologizer – is trustworthy. Undertaking these measures will help to close 
what Regan (2010) calls the “authenticity gap” between official rhetoric – what we say – and 
action – what we do (235). To engender trust, the apology must demonstrate a genuine 
change in outlook on the part of the apologizer, for lacking this there would seem to be no 
reason for trust. To be sincere, then, this message must be backed up with those actions that 
would be expected to follow from its authenticity.  
  Let us look at the two fundamental criticisms of the means of reconciliation noted 
above (3.5) to determine which measures of redress might contradict their basic assumptions. 
If the state can counteract these assumptions, the likelihood that apology will (eventually) 
help to engender trust will be higher. First is the idea that measures of reconciliation such as 
apology divert attention from the real changes required to address enduring injustices and 
redress historical ones. Second is the idea that measures of reconciliation such as official 
apology reify state power and entrench the status quo by legitimating state sovereignty over 
colonized Indigenous peoples (e.g. Alfred 1999, 119). While connected, these criticisms are 
different in emphasis. The first proposes that the state is seeking to divert attention through a 
whitewash of the ongoing colonial dynamic and offering empty gestures that force premature 
closure on political and social issues in urgent need of concerted attention. The second 
proposes that the state is deviously harnessing the tools of transitional justice to bolster its 
legitimacy, thereby imposing a “colonial ceiling” on what Indigenous peoples can hope to 
achieve (Short 2005, 274). This cynical maneuvering obstructs more meaningful negotiation 
with Indigenous peoples over restitution and self-government (Corntassel and Holder 2008). 
  With regard to the first criticism, it is self-evident that instituting the reform necessary 
to address the legacies of historical injustice would obviate the idea that apologies are 
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nothing but lip-service. In bolstering the credibility of apology in this way we are no longer 
talking about reparations per se, for reform does not necessitate an admission of historical 
responsibility for wrongdoing. It thus does not necessarily contain a moral message. Instead, 
reforms to such things as law, educational curricula or basic institutions are often undertaken 
as a response to current, ongoing injustices that stem from structural unfairness in a society. 
That is, we can justify reform on distributive or other grounds that make no reference to 
history. However, some of the strongest reasons for reform – and the justifications that 
interest us here – stem from the identification of the structural causes of past or enduring 
abuses affecting identifiable groups (Crocker 2003, 53). Reform justified on these grounds is 
initiated to avoid the persistence or reoccurrence of abuses not only because they are wrong 
in themselves, but also because recognizing that these injustices stem from historical 
wrongdoing highlights the urgency of addressing them (Lu 2011, 278). In this way, reform 
can contain moral messages akin to those of reparations insofar as they are stimulated by an 
acknowledgment of responsibility and undertaken to do justice for those who suffer from 
structural injustice. 
  As Alfred (2011) argues, “Indigenous-settler relations cannot be obviously reconciled 
without deconstructing the institutions that were built on racism and colonial exploitation” 
(168). Correcting structural injustice through reform requires alterations to such things as 
formal laws, social institutions and practices (Lu 2011, 279). In determining what these 
reforms should look like the findings of truth commissions are of value. As Hayner (2011) 
notes, given their broad investigative mandate “truth commissions are well positioned to 
evaluate the institutional responsibility for abuses and to outline the reforms needed to 
prevent further abuses” (22). This seems especially true when we consider that offended 
parties inform truth commissions directly, and thus suggested reforms can be responsive to 
their needs and demands. Given their commanding understanding of the injustices at issue, 
most final reports of truth or historical commissions offer explicit recommendations for 
reform (23). A good example of such recommendations comes from the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada’s Calls to Action (2015b). This document suggests 
sweeping structural and institutional changes to such things as child welfare programs, 
education, health care, the judiciary, law and even the practices of the media, museums and 
business. In addition, the recommendations suggest measures aimed at the revitalization of 
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Indigenous languages and cultures, alterations to structures of governance, and negotiation or 
reaffirmation of treaties premised on a nation-to-nation relationship of mutual respect. In 
short, the recommendations seek through reform to counteract the effects of historical and 
enduring injustice through a process of decolonization. It is illuminating from the perspective 
of the trust-engendering function of official apology to consider that reforms such as these 
are often classified in international law as ‘guarantees of non-repetition’ because they seek to 
make further transgressions near impossible (Vrdoljak 2008, 225). By carrying out these 
reforms, the state can demonstrate that it has forsworn the practices of the past, and hence 
that trust is rational.     
  Unfortunately, states are often reluctant to implement the recommendations of truth 
commissions in full (Hayner 2011, 163). It is precisely this reluctance which motivates the 
criticism that measures of reconciliation such as apology are a politics of distraction. The 
unwillingness to implement some of the most far-reaching and significant reforms is likely 
related to governments’ fears that doing so will undermine state power, thus corroborating 
the second overarching critique of reconciliatory measures (Corntassel 2012, 96). But it 
might also stem from another feature of redress movements that is less sinister. As Brooks 
(1999) notes, all large-scale and successful redress movements come about through 
legislative action (6; see also Lean 2003, 176). It is thus only through political pressure that 
reform happens. Yet, on the most charitable interpretation, the laborious soul-searching 
involved in a truth commission can exhaust the political will to implement the changes it 
recommends. In failing to institute needed reforms, then, the state gives insufficient evidence 
of its sincerity and hence trustworthiness. Without the political will to implement these 
reforms, few will consider an apology trustworthy, and it will never engender trust.  
  The reform needed for reconciliation can only occur if non-Indigenous citizens 
support the project (Saul 2011, 281; Moellendorf 2007, 215). This is where the complicity 
approach developed in chapter 1 of this dissertation can offer some hope. Among other 
things, the complicity approach holds that, because of their contributions to the perpetuation 
of enduring injustices, non-Indigenous citizens have normative reasons for playing their part 
in redress. A truth commission, by identifying systemic patterns of accountability, can serve 
to educate these citizens about their moral responsibilities and galvanize public opinion, 
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marshalling political support for reform (Kiss 2000, 75). This will require concerted and 
costly effort at the dissemination of the commission’s findings and proceedings, as well as a 
sustained effort to implant these into the public consciousness. But if this is not done, then 
what was it all for? In many ways, we should understand truth commissions as speaking to – 
and educating – non-Indigenous citizens more than anything else (Regan 2010, 11). We 
cannot forget that a state is ontologically dependent on its citizens (Govier and Verwoerd 
2002b, 192). What a state does is dependent in part on what its citizens are willing to 
undertake (Thompson 2008, 37). Just as the sincerity of an official apology depends in part 
on citizen endorsement of the apologetic message, so too does reform depend on the will of 
citizens. The findings of a truth commission can be harnessed to mobilize the necessary 
political support for reform. By instituting these reforms, the state will prove its sincerity by 
retroactively demonstrating the trustworthiness of its apology.  
  With regard to the second overarching critique of measures aimed at reconciliation – 
the idea that the state is employing the tools of transitional justice in order to suppress 
Indigenous movements and impose a ceiling on their aspirations through the reification of 
state power – the measures that will put the lie to it are a little murkier. It is clear, however, 
that structural reform of the kind just discussed will not be enough to neutralize it. In many 
cases, most notably in Australia, structural reform manifests in attempts to ‘close the gap’ 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in terms of social, economic and educational 
outcomes (Brennan 2004, 157). This narrow focus may be objectionable to Indigenous 
people in at least two ways. First, attempting to reframe reconciliation as a matter of ensuring 
distributively just outcomes may miss the forest for the trees: while eliminating distributive 
injustice is vital, the historical genesis of this injustice needs attention if it is to be responsive 
to Indigenous peoples (see 1.1). In this way a focus on distributive justice may indeed 
constitute a politics of distraction. Second, far from altering the terms on which settler states 
and Indigenous peoples interact, and far from establishing new moral and political norms to 
frame these interactions, a singular focus on economic equity can be interpreted as another 
attempt at assimilation (Woolford 2004, 440; Short 2003; 2005). By seeking to bring the 
economic outcomes of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people into line, the state diverts 
attention from transformative projects that would see Indigenous nations achieving greater 
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powers of self-determination, restitution of ancestral lands and cultural revitalization (Jung 
2018, 262).  
  Some official apologies offered by settler states support this view. For instance, as we 
saw in the last chapter, Canada’s 2008 apology to First Nations, Inuit and Métis people for 
the residential school system focused narrowly on the impact and legacy of residential 
schools and divorced these issues from the larger project of colonization. It thus closed the 
door to any transformative project of decolonization because “the apology [did] not offer any 
support for Indigenous autonomy or broader changes in crown-Indigenous relations” (Nobles 
2014, 124). The apology, like earlier attempts at reconciling Indigenous rights with state 
sovereignty, tacitly asked that Indigenous people put the past behind them and move on 
within the existing constitutional order (see Henderson Youngblood 2002). As Dorell (2009) 
argues, “[t]he implicit call to federal citizenship within the Harper apology does not 
constitute a movement toward a new relationship between Canadians and Aboriginals, but, 
rather, the reinforcement of the existing colonial relationship” (36). Likewise, the forward-
looking measures of Australia’s 2008 national apology to the Stolen Generations focused 
(strategically?) on issues of housing, education and employment (Nobles 2014, 128). As 
Dominello (2017) notes, “the trouble with this approach is that it does not depart from the 
policy of assimilation that underpinned the removal of Indigenous children in the first place. 
The rationale of the policy [of removal] … was to extend the benefits of Western civilization 
to them” (298).  
  An official apology in this context is supposed to represent a break from the past that 
signals a new relationship. Yet thus far apologies in settler states have failed to live up to this 
promise. Dominello (2017) convincingly argues that the scope of the state’s powers over 
Indigenous peoples is largely unchanged (296). If an official apology were really the 
harbinger of a new relationship, this would not be so. By implicitly affirming a colonial 
relationship that is discernibly continuous with that of the past, settler-states fail to engender 
trust. In acknowledging the harms of colonialism, the state is meant to be repudiating its 
logic. This logic sought to eliminate the political autonomy and cultural identity of 
Indigenous peoples through the exercise of state power. By acknowledging that this project 
was illegitimate it seems that redress would demand its reversal, for a consequence of 
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recognizing that the subordination of Indigenous people was wrong is that there were (and 
are) limits to its putative sovereign authority (293; Nobles 2008, 29). Assuming the 
legitimacy of state sovereignty over Indigenous peoples is a failure of such apologies, for it is 
partly what is at issue. Unacknowledged presuppositions like this, says Tully (2008b) “are so 
deeply woven into contemporary societies that they function as the ‘hinge propositions’ 
around which negotiation and litigation continue to take place” (276-277). In failing to 
concede greater powers of self-determination to Indigenous peoples the state undermines its 
repudiation of the logic of colonialism (Dominello 2017, 293). As we have seen, the worry of 
the second critique of official apology is about the reification of state power and the 
legitimation of internal colonialism. The antidote to this is substantive reform involving a 
weakening of state power through the surrender of some sovereign powers and/or 
jurisdictions. This would be an expected consequence of the repudiation of the rationale 
behind colonialism. If the apology offered by the state is sincere, that is, it will entail a loss 
of some sovereign powers (Reilly 2009b, 14). This will represent a real break from the past, 
empower Indigenous peoples and help to engender trust.  
  Once again, I run into a wall here, because it is not for me to say what such 
jurisdictional, institutional or constitutional arrangements should look like.70 Determining 
their character pre-politically is not appropriate, for it defies the spirit of reconciliatory 
projects. But it is worth speculating what these arrangements could involve. One thing that 
seems clear is that loss of some state sovereignty will surely mean the right of self-
determination for those Indigenous peoples that seek it. Otherwise, a repudiation of 
colonialism and the colonial mindset will be mere rhetoric. Consequently, as I argue in a 
moment, newly negotiated arrangements will likely (though perhaps not always) also involve 
rights to restitution of various kinds – to homelands, culturally significant sites, artifacts or 
territories adequate to secure economic self-sufficiency and cultural integrity. However, the 
content of these rights is contentious, and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
determine what they are (Vrdoljak 2008, 210). No doubt the resolution of their content will 
involve protracted negotiation between interested parties, and it is equally clear that the 
 
70 For discussion and some proposals, see Borrows 2017; Coyle 2017; Henderson-Youngblood 1994 and 2002; 
Papillon 2019; Tully 2008a. 
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solutions reached will differ on a case-by-case basis responsive to the history of relations 
between specific Indigenous nations and the settler state (Cairns 2002, 18-20). What seems 
certain, though, is that a sincere apology entails there is a case to be made for both restitution 
and self-determination. This is because self-determination without restitution will make self-
determination harder, and restitution without self-determination would detract from the value 
of restitution.  
   “To refuse to allow Indigenous people to manage their affairs in accordance with 
their own cultural values and practices” argues Sparrow (2000) “is to support assimilation” 
(352; see also Alfred 2011). Rejecting the logic of elimination therefore requires that 
Indigenous peoples obtain greater sovereign authority should they desire it. According to 
Thompson (1990), sovereignty “is the exercise by a people – whether a clan, a tribe or a 
nation – of control over a particular territory through their political and social institutions” 
(315). Sovereign peoples govern their internal affairs, deal with other sovereign powers on a 
formally equal basis, and are free of external control by these powers. Paying attention to this 
core meaning of sovereignty, without putting much emphasis on the scope of powers and 
responsibilities often associated with it, is an advantage here given the political realities of 
settler states, where many Indigenous nations comprise 500 persons or less (Cairns 2005, 
16).71 Alfred (1999) notes that sovereignty is an imported concept which may not reflect 
Indigenous ways of governance, and so its historically-laden meaning may not be appropriate 
(56). But we can understand sovereignty as minimally entailing the right to self-
determination (as opposed to the more restrictive concept of ‘self-government’). Rights to 
self-determination entail the right to control the cultural and economic life of the area in 
question, rights to exclude others, and control of natural resources. Article 3 of the United 
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) holds that the right of self-
determination of Indigenous peoples means that “they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (8).  
 
71 ‘Absolute’ sovereignty, or sovereignty over any and all matters in a territorially defined area, is the 
“quintessential” notion of sovereignty (Philpott 2020, sec. 1). However, this sort of sovereignty may not be 
possible for small nations within the geographical confines of settler states. As Cairns (2005) argues, “micro-
nations cannot themselves handle macro-tasks” (20). An arrangement similar to the non-absolute sovereignty of 
the states composing the European Union may be a better way to think of this (see Philpott 2020, sec.1).   
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  As many commentators have argued, sovereignty of this kind is the most reliable way 
of protecting a common way of life that is important for the well-being of cultural 
communities and – most importantly for liberalism – the people that compose them 
(Thompson 1990, 318-320; see Hendrix 2005, 768-771; Kymlicka 1995, 76 and 83-86). As 
Vrdoljak (2008) reminds us, many Indigenous peoples “maintain that the recognition of their 
collective right to self-determination is a prerequisite to their full enjoyment of all human 
rights, including cultural rights” (210). What self-determination will look like in detail will 
be a subject for negotiation. But to revitalize, affirm and protect the common ways of life of 
Indigenous peoples it is crucial that they have sovereign authority over their lands and 
communities if they see this as the best way of protecting this way of life.  
  There is an important connection between Indigenous sovereignty and the necessity 
of substantive restitution that we should take note of. The idea is that sovereignty justified 
with respect to the value of a common way of life must often be tied to land claims (Hendrix 
2005, 768-771). Here it is not primarily property rights that matter, but what control over 
land can do to protect (or revitalize) cultural integrity and promote economic self-sufficiency 
(Thompson 1990, 328). Particularly in the case of many Indigenous peoples, stewardship of 
ancestral lands is often central to cultural integrity and identity (Vrdoljak 2008, 219). This 
attachment to lands also has affective dimensions in the sense that a connection to them is 
important for the lives of individuals (Moore 2019, 94). Protecting cultural integrity may 
additionally require some level of economic self-sufficiency. Getting reconciliation off the 
ground therefore requires meaningful discussion of restitution. As Corntassel and Holder 
(2008) argue, “[a]s a part of a broader Indigenous self-determination strategy, substantive 
(versus symbolic) restitution has to occur before any discussion of rebuilding relationships or 
restoring dignity takes place” (470). Only this, they maintain, can counter the criticism that 
the architecture of settler state reconciliation projects is a politics of distraction (472).  
  If official apologies are ever to engender trust, there must be proof of their 
trustworthiness. This means undertaking those measures that would follow from a sincere 
apology. Substantive reform, restitution and the surrender of some of the state’s putative 
sovereign authority will go a long way towards moving apology from rhetoric to substance. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
An official apology is a speech act, recorded in writing, that has enormous potential for 
advancing the moral goals of national reconciliation projects in the context of settler states. 
But without complementary measures of redress, we are unlikely to achieve any of these 
goals. Rehumanization, historical correctives, and engendering trust require substantive 
measures that go beyond words. By undertaking those measures that would follow from the 
sincerity of the messages and avowed intent of official apology, settler states can overcome 
the objection that apologies are mere lip-service, symbolic cop-outs or cheap grace. Given 
that we are operating under the assumption that official apology is a component of the 
process of reconciliation, and considering that these measures of redress are indispensable 
complements to official apology, it follows that we have now determined further measures of 
redress that are components of this process: reparations, reform, restitution, and the 
renegotiation of state sovereignty and/or jurisdictions.  
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Chapter 4 The outcome of reconciliation: positive coexistence 
Introduction 
Though there is some disagreement over what can reasonably be thought analytic to it, the 
term ‘reconciliation’ has a core meaning that is not contested: the restoration of right 
relationships (Philpott 2012, 5).72 However, this understanding is so vague as to be 
effectively useless for the political contexts of settler states. Questions immediately arise 
concerning what ‘right relationships’ look like, and how we might achieve them. These 
complexities highlight the real-world importance of having a workable concept of 
reconciliation that expands on its core meaning. Rettberg and Ugarizza (2016) understate the 
case when they note that “ambiguity in the translation of a large-scale reconciliation mandate 
into specific public policy may have practical implications” (518). To design policy for 
reconciliation it is necessary to have a conceptual star to lead us there. A clearly articulated 
concept has the potential to guide social discourse and thereby transform relations among 
those party to it (Kofi Annan Foundation 2018, 17). The need for a comprehensive definition 
of reconciliation, then, is of more than academic concern. By exploring what the use of 
official apology says about the aims of reconciliation, this chapter will complete the work of 
this dissertation by shedding light on some necessary elements of such a comprehensive 
definition.  
  As we saw in the preface to this dissertation, a common way of defining reconciled 
political relationships is to begin by asking what healthy political relationships look like, then 
to elaborate on the norms which best govern them (Radzik and Murphy 2019, sec. 2). This 
approach follows the usual method of concept-formation, where scholars first determine a 
conceptual ideal, and then ‘operationalize’ it: “[t]he conceptual analysis of reconciliation 
must be prior to the strategic analysis of reconciliation,” says Meierhenrich (2008, 214). 
However, notwithstanding how perennial disagreements over the nature of reconciliation 
suggest it has not worked, this method of establishing a definition not only forecloses 
context-dependent understandings of reconciliation, it is also question-begging insofar as it 
assumes the content of the concept it is trying to explore. This dissertation aims at an 
 
72 Readers concerned about the use of the prefix ‘re’ can refer to footnote 1, in the preface to this dissertation, 
where I note that it is best to ignore the infelicity. 
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experimental inversion of the normal process of concept formation. It begins with the 
conditional premise that if official apologies for historical and enduring injustice are a part of 
reconciliation, then whatever effective official apology requires, whatever its normative 
foundations presume, whatever it aims to achieve – all will shed light on the concept of 
reconciliation. Allowing that official apology is a component of the process of reconciliation, 
and assuming that my analysis of this practice is correct, we thus have resources for deriving 
some necessary governing norms for a context-dependent understanding of reconciled 
relationships in settler states.  
  The findings of the previous chapters suggest that there is a moral substructure to 
official apologies and those mechanisms that promote its moral goals. Exploring these 
foundations allows us to approach the conceptualization of reconciliation by working 
backwards. The methodology of this chapter is based on the idea that there are several things 
that need to be presupposed before engaging in such apologies would even make sense to the 
parties that offer and receive apologies in this context. That is, if the apologizers and 
recipients both understand the ritual of apology, and if both parties recognize what makes for 
a good or bad one, then they must share an understanding of its purposes. By engaging in the 
social practice of official apology, then, parties tacitly acknowledge the value of its goals. 
Consequently, within apology lies the basis for a mutually agreeable vision of ‘right’ 
relationships, one which is cross-culturally acceptable and does not beg the question of what 
these relationships look like. Apology, I will argue, seeks both to circumscribe the range of 
reasonable interpretations of the past, and to acknowledge or engender attitudes of reciprocal 
respect and trust. The use of official apology, then, suggests that the practical implications of 
these aims constitute mutually agreeable normative expectations for reconciled relationships. 
As we will see, the apparent simplicity of this formulation masks the complexities that attend 
these goals when considered at various ‘levels’ of reconciliation. Happily, though, the 
conceptual dynamism of the attitudes of respect and trust can help us make sense of 
reconciliation as it applies to distinct kinds of relationships: that between individuals; that 
between individuals and collectivities; and that between collectivities. 
4.1 Apology and governing norms of reconciled relations  
Any conception of reconciliation should specify the type of improvement in relationship it 
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aims to achieve (C. Murphy 2010, 23-24). Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) refer helpfully to 
this as an issue of “content” which “concerns the kind of reconciliation involved” (180). For 
reasons that I revisit in sec. 4.1.3, it is not appropriate to determine the political, institutional, 
structural or constitutional arrangements that should emerge from the process of 
reconciliation pre-politically (see Schaap 2005, 8-11). Consequently, I restrict my focus to 
the governing norms, and normative expectations, of reconciled relationships.  
   Let’s return for a moment to paradigmatic interpersonal apology. Consider that 
apologies are transactions in which (at least) two parties must engage for the event to happen 
(Marrus 2007, 93-94; Tavuchis 1991, 46-47). “An apology is not a soliloquy,” says Minow 
(1998, 114). Parties to any apology have motivating reasons for engaging in the transaction. 
These motivating reasons stem from the perceived value of what the apology aims to do. By 
engaging in apology, then, parties (at least tacitly) accept the value of some or all of its goals. 
Since this is so, it follows that both deliverers and recipients likewise tacitly endorse 
normative reasons which count in favor of pursuing these goals. The normative reasons that 
concern us here are sometimes (self-regarding) prudential ones, sometimes irreducibly moral 
ones,73 but they all derive from propositions that one or both of the parties think true. These 
normative reasons are what I will call the ‘substructure’ of apology – they are the reasons 
why parties think apology’s aims are worth pursuing, or why they think these aims are good. 
In this case, motivating reasons – why parties engage in apology – stem from normative 
reasons – why they should engage in apology. Since apology would not be an instrument of 
moral repair if it did not have any moral goals, the normative substructure of these goals 
undergirds the social practice of apology itself.  
  Looking to this substructure is useful because the normative reasons people have for 
pursuing the goals of a given apology speak to the normative expectations of the relationship 
the apology seeks to help create or repair. For example, if I am motivated to achieve the goal 
of reciprocal trust with you only for prudential reasons – say, because it makes possible the 
goods of trusting relationships to my benefit, and only incidentally to yours – you may 
 
73 For the purposes of this discussion I understand a moral reason to be a reason that can only be described in 
ineliminably moral terminology.  
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justifiably wonder whether I bear any goodwill towards you, and vice versa.74 If there is no 
expectation of reciprocal goodwill, then the normative expectations of our relationship may 
be limited in a way analogous to those of a transactional business affiliation between trusting 
but aloof associates. Yet if we are both motivated to establish a relationship of reciprocal 
trust for the moral reason that the goodwill associated with trusting relationships is an 
intrinsically good thing, regardless of its attendant benefits, then the normative expectations 
of our relationship may be more demanding. I elaborate on this point below (sec. 4.1.2), but 
the takeaway here is that mutually recognized moral reasons imply shared moral precepts, 
which in turn imply shared understandings of the normative expectations that flow from 
them. For our purposes, the value of looking to the goals and substructure of apology is that 
defining ‘right relationships’ in an a priori manner is to beg the question; to define them with 
respect to what parties to reconciliation recognize as morally desirable is not. Allowing that 
official apology is a component of reconciliation, exploring the substructure of the goals of 
apology can help us discern the governing norms of healthy relationships that parties to 
reconciliation implicitly assent to already.  
  As we have seen, two crucial moral goals of official apology in the context of settler 
states are rehumanization and engendering trust.75 If the analysis in preceding chapters is 
correct, the mere fact that parties engage in official apology in this context suggest these 
goals are endorsed by both deliverers and recipients alike. Chapter 2 argued that one impact 
of grave wrongdoing is that it sends the de facto message that victims are of lesser moral 
value (2.3.1). The rehumanizing function of apology is a corrective to this. Apology affirms a 
moral equality, says Govier (2003), because “to receive acknowledgement that these things 
did happen, that they were wrong and should not have happened, is to receive confirmation, 
validation, of one’s dignity and status as a human being, and a moral being of equal worth” 
(85; see also M. Murphy 2011; MacLachlan 2015). Additionally, in repudiating the logic of 
colonialism an official apology is meant to inspire trust by serving as a harbinger of new 
relationships. As we saw in chapter 3, the reparations that give substance to an official 
 
74 Whether this would really be an instance of trust instead of mere reliance is beside the point here. I discuss 
this further below.   
 
75 Another core of aim apology is to issue correctives to history. I take up the consequences of this goal below 
(4.2.1). I separate the discussions because attitudes have more to say about the normative expectations of 
reconciled relationships than do correctives to history.  
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apology are premised on an assessment of what is due as a matter of justice to those whose 
moral equality was previously implicitly or explicitly denied (3.2-3.3). These reparations 
contribute to the rehumanizing function of apology and are likewise meant to inspire, among 
other things, trust. Since official apology for grave wrongdoing and its indispensable 
sincerity-bolstering mechanisms aim to affirm moral equality and engender trust, and since 
we are assuming apology is involved in reconciliation, it follows that a mutually agreeable 
vision of reconciliation will involve trust and an acknowledgement of moral equality.  
4.1.1 Rehumanization and recognition respect 
To see what follows from the mutual endorsement of these goals of official apology, then, we 
need to explore their normative substructure: why people think it worthwhile to pursue them. 
To avoid overcomplicating the discussion for now, in what follows I will continue to explore 
this normative substructure through the lens of interpersonal apology for grave wrongdoing. 
Later (4.2.2-4.2.3) I explain how this substructure translates to collective-level apology.  
  As we have seen, in committing grave wrongs perpetrators dehumanize victims by 
treating them as though their interests simply do not count (see 2.3.2). A morally significant 
apology for such grave wrongdoing thus requires a repudiation of this message through what 
I have termed ‘rehumanization’ (see 3.3). To rehumanize is to affirm that a victim’s interests 
are as important as one’s own in virtue of their moral equality. I begin our discussion with 
this goal of rehumanization because, while parties can have diverse and divergent motivating 
reasons to achieve the aims of apology, the goal of rehumanization hinges on the proposition 
that all persons ought to be treated as moral equals. That is, whatever ancillary motivations 
there may be, parties to apology accept that the moral equality of persons is a moral reason 
which counts in favor of engaging in the transaction, one which motivates parties to engage 
in apology. As I argue below, acknowledgment of de facto moral equality underpins the 
practice of apology itself, and so we cannot understand this practice without exploring the 
goal of rehumanization. 
  An inescapable consequence of an acknowledgement of the moral equivalence of 
people is a normative requirement to have an attitude of respect for others born of the 
recognition of the equal moral status of all persons. Normatively, one reason people think 
apology worthwhile is because it engenders and/or acknowledges a kind of respect that 
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attends its rehumanizing function. In terms of motivation, one reason I seek apology from 
you is because I want you to acknowledge that you treated me in a disrespectful way 
unbefitting of my moral status; you apologize to me because you recognize this. As an 
acknowledgement of de facto moral equality, the practice of apology is a way of recognizing 
the moral equivalence of the parties involved in the transaction. Since these parties are 
morally equivalent, it follows that respect is reciprocally owed. The normative substructure 
to the goal of rehumanization is built from idea that we should respect moral equals because 
moral equals are deserving of respect.  
  It may be wondered why I leap from a recognition of moral equivalence to a 
normative requirement of reciprocal respect. Admittedly, respect born of a recognition of 
moral equality is an attitude that places significant normative demands on the respecter. 
These consist in positive duties and negative constraints. Yet these fall readily out of what an 
acknowledgment of moral equality demands of moral agents. A useful descriptor for these 
demands is what Darwall (1977) calls ‘recognition respect.’ In Darwall’s sense, respect for 
something – whatever it is – “consists in giving appropriate consideration or recognition to 
some feature of its object” (38). The feature of interest here is the moral status of the person. 
“[To] have recognition respect for persons is to give proper weight to the fact that they are 
persons” (39, emphasis added). More specifically, it is “identical with recognition respect for 
the moral requirements that are placed on one by the existence of other persons.” (45). Tully 
(2008a) notes that this sort of respect is recognized in Indigenous and liberal-democratic 
traditions alike, where “human beings are said to warrant a certain respect in virtue of being 
human, as being of equal dignity and thus treated as ends rather than means” (242-243). The 
moral requirements of recognition respect are coextensive with the normative expectations 
placed on a person in a human community of moral equals. These are manifold, but we can 
highlight some salient ones here. When you respect someone in this sense you recognize 
their moral equivalence in a way that stimulates an epistemic humility. This disposes you to 
listen to their concerns, arguments and ideas. You understand that you do not have a moral 
monopoly when it comes to values. You are willing to consider openly and honestly what 
they say. You recognize that, while you may not agree with them on all things, their positions 
on matters of culture, spirituality or tradition are as worthy of consideration as yours. 
Recognizing their humanity, you understand that you should consider their legitimate 
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interests as objectively equal to your own. For these reasons, where seeking solutions on 
matters of mutual concern you cannot run roughshod over them. In virtue of others’ rights as 
persons of equal moral worth, recognition respect places moral constraints on the actions you 
may take if these actions affect others. These, then, are some of the normative expectations of 
the ‘right relations’ sought by apology. 
  Some will argue that I am reading too far into the conceptual underpinnings of 
apology. They may point out that disingenuous apologies occur all the time, or that recipients 
seek apology for assorted reasons, some of which are purely prudential. While general 
morality requires that we respect all persons, the simple fact that apology is used in our 
context does not prove that parties to these apologies implicitly acknowledge the moral value 
of achieving reciprocal recognition respect for one another. While, objectively, the value of 
rehumanization is a moral reason which counts in favor of engaging in apology, it need not 
translate into a motivating one. Motivating reasons can come from somewhere else, and 
parties need not have the same ones. If this objection holds water, then the idea that apology 
for grave and dehumanizing wrongdoing presupposes a shared acknowledgment of the moral 
value of reciprocal recognition respect among persons evaporates. For our purposes, this 
would not be satisfying, for it suggests that if respect is involved in reconciliation it falls out 
of general morality rather than apology – something that evacuates the significance of 
apology in deriving necessary governing norms of reconciled relationships. 
  While parties engage in apology for diverse reasons, the value of recognition respect 
born of acknowledgment of de facto moral equality underpins the practice. That is, 
apologizing would not even make sense without it. We can see this most clearly in the case 
of disingenuous apologies. While these are common, we should remember that we use them 
for reasons of expediency. For example, when an insincere apology forestalls needless 
conflict between strangers, the deliverer considers it expedient to be disingenuous rather than 
waste time arguing with someone they will never meet again. This does not change the fact 
that undergirding the wider practice of apology is a presupposition that parties have – and 
should have – recognition respect for one another. The disingenuous deliverer’s pro forma 
apology would not even make sense were it not for the fact that it is a token of a conceptual 
type that in its moral foundations presupposes the moral value of recognition respect.  
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  It's useful to recall that this dissertation offers a normative account of good apologies 
for serious wrongdoing. Good apologies are generated for the right reasons and delivered in 
the interest of victimized parties (Smith 2014, 47). An insincere apology is not a good 
apology, and nor is the meaning of any accompanying reparation what it could be, because 
these are undertaken for reasons of expediency. This reduces the recipient to a “pawn” in a 
“game” (M. Murphy 2011, 51). Yet these instruments are only expedient because they rely 
on the background idea that apologies and reparations are given to people who deserved 
better treatment because they merit (and always merited) respect in virtue of their moral 
equality. If a faux apology succeeds, it’s only because the deliverer has capitalized on this 
fact to let the recipient think they are doing something more than playing a game. That is, the 
deliverer pretends that their motivating reason stems from a morally laden normative reason 
when it in fact does not. Official apologies in the context of reconciliation are sought for 
moral (and not only prudential) reasons, and thus their moral work can only be done when 
they are sincere. When sincere, and when recognized as such, parties to the practice 
acknowledge the moral value of recognition respect.  
4.1.2 Apologies and reciprocal trust   
Recognition respect says little about trust, the other attitudinal component of reconciliation 
that I have suggested falls out of the analysis of the normative substructure of apology. As 
discussed in chapter 2 (2.3.4), one of the aims of apology in this context is to engender trust. 
Part of the reason apologies are employed in the context of reconciliation is because it seems 
self-evident that ‘right’ relationships are not possible in the absence of reciprocal trust. This 
seems equally true in many interpersonal contexts. In most cases, apologies arise in response 
to a breach of norms, a breach which gave evidence offenders are not trustworthy. In 
tendering apology (and reparation), wrongdoers signal that they seek to repair the harms of 
the breach. In committing to change their behavior in future, they aim to establish their 
trustworthy character and encourage the development of a trust-based relationship. For these 
reasons – and not just because ‘right’ relationships invariably involve reciprocal trust – it 
follows that parties to apology in settler states acknowledge the value of trust. Given my 
earlier argument (sec. 4.1), this entails that a mutually acceptable understanding of 
reconciliation will involve reciprocal attitudes of trust. But the normative substructure to the 
value of trust is not obvious. Put another way, it is not clear why parties to apology think that 
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reciprocal trust is worth working towards. Since the motives for trusting (and being 
trustworthy) inform the normative expectations of reconciled relationships, this question is 
worth exploring. Whether these motives are prudential or moral – or both – bears on the 
moral character of reconciliation. 
  Trust, like reconciliation, is a concept that admits of varying interpretations. For 
reasons I detail in a moment, Karen Jones’ (1996) will-based account of trust is apt for our 
purposes. According to Jones, trust is an “attitude of optimism that the goodwill and 
competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her” (4). 
Distrust is a pessimism about the goodwill and competence of another in this domain (8). 
Jones stresses that the trusting person’s optimism concerns, specifically, the goodwill and 
competence of the trusted party, and not the success of, say, a joint project (6-7). The 
character of ‘goodwill’ is variable and responsive to the type of relationship at issue (specific 
to a domain); it need not imply warm feelings or friendliness. For instance, a stranger’s 
‘goodwill’ might derive from basic decency and extend only so far as to refrain from 
harming us (7). Likewise, optimism about the competence of a trusted party need extend only 
over their conjectured competence in a specific domain of interaction. I trust a fellow driver 
(a stranger) if I am optimistic that their goodwill, whatever its exact character, is sufficient to 
motivate them to follow the rules of the road (the domain) – but only provided I have 
confidence that they are a competent driver. Importantly for my argument below, Jones adds 
a further, cognitive element to trust: the trusting person has an expectation that “the one 
trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that [the trusting person is] 
counting on her” (4). This expectation is grounded in optimism about the goodwill of the 
trusted party (11). For this reason, “[o]ur expectation is usually grounded in the very same 
evidence that grounds our attitude of optimism” (ibid.). 
  Whether or not Jones’ (1996) account offers an understanding of trust that is 
applicable to all instances of trust, we can make use of it here. Jones’ view is not only 
intuitively compelling, it also meets an empirical test of applicability which can help us make 
sense of how we should think about trust in this context. Colleen Murphy (2010) correctly 
notes that “[a]ny diagnosis of how relationships are damaged will also be prescriptive, 
suggesting how political relationships should change or be rebuilt” (23-24). Now consider 
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that those things required to realize Jones’ account of trust answer to some of those harms 
which made for a lack of it in the context of settler states. Goodwill on the part of settler 
states has historically been lacking. Indigenous people(s) had a right to expect that these 
states would not oppress them. Instead, states have done the opposite. Indigenous people(s) 
had a right to expect that settler states would prove competent when it came to abiding by 
treaty relationships, acting in good faith or establishing just relations. Instead, states showed 
themselves incompetent, as least insofar as they willfully failed to exercise their competence 
in this domain of interaction. Instead of being favorably moved by the thought that 
Indigenous people(s) trusted in settler states, many took (and take) advantage of Indigenous 
vulnerabilities to limit their self-determining authority or territorial claims. These harms are 
how relations went wrong, and they inspired the pessimistic attitudes associated with distrust. 
Identifying the effects of these relevant harms suggests their antidote: the trust suggested by 
Jones. 
  That achieving something like Jones’ (1996) trust equates to the repair of some the 
damage of settler colonialism suggests it has instrumental value insofar as it makes the goods 
of healthy relationships possible. This is a (prudential) normative reason that counts in favor 
of engaging in apology, one which suggests that one motivation to do so concerns the 
practical benefits of apology. The reciprocal character of the trusting attitudes sought means 
that it would be inconsistent for party A to expect party B to consider A’s interests in B’s 
deliberations, but for party A to pay no attention to the interests of B in A’s deliberations. 
Each party wins. As a reciprocal relationship, each is favorably moved by the thought that 
the other is counting on them, for each knows that the other would do the same for them. Yet 
if this were the only motive for trusting and being trustworthy, then, strictly speaking, this 
would not be a trusting relationship of the kind that concerns us. At best, such a relationship 
involves only an attenuated sort of ‘goodwill’ – one which offers indirect and prudential 
reasons for being favorably moved by the thought that parties are counting on one another. 
This makes it almost indistinguishable from mere reliance (see Jones 1996, 9). While there is 
nothing wrong with valuing trust for prudential reasons, these alone will not meet the 
stringent requirement of Jones’ account: namely, that the one trusted be “directly and 
favorably moved” by the thought that the other is counting on them (4, my emphasis).  
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  The moral character of apology, wherein parties seek to affirm and acknowledge 
moral equivalence in part because that is the right thing to do hints that there may be more 
than instrumental value to trust in this context. The use of apology, a categorically moral 
instrument, suggests that we are seeking to create a particular kind of relationship, and hence 
trust of a thicker kind. Here the requirement that the one trusted be ‘directly and favorably 
moved’ by the knowledge that the trusting person is counting on them recommends we make 
further use of the recognition respect component of reconciled relationships, a use which 
speaks to the moral character of reconciliation.  
  For Jones (1996), “the confident expectation that the one trusted will respond directly 
and favorably to the thought that the truster is counting on them is itself grounded in the 
attitude of optimism” (6). To re-iterate, this latter optimism concerns the goodwill of the 
person trusted. We cannot talk about goodwill without talking about motive – why a trusted 
person cares enough to consider the interests of the trusting person. We have just seen that 
one motive can be instrumental. But since an apology is not fully effective unless it promotes 
all its moral goals, it follows that the goodwill associated with trust in this context must 
extend at least as far as respecting the moral requirements imposed on one by the existence of 
other persons. This very minimal level of goodwill is coextensive with the demands of 
recognition respect. This means that the normative substructure to the perceived value of 
establishing trust is partly moral in nature. The motive to respond directly and favorably to 
the thought that the trusting person is counting on the trusted person is not just about what 
trust does for each party, but also stems from a shared acknowledgment that parties to the 
trusting relationships emerging from apology are morally valuable in themselves. 
Accordingly, one of the grounds for being optimistic about the goodwill of a trusted party 
lies in the fact that you know she has recognition respect for you, with all that entails in terms 
what she owes to you as a person, and with all it says about which actions she can 
permissibly undertake given your moral equivalence. When parties to a trusting relationship 
have reciprocal recognition respect for one another, each considers the interests of the other 
to be a reason for responding directly and favorably to the thought that each is counting on 
the other because that is the right thing to do. This says much about the character of the 
reconciliation we seek to understand. It might be a political project, but it is a moral one too. 
  150 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Considerations in favor of this view   
Thus far I have argued that the use of apology in settler states suggests that attitudes of 
recognition respect and trust are mutually endorsed aims of apology, and that these entail a 
variety of necessary governing norms for reconciled relationships. While the analysis has 
focused for the most part on the interpersonal paradigm, sincere collective apology is close 
enough in intent and composition to its interpersonal progenitor to imply that these governing 
norms apply equally in the political realm (see 2.1.1). I take up this point below (4.2.2-4.2.3), 
but here it is worthwhile to step back and look at some of the considerations in favor of the 
view outlined above. For one might object that the answer to the question of ‘content’ for 
reconciled relationships does not go far enough – or indeed goes too far. The governing 
norms could be anywhere on a spectrum, from those associated with a basic coexistence to 
attitudes associated with normatively rich relationships, such as esteem, ‘civic friendship’ 
(May 2011), mercy or forgiveness (Tutu 1999; Meierhenrich 2008). Just because apology’s 
normative substructure implies that parties to apology endorse the moral value of recognition 
respect and trust, it does not follow that other oft-cited goals of apology are ruled out. For 
instance, some consider forgiveness to be the telos of apology (Tavuchis 1991, 20; Wenzel et 
al. 2018). Others might point out that while recognition respect and trust are mutually 
acknowledged moral goals of apology, the political project of reconciliation does not require 
that parties to apology establish any kind of relationship afterwards. For example, it is 
conceivable that participants in apology, while endorsing the objective moral value of these 
goals, could nonetheless subsequently operate separately and avoid interaction of any kind – 
a sort of begrudging coexistence no thicker than “a mutual agreement to coexist” (Quinn 
2009b, 12). Why does my account rule out these options? 
  For both normative and empirical reasons, neither end of the spectrum offers a 
desirable answer to the question of content. First, consider the richer end, where such 
influential accounts of reconciliation as forgiveness (see Bhargava 2012; Meierhenrich 2008; 
Tutu 1999) or civic friendship (May 2011) might land. As illustrative examples, briefly 
considering why these accounts are inappropriate in this domain serves to demonstrate why 
we should rule out very robust or normatively ‘thick’ answers to the question of content. One 
count against these visions comes from the fact that, since most individual parties to 
reconciliation will never meet one another, the attitudes and affection associated with thick 
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relationships such as friendships are unreasonable if not impossible demands (Govier and 
Verwoerd 2002b, 196). More pointedly, accounts of something like ‘civic friendship,’ where 
“[t]he members of the society are concerned for the well-being of their fellow citizens as 
participants in a shared system of political, social, and economic cooperation” (May 2011, 
589), must be rejected at the outset. The supposed need for a shared comprehensive vision of 
this kind, says Damien Short (2005), “is challenged by the existence of indigenous nations 
that have never shared a comprehensive vision with the colonisers nor wish to” (274). 
Including such a vision is a form of political question-begging, where the outcome is 
presupposed by the content of the concept. Not only do rich societal visions like this 
objectionably presuppose that the outcome of the process of reconciliation will result in a 
unified society under the auspices of the state, but they consequently do not allow for a 
flexibility in the concept that will allow it to be applicable to a broad variety of political 
architectures and worldviews. Similarly, building forgiveness into reconciliation is an 
instance of paternalistic moral guidance from settlers that is objectionable from the outset. 
While forgiveness may indeed eventuate from collective apology, requiring it of Indigenous 
people burdens them with yet another responsibility they should not have to shoulder (see 
Verdeja 2012, 169; Brudholm and Rosoux 2012; Govier and Verwoerd 2002a). And since 
most of the reparative work in reconciliation should fall on settlers, requiring forgiveness 
would be not only objectionable but misguided. 
 The other end of the spectrum of content has more going for it. Here we find notions 
of reconciliation conceived as “simple coexistence,” wherein an abeyance of hostility follows 
the redress of harms (Crocker 2003, 54). Earlier I referred to this as ‘begrudging’ 
coexistence, but that isn’t fair to coexistence, for it is quite possible that parties to 
reconciliation of this kind might adopt an accommodating live-and-let-live-attitude. Indeed, 
coexistence can obtain in a variety of ways, with a variety of different attendant attitudes. 
One can hate another but coexist with them; one can be indifferent to another and coexist 
with them; one can respect and admire another and coexist with them. This gives coexistence 
a flexibility that might be useful. Short (2005) favours this conception of reconciliation 
because of its sensitivity to the dynamics of ongoing internal colonialism in settler states. By 
emphasizing coexistence as opposed to, say, ‘liberal social solidarity,’ this end of the 
spectrum respects the requirement that the concept of reconciliation not presuppose the 
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political outcome: “if a reconciliation process is concerned to address colonial injustice and 
its legacy it should proceed without the assumption that settler and indigenous communities 
comprise one nation or that indigenous peoples wish to share in the settler state’s vision of 
the good life” (274-275; see Alfred 1999, 63).  
   Empirically, coexistence without interaction is difficult to imagine given the 
geographic realities of settler states. Like it or not, Indigenous peoples and settler states will 
need to have a relationship of some kind, whatever political architecture results from the 
process of reconciliation. Moreover, the tendering and receiving of apology – an instrument 
of moral repair that serves to pave the way for healthy relationships – strongly suggests that 
neither party seeks a completely detached modus vivendi. For these reasons, isolated 
coexistence seems to be a non-starter. Yet while coexistence with interaction suggests a 
relationship of some kind, it does not describe the attitudes, dispositions and behavioral 
constraints required of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people for a reconciliation between 
them. That is, it does not describe its content in any detail. From an attitudinal perspective, 
coexistence in a world of ‘right relations,’ where interaction is inevitable and a moderately 
healthy relationship desirable, is characterized at the very minimum by tolerance, or a 
tolerant attitude towards the other.  
  This sort of coexistence represents almost the polar opposite of forgiveness on the 
spectrum of content. The classic conception of toleration holds that it involves an “objection 
component” (Forst 2017). As Wendy Brown (2015) argues, we ‘tolerate’ those things and 
those people that we object to (161). “Tolerance does not remove but regulates prejudice and 
subordination… we only tolerate what we would prefer did not exist” (ibid.). For this reason, 
people rarely say that they tolerate those for whom they have an abiding goodwill.76 On this 
reading, we could say that many settlers already ‘tolerate’ Indigenous people, and vice versa. 
But are we ready to say that these parties, considered as categories, have reconciled? The 
preponderance of reconciliation projects throughout the world suggests not. While 
 
76 Admittedly, this reading gives toleration short shrift. Forst (2017) notes that there are competing 
understandings of toleration, some of which to not have an ‘objection component.’ The purpose of the above 
discussion is to demonstrate why the extremes of the spectrum of content are not appropriate to this context. 
This is meant to give some support to the idea that certain attitudes need to be involved in reconciled 
relationships, while others cannot or should not be. That is why I focus on toleration as it is generally 
understood (i.e. as not involving positive feelings). These other conceptions of toleration do not lie at the 
extreme of the spectrum, so they do not interest me here.  
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coexistence may be a suitable term for the structure of relationships in reconciliation, the 
insights of this and previous chapters suggest that mere tolerance is not sufficient, and thus 
that this extreme on the spectrum of content is, like its antipode, not appropriate for this 
context. 
  This is not to say that ‘coexistence’ is a bad catch-all descriptor for the content of 
reconciliation. But it cannot be bare coexistence, and nor can it be an inappropriately ‘thick’ 
coexistence, for the reasons just canvassed. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to determine sufficient conditions for reconciled relationships, the discussion in this section 
suggests that the governing norms of reconciled relationships should be both constructive and 
beneficial to each party. While undoubtedly insufficient, reciprocal trust and recognition 
respect entail a variety of necessary norms that characterize such relationships, and this 
pushes our conception closer to the center of the spectrum of content than to any of its 
extremes. Since the use of apology entails that the attitudes of trust and respect are mutually 
agreed to be good – to be worth seeking – we can call this ‘positive coexistence.’  
4.2 Issues of ‘quantity’: applying the norms to relationships 
Before delving into the mechanics of what the norms of reciprocal trust and recognition 
respect demand in practice, we first need to determine which relationships are to be to focus 
of reconciliation. For Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) this is an issue of “quantity” concerning 
“the level at which reconciliation is sought” (180). This looks like a straightforward question. 
To put it mildly, Indigenous peoples and settler states have been at odds for centuries.77 The 
relationship between them needs (re)building. As we saw in the preface, the Summary of the 
Final Report of the Truth Commission of Canada argues that “[r]econciliation is about 
establishing and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples in this country”78 (2015a, 6). In its broad outlines, such a pre-theoretic 
view is surely correct. But it masks some complexities. Here there is no mention of the settler 
state. And if “peoples” need reconciling, what about individuals? In what sense can groups 
reconcile with one another? If reconciliation were simply a matter of establishing better 
 
77 See footnote 21. Settler states have enough in common with the political entities (colonies) that they emerged 
from that it is reasonable to consider them continuously subsisting agents.  
 
78 Note that even this conception presupposes a political outcome, and thus forecloses some of the more 
ambitious nationalist aspirations of some Indigenous peoples.  
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relations between entities such as states and other collectives (‘peoples’), one might think 
that formal structural changes alone could achieve the desired outcome. Yet the exhaustive 
recommendations of the Report (2015b) demonstrate that it does not hold this view. 
Moreover, the use of official apology – an interpersonal instrument in origin retroactively 
endorsed by the commission – implies that there may be affective dimensions to 
reconciliation that such changes might fail to address. To understand the application of the 
governing norms of trust and respect we need a more detailed picture of the relationships that 
are to be the focus of the project. For whether reconciliation concerns relations between 
individuals, between groups, or between groups and the settler state considered in the 
abstract will have important ramifications for what they look like in practice.  
 The previous section’s arguments offer a basic understanding of the concepts of 
respect and trust as they apply to individual persons. The rudiments of official apology are 
nearly identical to those of its interpersonal cousin (see 2.1.1), so it is right to assess its 
normative substructure at this level. Yet clearly something like a state, being without a mind, 
cannot ‘trust’ or ‘respect’ in the same way as a person. The conceptual dynamism of the 
attitudes of recognition respect and trust allows us to translate their application from the 
interpersonal to the collective level of analysis. This section will revisit some of the harms of 
settler-colonialism discussed in the previous chapters to determine which relationships they 
harmed. This will offer an inventory of which need mending, allowing us to apply the 
governing norms of reconciled relations to each level in need of repair. Along the way, we 
will see some of the preconditions that foster such reconciliations, shedding further light on 
chapter 3’s study of the process of reconciliation.  
4.2.1 Reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals 
Putting a spotlight on the individualized components of reconciliation in this context draws 
attention to their importance. As we saw in chapter 1, the normative dimensions of large-
scale injustices are not exhaustively described at the collective level of analysis; an 
individual-level analysis is required too (1.2). The complicity approach to understanding the 
remedial responsibility of individuals in the context of collective injustice suggests that we 
should not consider settlers idle bystanders in the enduring injustices associated with settler-
colonialism. They are participants, albeit ones whose liability has fuzzy edges. In addition to 
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supporting the state in its perpetration of injustice, settlers are party to maintaining the third 
sort of injustice we examined. Namely, the colonial mindset that enabled and legitimated 
historical injustice in the first place.  
  The colonial mindset stems from deep-seated racist and paternalistic attitudes towards 
Indigenous people(s). This is not to say that all settlers are consciously racist or paternalistic, 
but rather that the worldview which informs our thinking has a legacy that is exceedingly 
difficult to erase. Without confronting this legacy, settlers will continue to operate through 
channels of thinking that have historically led to – and supported – the settler state’s 
mistreatment of Indigenous people(s). The complicity view, entailing as it does that the 
activities of individuals contribute to enduring injustices, suggests that these patterns of 
thought have survived to the present. Quite apart from the fact that it is natural to identify 
individuals with the activities of the state of which they are often proud to form a part 
(Sepinwall 2011), Indigenous people are likely to mistrust these individual agents of state-
orchestrated wrongs, considered both as individuals and as members of the category ‘settler.’ 
Likewise, settlers who (consciously or unconsciously) materialize the colonial mindset may 
tend to look unfavorably on Indigenous people. A legacy of antagonism suggests the need for 
a reconciliation between Indigenous people and settlers considered as individuals. 
  The above discussion on the governing norms of reconciled relationships deriving 
from reciprocal recognition respect and trust applies most straightforwardly to interpersonal 
relationships of the kind at issue here. Interpersonal apology was the paradigm through which 
I derived these governing norms, and so it makes sense that we begin with a discussion of 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people considered as individuals. 
Indigenous individuals hear and receive collective apologies, and settlers should endorse 
them (or so I argued in 2.2). It follows from my argument above (4.1) that these parties, as 
participants, tacitly acknowledge the value of achieving apology’s aims. To understand 
reconciliation at this level, then, it is as straightforward as noting that the governing attitudes 
of reconciled relationships between these parties will consist in reciprocal recognition respect 
and trust, with all these entail in terms of normative expectations, motives, behavioral 
constraints, positive duties and the like. Yet considering that most Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people will never meet one another, a word on what such a reconciliation looks 
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like in practice is in order. For dissenters might note that it makes little sense to suggest that 
an interpersonal reconciliation can take place when most parties to reconciliation have never, 
nor will ever, meet one another. In what sense is this reconciliation at all?  
  The argument of this chapter concerns the governing norms of reconciled 
relationships – what they are, what they should be if we take the use of official apology 
seriously. Yet thus far most of my focus has been on showing that the attitudes of trust and 
respect fall out of an analysis of apology. These are attitudes which place normative demands 
on those who have them. To emphasize my point by example, when you have the attitude of 
recognition respect for others this means that you consider their interests objectively as 
important as your own; that you acknowledge that you do not have a moral monopoly when 
it comes to values; that you recognize that you cannot run roughshod over them; and so on. 
Having this attitude makes you disposed to act in a certain way when you encounter others, 
or when you deliberate on actions that will affect others. This has implications for what we 
can expect of reconciliation at this level.  
  A useful analogy to help elucidate concerns a distinction between the dispositional 
and occurrent properties of things. According to Marquis (2010), “[a] thing has a 
dispositional property in virtue of having the capacity to exhibit a corresponding occurrent 
property under certain conditions” (27). Given the right circumstances, a thing that has a 
dispositional property will develop the corresponding occurrent property. “[S]oluble is a 
dispositional property; dissolved is the corresponding occurrent property” (ibid.) Stretching 
this conceptual distinction only a little, and remembering that we are here using the term 
‘property’ loosely, we can say that when an individual actually has an attitude of respect for 
others they are disposed to fulfil the normative expectations that go along with it. They are 
disposed, for example, to treat others as moral equals because they do in fact respect others. 
In the right circumstances – in our case, when non-Indigenous and Indigenous persons 
encounter one another, or when they deliberate on actions that will affect the other – those 
who have the dispositional ‘properties’ associated with the norms and expectations of 
recognition respect will display their corresponding occurrent ‘properties;’ they will treat the 
other as a moral equal. As an outcome, then, reconciliation at this level involves individuals 
having attitudes that dispose them to fulfill the associated normative expectations of those 
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who have them. For the most part, that is, there will be no paradigmatic interpersonal 
reconciliation of the kind inaugurated by a handshake. However, this makes reconciliation at 
this level no less transformative. 
  To see how, it is worth considering for a moment what stands in the way of such 
attitudinal transformations. This requires we pay some attention to a core aim of official 
apology so far left out of the discussion: historical correctives. Issuing historical correctives 
is no less critical an aim of official apology in this context than are establishing reciprocal 
trust and respect. However, I chose to separate discussion of this goal from the others 
because, while the attitudes of trust and respect entail a variety of normative expectations that 
characterize reconciled relationships, correctives to history aim instead to provide a 
background context of mutually acceptable understandings of history within which these 
attitudes will manifest. That is, while no less important, wide acceptance of correctives to 
history is better understood as a precondition for reconciliation than a normative feature 
which characterizes reconciled relationships. Indeed, without basic agreement on the facts of 
history, it is very difficult to see how reconciliation can proceed at either the micro or the 
macro level.   
  That Indigenous people have historically been victimized at the hands of settlers 
implies that most of the work towards reconciliation at this level will have to be undertaken 
by settlers, for, at least considered as a category, they are the source of the warranted mistrust 
that exists. The concealed undercurrents of the colonial mindset that promote this mistrust 
must be acknowledged and expunged if reciprocal trust and recognition respect are ever to be 
achieved. After all, why would Indigenous people trust settlers, even well-intentioned ones, 
when important components of their mindset are continuous with the elemental cause of their 
current adversities? This suggests that obstacles to overcome in the process of reconciliation 
include not only the character of settler attitudes towards Indigenous people, but also their 
view of history. For without a realistic understanding of history the colonial mindset will be 
hard to dislodge. 
  In Unsettling the Settler Within (2010), Paulette Regan subverts the time-honored 
logic of the ‘Indian problem’ by encouraging us to consider instead the “settler problem” 
(11). Regan argues that the preeminent value of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission lies in its potential to educate settlers about themselves and their history. 
Ignoring the legacies of injustice and the assumptions that underwrote settler-colonialism 
promises to lead to the reproduction of the oppressive and paternalistic dynamic of 
Indigenous-settler relations that has existed for centuries (e.g. 84). Settlers have long 
espoused the myth of Canada and themselves as benevolent – though sometimes misguided – 
peacemakers, a myth that the historical record emphatically does not support. As we saw in 
chapter 2, issuing correctives to history is one of the three principal aims of apology in this 
context (2.3.3). This suggests that settlers who endorse apology, and Indigenous people who 
receive it, mutually acknowledge the value of this goal in the same way that they mutually 
acknowledge the value of reciprocal recognition respect and trust. Therefore, the implications 
of this goal have something to say about reconciliation. 
  “Without a truth telling in which we confront our own history and identity, and make 
visible how these colonial practices continue today, there can be no ethical or just 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples” (Regan 2010, 235). Changing settler attitudes is thus 
a necessary precondition for reconciliation of any other sort because what a state can do 
depends on what its citizens are willing to undertake (Thompson 2008, 37). Large-scale 
reconciliation projects in settler states, where settlers constitute a voting majority, are 
dependent on broad-based support from citizens (Moellendorf 2007, 215; Nobles 2008, 70; 
Saul 2011, 281). In part, that is why I direct my dissertation primarily towards settlers. 
Failing to address settler mindsets at the outset of the process of reconciliation is part of the 
reason reconciliation projects have manifested as tone deaf. As Elgersma (2012) argues in the 
context of Canada, “[r]ather than focus on reparations and justice, nonindigenous Canadians 
have turned reconciliation into the responsibility of indigenous people to heal, forgive, and 
‘get over it’ so that the Canadian nation can move forward and progress” (93). 
  This failure to acknowledge the root of the problems at issue points again to why 
being convinced of one’s reparative duties on, say, distributive grounds is not enough. As 
I’ve repeatedly stressed in other chapters, motivations matter in reconciliation. Since a 
history of unjust treatment by settler states is significantly connected to the identity and 
dignity of Indigenous peoples, the normative motivations that underlie the justification for 
the redress associated with reconciliation will dictate the sorts of significance that it can have 
  159 
 
 
 
in the context of the project. For settlers to simply go through the motions of reconciliation 
projects, without addressing the colonial mindset that is the ultimate reason for the necessity 
of their very inception, would offer only brushstrokes when we need a coherent landscape. 
Salient examples of such brushstrokes are found in extant apologies, where cynical 
underlying motives of nation-building contribute to the perception of insincerity (Philpot et 
al. 2008; see 3.5). Settlers, to greater or lesser degrees, continue to adhere to established 
patterns of colonial thinking in their dealings with Indigenous peoples. “As a result, the 
legacies and paradigms of the colonial mind continue to structure current policies and trends 
regarding Indigenous populations” (Elgersma 2012, 91). 
  Consider how such a mindset was exemplified in the words of former Canadian 
cabinet minister John Crosbie as recently as 2003: “[t]he need to bring… Indigenous peoples 
into our national consciousness, to deal fairly and equitably with them, to reconcile them as 
part of the Canadian mainstream and to deal with their problems, [is] likely the most 
important public policy issue of the 21st century” (quoted in Cairns 2005, my emphasis). This 
statement betrays a latent colonial attitude towards Indigenous peoples. The idea remains to 
absorb them; to solve their problems for them; to control them and see them as the problem. 
For this mindset to change, settlers need to come to terms with the past, revisit national 
myths or narratives, and thereby facilitate the development of reciprocal trust and recognition 
respect. One way to do this is to pay attention to the historical correctives apology calls for.  
 To get a grip on the difficulty posed by settler mindsets, let’s consider Regan’s (2010) 
settler problem. The problem, as I understand it, has at least three components. First, it 
consists of longstanding myths of settler benevolence, wherein well-intentioned but 
sometimes misguided settlers sought to help Indigenous people rather than eradicate them. 
Second, it involves a paternalistic attitude wherein settlers believe that they, and not the 
communities most affected by injustice, are best positioned to solve the problems facing 
Indigenous people. Finally, this paternalism suggests a mindset infused with latent racism 
and cultural chauvinism. What better way to begin addressing these issues than by looking to 
the facts of history?  
  Much of this dissertation can be read as an attempt to promote Regan’s (2010) call to 
address the settler problem. Chapter one justifies the imposition of reparative burdens on 
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contemporary settlers and the settler state from within the liberal liability framework in an 
effort to address (a majority of) settlers on their own terms, for an initial persuasion is 
required before any more transformative participation can ensue. Later chapters imply a 
response to each of the components of the settler problem. Consider first my discussion of 
official apology (chap. 2). By seeing what good, effective apologies require in this context, 
and by comparing this ideal to extant ones, we have a magnifying lens through which we can 
see the difficult-to-discern colonial mindset that persists. Good apologies reject the settler 
myths that are the focus of Regan’s attention (MacLachlan 2013, 285). For the most part, 
however, official apologies have served only to reinforce them (see Dorell 2009; Moran 
1998; Blatz, Schumann and Ross, 2009). Crucially, an effective and comprehensive official 
apology requires an explicit acknowledgement of the wrongs at issue. Recall that such an 
apology requires the endorsement of non-Indigenous citizens (2.2.2). Endorsement requires 
that settlers acknowledge the history of the state of which they form a part, for as 
Waziyatawin (2011) argues “[n]o one will be committed to righting the wrongs if they cannot 
recognize and name those wrongs” (176). As I argued (1.2.1), these wrongs were intentional 
in nature, and thus the myth of benevolence surely cannot endure. Consider next the 
discussion of those substantive measures which demonstrate the sincerity of an official 
apology (chap. 3). Of particular note is the truth or historical commission, which is meant to 
inform the constative elements of apology (3.4). In virtue of its function as the evidentiary 
basis of apology, this is the only form of reparation that I suggested was non-negotiable. By 
emphasizing the meaning and impact of history for Indigenous people(s), as well as the need 
to issue reformative correctives to official narratives, a commission brings history to bear on 
settler identity and informs the present circumstances in which we find ourselves. Focusing 
on enduring injustice and the colonial mindset, especially, promises to subvert the notion that 
the legacies of settler-colonialism are erased. In exposing the unpalatable events of the past 
and their enduring effects, truth commissions compel a reexamination of national narratives 
that cannot survive such an audit intact. The actual operation of such commissions likewise 
serves to erode paternalistic attitudes, for hearing the voices of previously silenced people 
encourages one to learn from Indigenous peoples as opposed to imperiously suggesting they 
have nothing to teach us. Finally, consider that the act of apologizing presupposes the moral 
equality of interlocutors that by its very undertaking will help to collapse any pretensions to 
cultural or racial superiority.  
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  What this discussion points to is that the acknowledgments of wrongdoing featured in 
comprehensive official apology aim in part to circumscribe the range of reasonable 
interpretations of the past such that colonial attitudes are exposed as deeply flawed. Knowing 
the facts of history will help settlers reevaluate their mindset and contribute to an emerging 
relationship framed by mutually agreed views of fundamental aspects of the past, where there 
is significant overlap in parties’ understanding of the facts and their significance. That is, one 
thing that apology aims to do in this context is constrain the field of reasonable discourse. 
For this reason, a “narrative equilibrium” of this kind demands settlers adjust their views 
accordingly (Dwyer 2003, 100). 
  One might object here that demanding settlers change their worldview in the interest 
of reconciliation is illiberal. For a state to force a citizen to think a certain way is 
indefensible. I do not deny this. As a response, it is useful to revisit the discussion in chapter 
3 on the kinds of truth a truth commission is warranted in producing and disseminating 
(3.4.1). While a settler state cannot force citizens to accept a value-laden interpretive truth of 
the past, it can circumscribe the range of reasonable interpretations of the past by producing 
incontrovertible facts which inform social discourse. Arendt (2005) recounts an episode from 
the 1920s, when Clemenceau, the wartime leader of France, was asked what future historians 
might say about outbreak of the First World War. His reply nicely captures this idea: “This I 
don’t know. But I know for certain that they will not say Belgium invaded Germany” (302). 
Uncovering such incontrovertible facts will not force a change in mindset, but it can 
stimulate one. Establishing a baseline view of history in this way is part of the value of 
correctives to history. As Hayner (2011) argues, there are some facts that are so fundamental, 
so undeniable, “that broad acceptance of their truth is necessary before real reconciliation can 
take place” (189).  
  This dissertation’s attention to history has demonstrated that many of the narratives 
surrounding the colonial past are false. So too are those myths which suggest that colonial 
dynamics have disappeared. Regan asks: “[w]hat does our historical amnesia reveal about 
our continuing complicity in denying, erasing, and forgetting this part of our own history as 
colonizers while pathologizing the colonized?” (6). The attitudes that inspired settler-colonial 
injustices subsist in the present, she argues, “rooted in settler historical myths and colonial 
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mindsets” (ibid.). To combat this, “… a Canadian society of perpetrators and bystanders must 
remember itself not as ‘innocent’ but as complicit” (177). Doing so requires settlers approach 
with an open mind the re-evaluation of the history of relations between the settler state and 
Indigenous peoples. If they are willing to endorse official apology, they should be willing to 
do this, for apology cannot get off the ground without looking to history. This will expose the 
underlying principles of racism and cultural chauvinism which drove colonial injustice and 
facilitate the development of reciprocal respect and trust.  
4.2.2 Reconciliation between Indigenous individuals and the settler state 
Having addressed the individual level of reconciliation it is tempting, given the political 
characteristics of reconciliation projects, to move directly to reconciliation between the 
settler state and Indigenous groups qua groups. However, this would be a mistake. Chapter 1 
argued for a strong distinction between collectives and the individuals that compose them. 
This was necessary to make sense of the remedial responsibilities of individuals in the 
context of collective injustices. One corollary of this approach is that a collective can 
theoretically form an intention that none of its members share. However, while not disturbing 
the distinction between individuals and organized collectives, the discussion of the 
endorsement criterion of official apology in chapter 2 drew attention to how politically 
inconsequential this corollary can be when considered in the context of reparative projects 
(2.2.2). I argued that while a state can apologize for historical injustice even in the absence of 
endorsement from co-responsible citizens, such an apology would be insufficiently 
meaningful, or at least politically ineffective. Inferring that citizens are apologetic because 
the state is apologetic is to commit the fallacy of division (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b, 
191). Without endorsement from co-responsible citizens, an apology will not come from all 
parties with standing to apologize, will not be perceived as sincere, and thus cannot do its 
moral work. To be meaningful, I argued, an apology requires an indeterminate level of 
endorsement from the individuals composing the apologetic collective. I now want to suggest 
that a formally reconciled relationship between Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and the 
settler state would be similarly politically inconsequential were it not accompanied by a 
reconciliation between Indigenous individuals and the settler state.  
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  I will elaborate on what such a reconciliation could look like in a moment, but first I 
should explain the need for it. A ‘formally reconciled relationship’ of the sort just mentioned 
would be one in which the collective entities party to it could be described as having 
reconciled, yet where none of the members of the respective collectives share in the 
constitutive attitudes of reconciled relations. A more precise way of saying this is that the 
parties qua collectives display a conjunction of propositional attitudes – say, they ‘believe’ 
the other to be trustworthy – that no individual member shares. Given the nature of much 
collective decision-making, such an eventuality is difficult to imagine.79 It would be like 
saying that the state is apologetic, but nobody in the state is apologetic. Given the framework 
espoused in chapter 1, this does indeed make sense. But how politically useful or morally 
meaningful such a locution would be is open to question. Thus, to say that groups have 
reconciled when no member shares in the constitutive expectations associated with 
reconciled relationships at the collective level certainly puts a limit on what we can expect 
from formally reconciled relationships. After all, groups are composed of people. Since trust 
is a constitutive attitude of reconciled relationships, it would be odd at the very least to say 
that a group A trusts group B when no member of group A trusts group B. This is part of why 
we need to pay close attention to the individualized components of reconciliation. 
  Metaphysical issues notwithstanding, the fact is that individuals often interpret states 
as having attitudes towards them, especially when the state’s actions affect them directly. 
Individuals’ interpretations of the actions of the state then play a role in forming a 
collective’s stance towards that state. Radzik (2009) offers an illuminating Strawsonian 
discussion of individuals’ reactive attitudes in in this domain, though her focus on institutions 
such as the Catholic Church is narrower than mine. “In interacting with institutions… we 
frequently take the participant stance. We experience reactive attitudes, such as resentment 
and gratitude, toward them because we expect our dealings with them to be shaped by basic 
standards of morality” (184). If the discussion of the expressive messaging of injustice in 
chapters one and two is broadly correct, Indigenous people will justifiably interpret the 
 
79 But not impossible. “Consider a group of three [individual] agents, A, B, and C, that tries to conform to 
majority voting in the formation of its [the group’s] judgments; a similar lesson might be derived for 
preferences. Imagine that under the pressure of decision and action, they have to form judgments, now on 
whether P, now on whether Q, now on whether R, and yet again on whether P&Q&R. All but A may vote for P; 
all but B, for Q; all but C, for R; and, consequently, none for P&Q&R: each will reject it because of rejecting 
one conjunct” (Pettit 2007, 181). 
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actions of the settler state as expressing negative attitudes towards them, because “[the 
state’s] operations communicate messages of respect or disrespect, goodwill or hostility” 
(184). Such facts about human psychology cannot be ignored in moral theory (Dwyer 2003, 
97).  
  Justifiable perceptions that the state does not respect Indigenous peoples contribute to 
unhealthy relationships at the collective level. As Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) note, there is 
a “complex interdependency between individuals and groups” (192). Just as individuals’ 
perspectives are informed by those of their group, so too can individual perspectives inform 
those of that same group. I flag this here to highlight the practical, if not theoretical, 
importance of individual attitudes on distinctively collective ones. To illustrate using our 
operative example of trust, many living Indigenous individuals have been direct victims of 
the injustices perpetrated by settler-states. Residential school survivors in Canada are one 
example. These individuals may distrust the settler state for what it has done to them 
personally, because what is has done justifiably generates negative reactive attitudes. Their 
experience, and the resultant anger and distrust, informs the collective attitude of their group, 
which in turn informs the views of other members who were not direct victims. This 
interdependency is one reason a reconciliation between Indigenous individuals and the settler 
state is required for a subsequent macro-level reconciliation between Indigenous groups and 
the state.               
  However, this ‘micro’ reconciliation is of more than instrumental value. Emphasizing 
the need for a reconciliation between Indigenous individuals and the settler state has 
additional advantages beyond its importance for generating macro-level reconciliation 
between groups and the state. For not only does it consider the importance of the well-being 
of individuals, it also accommodates a demographic reality sometimes glossed over in this 
area. In some settler states a sizable proportion of Indigenous individuals live and work 
outside of Indigenous territory. This is especially notable in Canada, where more than half of 
Indigenous individuals live in urban spaces (Statistics Canada 2017, 9). Many of these 
individuals do not have a close association with First Nations, Métis or Inuit bodies, meaning 
that they lack the political leadership associated with territorially defined groups (Cairns 
2005, 12). Pretending that reconciliation is simply a matter of reconciling the settler state 
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with homogenous groups occupying Indigenous lands will result in an impoverished account 
of what it involves. Ignoring demographic realities threatens to leave many individuals 
behind (15).         
  The injustices perpetrated by the settler state send expressive messages which have 
consequences for the prospects of reconciliation. Historical injustices sent the message that 
Indigenous people are of lesser moral worth. Enduring injustice compounds this message 
while simultaneously expressing moral contempt. Repeated transgressions over the centuries, 
combined with the failure to redress these injustices, communicate, in aggregate, that the 
state cannot be trusted to act justly or take the interests of Indigenous people seriously. 
Unjust treatment engenders negative reactive attitudes such as resentment, distrust, wariness, 
anger. In virtue of its causal and moral responsibility, the state must undertake to change 
these attitudes by making amends and communicating corrective messages if ‘right’ 
relationships are ever to be possible. Of course, the state cannot dictate a change in attitude, 
but it can provide evidence that warrants it. Some of the ways it can do so were canvassed in 
the last chapter, so I will not elaborate on this point here. Provided we keep this unfinished 
business in mind, we can now circle back to ask what a reconciliation between Indigenous 
individuals and the settler state would look like if the state ever offered enough evidence of 
trustworthiness, respect and goodwill. In what follows I am not going to argue that 
Indigenous people need to come to like the state for reconciliation to be possible. Nor that 
Indigenous people need to reconcile with ongoing internal colonialism in the ‘reconciliation-
as-resignation’ sense I discussed in the preface (see Alfred 2011, 168; Regan 2010, 60). 
Instead, the idea is that genuine reconciliation demands the achievement of attitudes in both 
the state and Indigenous individuals.80 
  On the state’s side of this equation, the arguments of sec. 4.1.1 concerning 
recognition respect hold equally in this relational domain and need not be re-examined in 
detail. Official apologies in this context are delivered not just to Indigenous groups, peoples 
or nations, but also by extension to Indigenous individuals who are affected by injustice in 
 
80 To be clear, by ‘demands’ I do not mean that the thing subject to the demand is the state or the individual. 
The thing subject to the demand is the state of affairs ‘reconciliation.’ That is, if reconciliation exists, so too 
must these attitudes.    
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virtue of their membership in a category. This suggests that a state’s apology and reparation 
to Indigenous people aims to express a form of recognition respect towards Indigenous 
individuals premised on an acknowledgement of their moral status.81 Since states can act, 
they can likewise abide by the normative constraints of recognition respect, as well as fulfill 
its associated positive duties. At least in a functional sense, the state must have the attitude of 
recognition respect for Indigenous people for us to be able to say that a necessary condition 
for reconciliation between the state and these individuals is met.82 Recall that recognition 
respect in our sense “consists in giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some 
feature of its object” (Darwall 1977, 38). The feature of interest here is the dignity that 
attends the moral status of Indigenous individuals. Concomitant with such a recognition will 
be much of what is involved with recognition respect at the interpersonal level: an 
appreciation that the state does not have a moral monopoly on cultural practices, law or 
tradition; a willingness to listen, learn and incorporate or consider a variety of perspectives 
and worldviews; an acceptance that the interests of Indigenous individuals are as important 
as those of any other, and that these interests cannot be defeated by the mere fact of 
Indigenous difference. In short, as was the case with recognition respect among individuals, 
acknowledgement of the moral status of Indigenous people suggests moral constraints on, 
and normative expectations of, the state.  
  The other side of the equation is harder to come to grips with. As argued in sec. 4.1.1, 
the use of apology suggests that recognition respect should be reciprocal. Yet it is unclear 
how Indigenous individuals can have recognition respect for the state, for it is not a moral 
person in any conventional sense. This side of the equation is more complicated, for not only 
is a state not owed recognition respect in virtue of moral equivalence, as is the case in 
interpersonal contexts, but because the ‘feature of its object’ due recognition respect must be 
determined politically. These points need elucidation. Consider that when parties engage in 
 
81 Admittedly, the use of the term ‘recognition’ in ‘recognition respect’ is infelicitous considering the robust 
criticisms of the ‘politics of recognition’ offered by some scholars. In these criticisms, ‘recognition’ of subaltern 
groups by and within a settler state is seen as an extension of colonialism, a means to mollify Indigenous people 
and thereby defuse more transformative projects (e.g. Coulthard 2014). In tendering recognition, some argue, 
the state necessarily communicates the subordinate status of Indigenous peoples. But that is not what is meant 
by ‘recognition’ in ‘recognition respect’. 
 
82 The next section will elaborate on how states can have attitudes. 
 
  167 
 
 
 
interpersonal apology, they seek to affirm a moral equivalence. The shared moral precept that 
persons are equal in moral status implies a normative expectation of reciprocal recognition 
respect for this feature of persons. This means that an inescapable aspect of the practice of 
interpersonal apology is respect-seeking on the part of the apologizer.83 In affirming 
recognition respect for recipients, apologizers simultaneously (implicitly or effectively) ask 
recipients to reciprocate. A state’s apology is analogous.  
  As an apologizer with standing, one of the things the state seeks in delivering apology 
is recognition respect from Indigenous people. But it is recognition respect of a distinctive 
character. Here is where the conceptual flexibility of recognition respect is of value for 
understanding what is going on in these instances. While the recognition respect we can owe 
to a state differs from that we owe to beings with equal moral status, it is still recognition 
respect insofar as it consists in respect for some feature or features of the object (the state) 
which suggest constraints and normative expectations related to what sorts of things people 
can or should do to (or within) it. More specifically, a secondary motive of apology tendered 
by a state is that it is seeking a sort of recognition wherein its rights, jurisdiction and 
sovereignty are respected. This is analogous to the constraints and expectations on 
individuals defined by the recognition respect owed to all persons.  
  Before I expand on this, it must be stressed that I am not suggesting that Indigenous 
people need to reconcile themselves to the colonial status quo. Nor am I suggesting that 
Indigenous people need to have “appraisal respect” for the state, wherein they respect it in 
virtue of some quality that they admire in it (Darwall 1977, 38-39). Instead, my contention is 
simply that official apology is an instance of the state seeking a recognition of its 
jurisdictions, powers, rights, and so on. We can give recognition respect to an institution, a 
law or a state just as we can give it to a person; it is just the relevant facts that are different. 
“Strictly speaking, the object of recognition respect is a fact. And recognition respect for that 
fact consists in giving it the proper weight in deliberation” (Darwall 1977, 39). Recognition 
 
83 This view is inspired by Tavuchis (1991) who argue that apologizers, through apology, seek readmission into 
a moral community, their membership in which was called into question by their wrongdoing (18). Lazare 
(2004) holds much the same view. 
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respect in this area, then, would consist in individuals paying due attention to the fact that the 
settler state has rights, powers and jurisdiction in defined areas when deliberating on actions.  
  As Muldoon and Schaap (2012) argue in the context of Australia’s 2008 apology for 
the Stolen Generations, in making its apology the state was seeking a recognition of its own 
sovereignty. Such recognition-seeking on the part of the state is often masked in this context 
because “a state’s claim to sovereignty is less often perceived as a demand for recognition 
than are the claims of subaltern groups” (185). Yet in presumptively assuming that 
Indigenous Australians were unalloyed members of the Australian nation, this recognition is 
part of what the apology was trying to achieve (194). That this presumption was 
objectionable does not negate that this was a secondary goal of the apology. While it may 
oftentimes be an unpalatable feature, official apologies in this context seek to enact a 
recognition respect defined by the parameters of state sovereignty.   
  This is partly why I mentioned earlier in this dissertation that official apologies have 
been damagingly premature (2.3.3; see Dorell 2009). In presupposing the legitimacy of the 
status quo, they undermine the process of reconciliation. It is also why above I intimated that 
this side of the equation is a politically tricky question. The rights, jurisdiction and powers of 
a state cannot be determined in this context pre-politically. This would be to defeat part of 
the purpose of the process of reconciliation. The ‘features’ (rights and powers) of the ‘object’ 
(the state) are subject to (re)negotiation during this process. Yet if official apology is a part of 
reconciliation, and if official apologies seek to enact a recognition respect on the part of 
Indigenous individuals, it follows that the shape and parameters of state sovereignty – 
whatever these end up being – must be acceptable to Indigenous people.  
  This is not really a surprising conclusion. Nor is such an outcome inconceivable. 
Indeed, it has happened before in settler states. For example, Britain’s 1763 Royal 
Proclamation and the 1764 Treaty of Niagara between the British Crown and 22 Indigenous 
nations sought to enact a form of reciprocal recognition respect which recognized the rights 
and sovereignties of separate legal orders (Royal Commission 1996a, 107-108; Borrows 
2017, 22; see Coyle 2017). That such an arrangement seems in some places to be a long way 
off now does not mean that something like it is unnecessary for genuine reconciliation 
considered as an outcome. For consider that if Indigenous people rejected the legitimacy of 
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settler states’ sovereign powers – or indeed their very right to exist – it would be strange to 
suggest that these parties have reconciled. This of course does not entail that Indigenous 
people need to be a part of these states. Nor does it imply that they cannot be a part. But 
recognition respect requires that whatever the political structures of these states are, whatever 
territory and territorially defined powers they have – these must be broadly acceptable to 
Indigenous individuals in the same way that I find the rights, powers and jurisdiction of 
Sweden, Germany or Japan to be broadly acceptable to me.84  
  As we have seen, in addition to recognition respect another attitudinal requirement for 
reconciliation suggested by the use of official apology is reciprocal trust. This means that – in 
a reconciled world – Indigenous individuals trust the state, and the state trusts Indigenous 
individuals. However, regarding the latter desideratum, the power differential between a state 
and a solitary individual makes it unfruitful to delve too deeply into how, or how far, a state 
can trust a person. For the asymmetry in the vulnerabilities involved here means a state’s 
trust is almost risk-free, and hence we are stretching the notion of trust. Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to say that if the settler state can appreciate that Indigenous individuals have 
recognition respect for its rights, powers and jurisdictions, it follows that it can be reasonably 
optimistic about both these individuals’ competence in respecting them, and that their 
goodwill, whatever its character, will be sufficient to motivate them to do so. To that extent, 
the state can trust individuals. 
   As chapter 2 made clear, however, the real focus should be on how official apology 
is meant to inspire trust in the state on the part of Indigenous people (2.3.4). If we take an 
evidentialist perspective on justifications for trust and distrust, it seems that Indigenous 
people can reliably conclude that they are warranted in distrusting the state, or that trust 
would be misplaced. This is because of the state’s long record of injustice, broken promises 
and mistreatment of Indigenous people. Once again, and in parallel with the argument above 
(4.1.2), Jones’ (1996) account of trust is useful for understanding the remedy for this. 
Consider again that those things required for Jones’ account of trust answer to many of those 
 
84 This is an apt analogy to note, because often countries have an obligation to be more scrupulous towards non-
nationals than towards citizens. States cannot tax, conscript or expropriate anything from the non-nationals, 
while they can do these things to citizens (Goodin 1988). That is, recognition respect does not call for 
subordination.  
  170 
 
 
 
harms which made for a lack of it in the context of relations between Indigenous individuals 
and the settler state. Goodwill on the part of the state has rarely been on display. Indigenous 
individuals had a right to expect that the state would refrain from harming them. Instead, as 
with Canada’s residential school system, it did the opposite. Indigenous people had a right to 
expect that the state would prove competent when it came to dealing fairly and treating them 
as full members of the moral community. Instead, it willfully failed to develop competence in 
this area, as evidenced by statistics on incarceration, health, education violence or 
socioeconomic indicators canvassed in this dissertation (1.3). Instead of being favorably 
moved by the thought that Indigenous people trusted in the intentions of the state, as after the 
Treaty of Niagara, the state took advantage of this trust to further entrench colonial 
dominance. Combined, these injustices and failures produced distrust towards the settler 
state. Identifying the effects of these relevant harms suggests their antidote: the trust 
suggested by Jones, where Indigenous individuals are optimistic about the goodwill and 
competence of the state in a negotiated domain of interaction.  
 Goodwill is the linchpin for trust in this context, but again we face some limits to 
what we can say about it. The character or content of ‘goodwill,’ as we saw, is responsive to 
the type of relationship at issue – the domain of interaction. As noted, Jones (1996) uses an 
example of trust in strangers to illustrate this: our expectation is that the goodwill of 
strangers, whatever its motive or character, extends at least over their not harming us (7). 
This reflects the ternary relation of trust that often obtains in a given domain: “A trusts B to 
do [or not do] X” (Hardin 1993, 506). Here X stands in for the normative requirements of 
trusting relationships. But what is X in this context? In the case of an Indigenous individual 
trusting in the state, optimism about the goodwill of the state need extend only so far as is 
required for the specified domain of interaction. That is, optimism about goodwill is justified 
if the goodwill appropriate for the domain of interaction is evident. Yet, frustratingly for 
those who seek a detailed picture of reconciliation as an outcome, it is the character and 
scope of this domain of interaction that is precisely what is at issue. It is – or should be – 
subject to (re)negotiation. So, a priori, very little can be said about the goodwill that the state 
must have towards Indigenous individuals without first determining the political architecture 
of postcolonial settler states.  
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  However, and again in parallel with the discussion above (4.1.2) we do know that 
recognition respect for Indigenous people is a fundamental requirement of reconciliation 
between Indigenous individuals and the state. As such, the minimal goodwill required of the 
state must extend to cover those things owed to people in virtue of the respect that attends 
their moral status. That is, the minimal content of this goodwill is recognition respect, and 
with recognition respect comes a variety of normative expectations governing interactions 
with moral agents. When the recognition respect associated with goodwill has been 
demonstrated over time, this will encourage optimism about not just the goodwill, but also 
(in light of a solid record) the competence of the settler state. Furthermore, appreciation that 
states acknowledge the moral value of individuals will ground the confident expectation that 
it will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that Indigenous individuals are 
counting on it to fulfill these normative expectations, even if for no other reason than that 
they are persons. These components comprise the trust required for reconciliation, and it will 
take a lot of evidence to warrant it.   
  As necessary conditions, the elements to reconciliation in this domain might seem 
rather paltry. However, their slightness is what makes them appropriate as a priori conditions 
for reconciled relationships. Suppose some Indigenous groups do not seek self-determination, 
and instead their composite members seek full and undifferentiated citizenship in the settler 
state. Our minimal conditions would stand, albeit with further requirements of goodwill 
suitable for such a relationship. Suppose other Indigenous groups seek full withdrawal and 
independence from the state. These requirements would still stand, as they do for Japan and 
me when I visit Tokyo. This conception not only meets the desideratum that the concept of 
reconciliation not presuppose the political outcome of reconciliation, it also allows for 
maximum flexibility in that outcome. What’s more, trust sufficient for a specified domain of 
interaction, combined with recognition respect premised on the moral equivalence of people, 
means that it is amenable to a variety of worldviews.   
4.2.3 Reconciliation between the settler state and Indigenous groups, 
peoples or nations 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 discussed several of the injustices attendant on settler-colonialism in 
some detail. As Moore (2019) argues, there is no single thing that is wrong with colonialism. 
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To get a fuller picture of the harms involved, it was necessary to consider several of those 
that fall under the umbrella ‘settler-colonialism’: discrete historical injustice such as 
dispossession, cultural genocide and broken treaties; enduring injustice such as the failure to 
make amends for historical injustice, and those structural injustices which resulted from 
historical ones; and a persisting colonial mindset that legitimized and facilitated the latter 
injustices in the first place.  
  An illuminating thing to note about the first form of injustice – the historical – derives 
from the state-as-agent thesis defended in chapter 1. Namely, historical injustices were 
always perpetrated intentionally by the settler state against Indigenous groups, peoples or 
nations. Even if one wishes to re-describe these injustices as harms to groups’ individual 
members, it was nonetheless their status as members of a specific nation, or the 
undifferentiated category ‘Indian,’ that led to their persecution. The state undertook 
deliberate policies to marginalize, assimilate or eradicate Indigenous peoples as peoples. It is 
telling that the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015a) 
begins, on page one, by noting that the activities of the settler state in this era merit the label 
‘cultural genocide,’ which encompasses “the destruction of those structures and practices that 
allow the group to continue as a group” (emphasis added). The perpetration of genocide is 
ipso facto a group or group-based harm. In settler states, spiritual practices and the wearing 
of Indigenous regalia were banned, families disrupted, populations forcibly moved, 
languages outlawed (ibid.). The residential school system in Canada, or the Stolen 
Generations of Australia, are a case in point. Children were abducted from their families 
because they were members of Indigenous communities that the state wished to eliminate 
(see Holder 2014). Because the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into mainstream society 
was considered an essential part of the civilizing mission of settler states, the focus was on 
eliminating groups, peoples or nations.    
  Likewise, injustice of the second variety – the enduring – affects Indigenous people in 
virtue of their status as members of Indigenous groups, peoples or nations. As quoted in 
1.2.3, structural injustice obtains 
  when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of 
 domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the 
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 same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of 
 opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities. (Young 2006, 114, 
 emphasis added). 
The proper translation of Young’s passage for this context would see “categories of persons” 
read as “Indigenous groups, peoples or nations.” That structural injustices manifest in harms 
to individuals composing a category of persons does not negate the fact that systemic 
iniquities affect them in virtue of their membership in that category. That is, structural 
injustice can meaningfully be said to affect groups. 
  Similarly, the enduring injustice of the settler state’s failure to make reparations for 
historical injustice – a distinct injustice affecting groups in material, psychological and 
symbolic ways – is primarily an injustice which targets groups, peoples or nations. As we 
saw in chapter 1, Indigenous peoples, because of their enduring identity as identifiable 
collectives – organized or not – deserve redress for historical injustices perpetrated against 
them (1.2). This is the case whether reparations translate into ‘individual’ forms or collective, 
‘rehabilitative’ ones (Brooks 2003, 108). In the case of historical injustice, the justification 
for each form appeals to collective identity. Admittedly, certain injustices addressed through 
the courts have resulted in reparations to individuals who have suffered by them, as in the 
cases of the Indian Residential School system in Canada or the Stolen Generations in 
Australia. But, quite apart from Western legal systems tending towards individual solutions 
anyway, the focus of these schemes has been on direct victims because many of these 
individuals are still alive. It is not because such reparations absolve the state of all reparative 
obligations. That is, tendering individual reparations does not exhaust the moral 
responsibilities of the state. A strong moral – and indeed legal – case can be made for 
collective reparations for these state-directed injustices because of the cultural harms 
resulting from them, harms which cannot be reduced to the individual level of analysis 
(Anker 2016, 20-22; Chrisjohn and Wasacase 2011, 203; see Vrdoljak 2008). 
  This brief return to the discussion of historical and enduring injustices highlights the 
collective dimensions of settler-colonialism. Unsurprisingly, it suggests that one relationship 
in need of concerted attention is that between Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and the 
settler state, both categories considered as distinct from their members. The settler-state, in 
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targeting Indigenous peoples because of their status as Indigenous peoples, sowed the seeds 
of protracted conflict between the parties. The hope of relationships premised on mutual 
respect and trust was repeatedly undermined by these injustices, the perpetration of which 
demonstrates that the state has not been capable of healthy political interaction. 
Reconciliation, if it is to mean anything at all, demands the creation of healthy relationships 
at this level.85  
  Even if reconciliation were to occur between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
individuals, and between Indigenous individuals and the state, we still could not say that 
Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and the settler state have reconciled. Although 
individuals’ attitudes matter for macro-level relationships between collectivities (see 4.2.2), 
to suggest that Indigenous individuals’ reconciliation with the state entails that Indigenous 
groups, people or nations have reconciled with the state is to commit the fallacy of 
composition (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b, 191). That said, the ‘micro’ reconciliations we 
have already canvassed have much in common with the ‘macro’ reconciliation I discuss here. 
As with all other levels, the use of collective apology and its attendant sincerity-bolstering 
mechanisms implies that recognition respect and trust are mutually endorsed goals of 
reconciliation between Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and settler states. As such, they 
describe cross-cultural values that should feature in an understanding of ‘right’ relations 
between them. Additionally, the importance of historical correctives in apology suggests 
each party agrees that there need to be upper and lower bounds to what constitutes a 
reasonable interpretive view of history. However, since the focus now moves to the 
collective level, how we should understand these components differs from their formulation 
at other levels in significant ways. While we can draw on the conclusions of the previous 
subsections for our analysis, there are notable differences. In the first place, the constitutive 
attitudes of trust and recognition respect will require substantive and permanent reforms to 
organizing features of collectives for them to be applicable at all. In the second, reciprocal 
 
85 For reasons of clarity, note that the reconciliation required at this level is not to be simplistically understood 
as obtaining between the state and some undifferentiated mass ‘Indigenous peoples,’ but rather between the 
settler state and each Indigenous group, people or nation that has suffered at its hands. This adds a rarely 
emphasized layer of complexity to reconciliation. Failing to account for this complexity can contribute to the 
mistaken impression that reconciliation is a matter of repairing a relationship between the state and an imagined 
generic group of people denotated by the umbrella term ‘Indigenous.’ 
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recognition respect at this level concerns not just one, but two features of the respective 
parties. 
  The first obstacle to understanding reconciliation between collectivities as the 
establishment of trust and recognition respect is that we need to explain how collectivities 
can be said to have attitudes. Govier and Verwoerd (2002b) note that scholars do this in one 
of two ways. The first is through a distributive understanding, wherein “groups have these 
attitudes only to the extent that some, most, or all of their members have them” (189).86 
Above (4.2.2) I argued that distributive considerations are important to keep in mind when 
assessing the political efficacy or usefulness of reconciliation processes or outcomes 
considered at the macro-level. For not only is the meaning and significance of an official 
apology dependent on a certain level of ‘distribution’ of shared sentiment in settlers, but also 
– in practice if not in theory – a certain distribution of trusting and respectful attitudes among 
members of collectivities is necessary for any substantive and politically tenable 
reconciliation between collectivities. Yet, since we cannot infer macro-level reconciliation 
from the achievement of micro reconciliations, more than individual attitudes and 
dispositions are required to establish reconciliation between collectivities, and so this account 
will not do. 
   The second way of explaining how collectivities can have attitudes, the ‘collectivist’ 
or ‘nondistributive’ approach, draws on the theory discussed in chapter 1 of this dissertation 
(1.2). It appeals to the idea that, in virtue of policies, procedures, and structured pathways of 
decision-making, collectives can constitute agents distinct from their individual members 
(Govier and Vewoerd 2002b, 189). As such, they can meaningfully be said to take actions 
and form intentions.87 The case is similar with respect to attitudes. To take just one way of 
defending this idea, if a collective acts in such a way that an attitude is the most plausible 
explanation for the action, then that attitude can be posited for explanatory reasons, even if 
there is no ‘group mind’ behind it (ibid.). As an example, we can cash this out by saying that 
the propositional attitude of optimism with respect to the goodwill and competence of 
collectivity B expressed by the statement ‘collectivity A trusts collectivity B’ can be inferred 
 
86 See Van Den Beld 2002 for an example of the distributive approach.  
 
87 See also Kukathas 2003, 181; Pettit 2007, 187; Isaacs 2011, 27; French 1979. 
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from the actions of A. Since we need an account of collective attitudes that respects the 
ontology of collectivities, this is the approach we should take. 
  Parties to collective apology, like parties to interpersonal apology, tacitly 
acknowledge the moral value of reciprocal recognition respect. But what is recognition 
respect at this level? As we have seen, one form of recognition respect that can be owed to a 
state or collectivity concerns their defined rights, jurisdictions, powers, and the like. This 
conclusion is in line with the discussion above (4.2.2), where I argued that the recognition 
respect we can owe to a state consists in paying due attention to these features when 
deliberating on actions. Analogously, when collectivities have recognition respect for one 
another, this can be inferred by observing how each pays attention to the rights and powers of 
the other. Since official apology in this context is meant to repudiate a logic of colonialism 
wherein Indigenous groups, peoples or nations were thought to have only very limited rights, 
powers and jurisdictions, acknowledging their newly recognized rights, powers and 
jurisdictions is part of what a good comprehensive official apology should aim to do. 
  Importantly for our investigation into the content of recognition respect at this level, 
the rights, jurisdictions and powers of collectivities frame their domain of interaction. For 
instance, the domain of interaction between Japan and Sweden – formally equal sovereign 
powers – is different than that between Ontario and Canada’s federal government, where the 
former’s powers are limited to those not devolved from the latter. That is, the structure of the 
relationship bears on the normative (and legal) expectations associated with recognition 
respect. Yet because the domains of interaction between Indigenous groups, peoples or 
nations and the settler state have in many cases yet to be defined through (re)negotiation, we 
cannot say much about the shape of the features that are due recognition respect in these 
relationships. We can however say, given the argument above, that the attitude of recognition 
respect can be inferred by attending to the actions (or inaction) of the respective parties to 
reconciliation. If each collectivity respects the defined jurisdictions, powers and rights of the 
other, then recognition respect of this kind is reciprocal.    
  Perhaps more than at any other level, trust and recognition respect are here 
inextricably intertwined. This is because, considering history, trust will not be rational 
without assuring recognition respect. Allowing that organized collectivities can have 
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attitudes – at least insofar as they can display them through action (or inaction) – the nature 
of their organization becomes significant. As independent agents, organized collectives are 
governed by rules, established procedures, policies, constitutional documents and so on. 
These rules constrain or suggest the actions that collectivities can or should take just as they 
constrain or suggest the actions that individual members can or should take. The importance 
of this facet of organized collectives is apparent when we remember that trust involves a 
grounded optimism about not just the goodwill, but also the competence of the trusted party. 
A collectivity cannot ground this optimism with the simple announcement that it has 
competence with respect to a negotiated domain of interaction. Instead, such optimism will 
only be grounded if collectivities take steps to enshrine the governing norms of interaction of 
the domain in those policies, rules and procedures that constrain and suggest the courses of 
action available to it in its dealings with other (trusting) collectivities. That is, the normative 
demands of recognition respect at this level of reconciliation must be enshrined in the 
organizational structure of collectivities for trust to be warranted. For obvious reasons, the 
bulk of the work here falls on the state. 
  These last points need some defense. Consider that settler states have amply 
demonstrated that they are not competent when it comes to dealing justly with Indigenous 
groups, peoples or nations. They have also shown that they often only belatedly realize – or 
acknowledge – that what they have done was morally wrong (Muldoon 2009). Given their 
incompetence in this area, it follows from Jones’ (1996) account of trust that many 
Indigenous groups cannot reasonably trust in the state. This is part of why the last chapter 
argued that a certain loss of state sovereignty is required for genuine comprehensive apology 
(3.5.1). By constraining the state’s remit through structural, institutional and/or constitutional 
reform, gross abuses of power will no longer be possible. To prove itself competent, that is, 
the state needs to make binding changes (Reilly 2009a, 99).88 The upshot of this is that 
reconciliation between Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and the settler state will not be 
possible without transformative institutional, structural, and perhaps constitutional reform.  
  We cannot specify the nature of these reforms in precise detail for reasons already 
discussed, but, as we saw in chapter 3 (3.5.1), the underlying logic of comprehensive official 
 
88 See Muldoon 2009 for an argument on why these changes should be embedded in constitutional documents.  
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apology for historical and enduring injustice speaks to their scope. As Smith (2008) notes, 
“[a] declaration promising to reform behavior and redress injuries obviously differs from one 
that actually honors such promises” (233). A good apology will signal that that the state will 
undertake these reforms, and as such reconciliation minimally requires that they be achieved. 
We can think of these reforms as enshrining the norms, structure, rules and procedures that 
will govern a negotiated domain of interaction. What this domain of interaction will look 
like, of course, we cannot say. Yet as many scholars working in this area have noted, if we 
hope to eliminate patterns of unjust interaction and the legacies of colonialism, then 
reconciliation at this level requires broad-based and programmatic reform. This may involve 
such things as significant restitution of lands (Alfred 2011; Corntassel and Holder 2008; 
Thompson 1990), cultural revitalization and affirmation (Alfred 1999;2005; Coulthard 2014; 
Henderson and Wakeham 2009), structural and institutional changes (Muldoon 2009; Lu 
2011), and constitutional reform or reinterpretation (Cairns 2003; 2005; Borrows 2017; 
Henderson Youngblood 1994; 2002; Papillon 2019). The broad and transformative reach of 
reform is suggested by the comprehensive rejection of the logic of colonialism implicit in 
meaningful official apology in this context. As Dominello (2017) argues, “[a]n offer of an 
official apology would signify that the old way of doing things has failed, providing 
justifications for changes in the content and direction of state policies and laws in line with 
Indigenous peoples’ demands for justice” (285).  
   So much for competence. What about the reciprocal goodwill required for trusting 
relationships between collectives? Here again we find that trust and recognition respect 
intertwine. To be ‘directly and favorably moved’ by the thought that either party is counting 
on the other, goodwill is required. Previously I understood goodwill towards individuals as 
minimally encompassing recognition respect, where the moral status of persons constitutes 
both a moral and motivating reason for being directly and favorably moved by the thought 
that they are counting on us (4.1.2). In that domain, goodwill must extend at least as far as 
respecting the norms of decency in dealings with moral beings. Goodwill for other 
individuals entails that one considers their interests, even if for no other reason than that they 
are persons. Yet, although they approximate moral agents in that they can act, form 
intentions and be held responsible for their actions, collectives are not moral beings in the 
same sense as individuals. If the recognition respect associated with goodwill towards 
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individuals stems from the moral value of persons, the respect associated with the goodwill 
of collectives for other collectives must be different. Of course, one reason for a collective to 
have a kind of recognition respect associated with goodwill is prudential. Collectivity A will 
respect the defined rights and powers of collectivity B because A ‘knows’ that B will likely 
not do so for A if A does not. The importance of recognition respect here speaks to the 
motive for trusting (if indeed this even is trust). However, the fact that goodwill in the 
interpersonal context is additionally (and non-instrumentally) motivated by a recognition of 
the moral status of persons hints that the practice of collective-to-collective apology may 
hinge analogously on a recognition of the moral status of collectives. 
  To say that something has moral status is to say that the interests of that thing matter 
morally for their own sake, or that that thing is an end in itself (Agnieszka and Tannenbaum 
2018). Can a collective have interests that matter morally for their own sake? When we ask 
why it is that a person has moral status the response will usually refer to some irreducible, 
intrinsically valuable feature of humans, such as autonomy or the dignity that attends 
personhood, wherein a person is thought to have moral status simply because they are a 
person. The question of moral status is thus a question about the grounds of moral status. 
When we ask about moral status, that is, we are asking if something is valuable in its own 
right, notwithstanding its being valued by any person, and if it is, whether that is enough to 
ground moral status of any kind. Unlike persons, collectives do not appear to have intrinsic 
dignity in any straightforward way, and the ontology of collectives means that their 
functional autonomy may not be of the same character as a person’s. That is, the line of 
questioning over the moral status of collectives may not end by citing some irreducible 
feature of collectives. There are other disanalogies to consider as well. For example, whereas 
a morally repugnant human being is nonetheless still thought to have full moral status in 
virtue of their personhood, collectives are generally required to have some “minimal 
threshold of value” before we can say they have any value at all (Renzo 2012, 112). If they 
have no value, then they cannot have moral status. This threshold of value is usually 
measured against some vision of universal values external to the parochial values of the 
collective (e.g. Horton 2007, 880-883). The Nazi party, in failing to meet this minimum 
threshold, was not a collective with moral status. 
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  In our context the question of what might give a collective moral status approximates 
the question of what might give a culture moral status, for the respective parties to 
reconciliation embody cultures to greater or lesser degrees.89 If we allow that collectives of 
the type we are discussing – states, nations, peoples – embody distinct cultures, the question 
of the moral status of collectives is much the same as that of the moral status of culture. 
Some argue that cultures are valuable because of what they are able to secure for the 
individuals who share in them (Thompson 1990, 318-320; Kymlicka 1995). Others might 
argue that cultures (also) have value in and of themselves, at least inasmuch as they can be 
considered irreducibly social goods (Taylor 1995). Suppose we were to ask someone why 
they think their culture is worth preserving. She might respond with the liberal line that ‘my 
culture is worth preserving because it offers me and others like me a route to the things we 
think valuable in their own right, such as a sense of identity, meaningful relationships and an 
orientation towards the world that frames our experience in such a way that we can lead a 
fulfilling lives.’ Or she might respond with something harder to unpack but no less powerful, 
such as ‘my culture is worth preserving because this common way of life is a good thing in 
and of itself.’ These are instrumental and non-instrumental reasons, respectively: it is good 
for me and others like me, or it is good simpliciter. In the first instance, the culture is seen as 
a means to intrinsically valuable goods. If it is seen as a mere means, it cannot be valuable in 
its own right, and so cannot have moral status. In the second instance, our interlocutor’s 
culture is seen as valuable in its own right, and so could arguably have independent moral 
status. However, we seek an understanding of reconciliation that is amenable to a variety of 
worldviews. The mere fact of disagreement on the source of the value of culture suggests that 
we should hedge our bets and err on the side of caution by allowing that cultures may not 
have any value in their own right. Therefore, they may not have moral status in any way 
analogous to that of persons. 
  So, we have to allow that cultures may not have moral status due recognition respect. 
Notice, however, that with both approaches to understanding the value of a culture our 
interlocutor responds using ineliminably moral terminology. She values her culture, valuing 
 
89 Although liberal democratic states often comprise a multiplicity of cultures, they nonetheless have a political 
culture that is generally thought valuable. 
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what it values; she thinks it good, either intrinsically or derivatively. That is, she offers moral 
reasons – reasons that cite normative claims – for preserving her culture. The bar for holding 
that a particular culture has no intrinsic or derivative value is higher than the bar for saying 
that a self-evidently repugnant political association like the Nazi party has no value. 
Measured against universal morality, there is no sense in which the Nazi party met a 
minimum threshold of value. From a necessarily blinkered vantage point, though, it is much 
harder to argue that a culture has no value at all when we remember that there are many 
people – namely, those like our interlocutor who are a part of the culture – who probably 
value it quite a bit. To show that a culture has no value, we would have to show why these 
people are mistaken in their assessment by demonstrating why their culture cannot meet a 
minimum threshold of value. That is, it would take compelling evidence to suggest that a 
culture has no value.   
  The value people place on their culture may not be always be independent moral 
value, but it is value nonetheless because the culture is valued. Because of the importance of 
culture for both individual and group identity, Taylor (1994) argues that we should presume 
the moral equality of all cultures (66). This position, though defeasible in the face of 
compelling evidence to the contrary (think of the political culture of the Nazi party), seems 
the most morally appropriate one to have when we consider that those embedded in other 
cultures will often find their culture just as valuable to them as ours is to us. As socially 
embedded beings, it is right to take Taylor’s presumption of moral equality seriously in the 
interest of epistemic humility. Of course, cultures can involve morally repugnant practices 
just as individuals can have morally repugnant features. The latent colonial mindset which 
characterizes the political culture of settler states is an example of such a morally repugnant 
feature. But just as a morally repugnant person does not surrender their moral status as a 
person through their repugnance, so too might cultures retain moral value despite some of its 
practices clashing with universal morality. Cultures are dynamic and changing, and a moral 
failure on their peripheries does not entail that the whole thing is irredeemable and without 
value. People value their cultures, and a culture’s significance for the lives of individuals and 
communities should be recognized. While moral value is not a function of what people think, 
still epistemic humility (and recognition respect for persons) demands we pay attention to the 
normative claims people tend to make about the value of their culture. We can disagree on 
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how or whether a particular culture has independent moral value while still agreeing these 
cultures can have moral value in some way or other. The important takeaway here, then, is 
that we can understand the value of collectives in our context to be (at least partly) of a moral 
nature. Whether we agree that the cultures and collectives in question are instrumentally 
valuable, or intrinsically valuable, or both, one corollary remains the same: the collectives in 
our context have moral value insofar as their value cannot be described without citing 
normative claims which feature ineliminably moral terminology. People value culture, and 
that matters. It is in the recognition of the moral value of the collectives party to 
reconciliation that we can find a properly moral motivation for the goodwill between 
collectives. 
  As with respect for individuals, this non-instrumental reason for goodwill stems from 
the acknowledged moral value of each collective party to reconciliation, whatever its exact 
source or character. By hedging our bets, we can hold that either the moral status of a 
collective is owed recognition respect in its own right, or we can hold that the members of a 
collective value that collective is a fact owed recognition respect. This is a form of 
recognition respect that is additional to that owed to the rules and norms of a negotiated 
domain of interaction, and indeed functions as a motivating reason for respecting these. At 
this level, the ‘feature’ (moral value) of the ‘object’ (a collective) demands its own 
recognition respect. Minimally, that a collective is valued is something collectives need to 
take into account when deliberating on actions, for this is a requirement that falls out of 
recognition respect for persons (see 4.1). The use of apology – a moral instrument – suggests 
that more is going on than a pro forma instance of acknowledgement or recognition. 
Apologies to collectives, like reparations, are demonstrations of respect for the moral value 
of groups, peoples or nations. In apologizing to groups, we acknowledge their value. By 
publicly acknowledging the wrongs of the past and present, and by tendering reparations, the 
settler state seeks to demonstrate a form of respect that will govern norms of interaction 
going forward. When a reciprocal form of this respect is achieved, it suggests a goodwill that 
will encourage the parties to reconciliation to respond directly and favorably to the 
knowledge that each is counting on the other, for each recognizes the moral value of the 
other.  
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  Tully (2008a) argues that respect of this kind requires a public attitude of mutual 
respect for the cultures embodied by the collectives party to reconciliation. Mutual “cultural 
respect” of this kind “creates the positive and mutually supportive climate that enables 
relations among cultures to be harmonious, rather than the acrimonious and strife-ridden 
relations of the colonial culture of disrespect” (244). In our context, this describes a 
relationship of trust premised on a respect derived from the recognition of the moral value of 
the collectives party to reconciliation, a relationship which contrasts sharply with that which 
has characterized the relations between settler states and Indigenous groups, peoples or 
nations for centuries. 
4.3 Reconciliation as positive coexistence 
This chapter offered necessary conditions of reconciliation conceived as an outcome, but the 
focus was narrow. The aim was to explore only what the use of official apology says about 
the normative expectations associated with reconciled relationships. As such, there are many 
questions the chapter – and the dissertation more broadly – could not answer. How long will 
reconciliation take? What exactly will the political architecture of settler states look like in 
20, 50 or 100 years? What else is involved in reconciliation, both as a process and an 
outcome? However, provided we keep in mind that these conditions are not sufficient, the 
conclusions offer a frame of reference that can help us (or, more likely, our descendants) 
identify when reconciliation has been achieved. It is important to remember, though, that the 
attitudes and normative expectations described in this chapter are not to be demanded of any 
Indigenous person or group that is unwilling or unprepared to embrace them, or that does not 
think they are warranted, or that thinks they are all so much pie-in-the-sky rhetoric. Strictly 
speaking, the words ‘require’ and ‘demand,’ used so freely in this chapter, apply to the 
outcome of reconciliation itself. That is, reconciliation demands this; reconciliation demands 
that. We cannot take this conception of the governing norms of reconciliation and burden 
Indigenous people(s) with cultivating their attendant attitudes. This chapter says only this: 
when these attitudes are in evidence, we are closer to reconciliation. 
  The outcome of reconciliation in this context has a multivalent character operating on 
at least three distinguishable levels. As we saw, a precondition for reconciliation of any kind 
is a change in the attitudes of settlers. We will know the colonial mindset is erased when 
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settlers have a balanced view of their country’s history, have rejected myths of settler 
benevolence, and when attitudes of paternalism, cultural chauvinism or racism are no longer 
on display in even latent form. Eradicating the colonial mindset contributes to reconciliation 
between Indigenous people and settlers considered as individuals. One necessary feature of 
such a reconciliation is that parties have reasonably consonant views of history, views which 
bound the realm of acceptable discourse. Indeed, agreement on the characterization of 
historical settler-Indigenous relations seems to be a precondition for reconciliation at any 
other level. Reconciliation at this level further requires that individuals of each category 
acknowledge the moral value of one another, that trust appropriate to a negotiated domain of 
interaction is apparent, and that the goodwill associated with trusting relationships involves a 
recognition of what is due to others in virtue of moral equality. Goodwill towards 
individuals, this time on the part of the state, is likewise required for reconciliation between 
Indigenous individuals and the settler state. At this level, reconciliation is not achieved until 
trust appropriate to a negotiated domain of interaction is established. Yet this trust is not 
possible until the domain of interaction is acceptable to Indigenous individuals, where 
Indigenous individuals have recognition respect for the negotiated spheres of the state’s 
jurisdiction. Recognition respect of this latter kind is similarly necessary for reconciliation 
between Indigenous groups, peoples or nations and the settler state, and requiring that each 
party be satisfied with the parameters of a negotiated domain of interaction, and that the 
normative expectations of this domain are enshrined in governing policies and procedures of 
states to ensure competence. Finally, another kind of reciprocal respect is required are this 
level, one which is premised on the acknowledged moral value of the respective collectives. 
Such respect informs the goodwill that each party must have for the other in the context of 
trusting relationships.  
  In short, if apology is a necessary component of the process of reconciliation, then 
reconciliation as the outcome of ‘positive coexistence’ minimally requires mutually 
acceptable interpretations of history, reciprocal recognition respect and trust. 
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